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ABSTRACT
DYNAMICS OF DISINTEGRATION:
THE LATER HAN EMPIRE (25-220CE) & ITS NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER

Wai Kit Wicky Tse
Paul R. Goldin

As a frontier region of the Qin-Han (221BCE-220CE) empire, the northwest was a new
territory to the Chinese realm. Until the Later Han (25-220CE) times, some portions of
the northwestern region had only been part of imperial soil for one hundred years. Its
coalescence into the Chinese empire was a product of long-term expansion and conquest,
which arguably defined the region’s military nature. Furthermore, in the harsh natural
environment of the region, only tough people could survive, and unsurprisingly, the
region fostered vigorous warriors. Mixed culture and multi-ethnicity featured
prominently in this highly militarized frontier society, which contrasted sharply with the
imperial center that promoted unified cultural values and stood in the way of a greater
degree of transregional integration. As this project shows, it was the northwesterners who
went through a process of political peripheralization during the Later Han times played a
harbinger role of the disintegration of the empire and eventually led to the breakdown of
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the early imperial system in Chinese history.
In this study, the author adopts a regional perspective by focusing on the role of the
northwestern frontier region vis-à-vis the imperial center to explain the collapse of the
Later Han empire. The author emphasizes the role that regional conflicts played in the
decline and fall of the dynasty, and paid particular attention to the incompatibility
between the militarized culture of the northwest and the civil values promoted by the
imperial center, which was dominated by the eastern-based scholar-officials. Through this
analysis, the author provides a case study of the relationship between the imperial center
and the regions with different cultures and identities, and the variations of the conception
of such a relationship in the period of early imperial China.
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1
Introductory Orientations:
A Northwestern Frontier in Early Imperial China

In the spring of 190 CE, having taken de facto control of the imperial court and
replaced one boy emperor with another, Dong Zhuo 董卓 (d. 192CE), a warlord from
the northwestern region, was planning to raise a large army against his opponents, who
were mainly heads of regional governments in the eastern part of the empire. When Dong
put forward his plan at a court meeting, nobody but one courtier named Zheng Tai 鄭泰
(ca. 152-192CE) held a different opinion. Zheng, as a partisan of the eastern alliance,
tried to thwart the warlord’s plan of enlarging his military forces and persuaded him that
his enemies were not worth sending any troops over. To answer Dong’s query, Zheng
gave his reasons as follows,

Now, the provinces and commanderies to the east of the mountains have collaborated
and formed alliances. Their people have been mobilized. One cannot say that they are
not strong. However, since the reign of Emperor Guangwu [founding emperor of the
dynasty], there was no military alert in the Central Country, the populace has long been
enjoying peaceful lives and has forgotten war-fighting. As Confucius said, “To send the
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people to war without prior training is equal to throwing them away.” Even they are
numerous, they are unable to cause any harm… Your Excellency is a man from the
western province and has been the imperial general since a young age. You have
profound knowledge of military affairs and have engaged in battlefield frequently.
Your name bangs on the whole realm and everyone is awed by Your reputation. Yuan
Benchu [Yuan Shao 袁紹 (d. 202CE)] is a descendent of grand ministers and was
born and grew up at the imperial capital; Zhang Mengzhuo [Zhang Miao 張邈
(d.195CE)] is a gentleman from Dongping, who strictly follows the principles of
courtesy; Kong Gongxu [Kong Zhou 孔伷 (fl. 160s-190s CE)] is good at pure
conversation and abstruse talk that he is able to bring withered things to life and living
things to die by his impressive speech. None of them have the ability of commanding
armies. They are no match with Your Excellency in terms of wielding arms and facing
enemies in decisive moment… It is a commonplace that there is no well-trained and
brave soldier in the east of the mountain (Shandong)… Even if they have capable
people, however, their ranks are in disorder and without legitimate authority given by
the emperor. Each of them will rely on his own strength and end up in a stalemate, in
which everyone will just wait for the results of others’ actions and will not agree on
coordinating their pace of advance or retreat. [People of] The various commanderies to
the west of the pass have been accustomed to military affairs. Since they have long
been fighting with the Qiang, even women and girls can carry and use halberds, spears,
bows and arrows. How could the ignorant [eastern] people resist the strong and brave
soldiers [of the west]? The victory [of the west] is assured… The men of Bing and
Liang, as well as [alien people] the Xiongnu, the Tuge, the voluntary followers from
the Huangzhong area, and the eight stocks of the Western Qiang are the most vigorous
fighters all under Heaven and are feared by the people. They are all under the
command of Your Excellency and serve as [your] teeth and claws. It will be like
driving tigers and rhinoceros against dogs and sheep… Moreover, Your military
officers are as intimate as [your] heart and stomach; they have gotten along with You
for a long time and established mutual trust; their loyalty can be counted on and their
wisdom can be relied upon. By employing such a solid group against the loose alliance,
who oppose them will be swept away like dead leaves before a violent wind… 1
今山東合謀，州郡連結，人庶相動，非不強盛。然光武以來，中國無警，百姓優
1

Fan Ye 范曄, comp., Hou Hanshu 後漢書 (hereafter HHS), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), 70:
2258-59.
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逸，忘戰日久。仲尼有言：
『不教人戰，是謂弃之。』其眾雖多，不能為害…明公
出自西州，少為國將，閑習軍事，數踐戰場，名振當世，人懷懾服。袁本初公卿
子弟，生處京師。張孟卓東平長者，坐不闚堂。孔公緒清談高論，噓枯吹生。並
無軍旅之才，執銳之幹， 臨鋒決敵，非公之儔…山東之士，素乏精悍…就有其人，
而尊卑無序，王爵不加，若恃眾怙力，將各棊峙，以觀成敗，不肯同心共膽，與
齊進退…關西諸郡， 頗習兵事，自頃以來，數與羌戰，婦女猶戴戟操矛，挾弓負
矢，況其壯勇之士，以當妄戰之人乎！其勝可必…且天下彊勇，百姓所畏者，有
并、涼之人，及匈奴、屠各、湟中義從、西羌八種，而明公擁之，以為爪牙，譬
驅虎兕以赴犬羊…又明公將帥，皆中表腹心，周旋日久，恩信淳著，忠誠可任，
智謀可恃。以膠固之眾，當解合之埶，猶以烈風掃彼枯葉…

Zheng then concluded that, with these advantages, Dong Zhuo would easily vanquish
his rivals. Unnecessary levying of troops would only frighten the people and force those
who were afraid of being conscripted to rebel, which would undermine Dong’s prestige.
Dong was flattered and thus halted his plan. Shortly afterwards, facing the threat posed
by his eastern enemies, Dong transferred the imperial capital westwards from Luoyang
洛陽 to Chang’an 長安. He forced all residents of Luoyang to move, let his troops
looted and finally burnt down the city. 2 The fire not only destroyed the splendid imperial
capital but also marked the breakdown of the imperial rule. While the young emperor was
held in captivity by Dong, Dong’s rivals in the east forcefully turned the situation to their
advantage and dismembered the empire into various warlord domains, which unveiled a
chaotic period of incessant warfare in Chinese history. Therefore, although the last
2

The most detailed English-language survey on the Later Han capital is Hans Bielenstein, “Lo-yang in
Later Han Times,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities (hereafter BMFEA) 48 (1976): 1-147.

4

emperor of Later Han dynasty (also known as the Eastern Han dynasty, 25-220CE)
formally abdicated in 220CE, the dynasty actually ended with Dong Zhuo’s control over
the imperial court in 190CE.
Zheng Tai’s speech is of critical importance in analyzing the factors contributed to the
collapse of the Later Han dynasty. It provides a contemporaneous account of certain
people’s perception of what befell the empire. Although the speech primarily aimed to
flatter (and implicitly obstruct) Dong Zhuo, it should not be merely treated as hyperbole.
It must be telling the truth to some degree and was credible to Dong and his followers.
Zheng depicted a vivid picture that the empire was divided into two halves: East and
West. Dong Zhuo and his men were from the militarized west and represented a coalition
of fierce Han and non-Han fighters; on the other hand, people of the east generally feared
the westerners and were weak and slack in war preparation, the leaders of the eastern
alliance were cultured but military inferior to their western counterparts. There was an
obvious regional confrontation existed in the empire.
This is a study aims to describe and explain how and why such an East-West
confrontation came into existence in the Later Han period, and to examine the regional
confrontation as a dynamics in the process of empire collapse. It is my first step of
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understanding the Later Han world as an axial or transitional period between the
establishment of the first unified imperial system nominally began in 221BCE and the
failure of the system in the late second century which ensued a period of political division
for 400 years. Since it was the warlord Dong Zhuo and his men from the northwest who
dealt the final blow to the imperial authority by desecrating the throne and the imperial
capital, the questions of why the northwesterners but not other groups and what attitudes
toward the imperial center they held constitute the main subjects of the present
investigation. By adopting a longue durée approach, this study will not be confined to the
Later Han period but will be extended to the preceding centuries in order to trace the
cultural and social development of the northwestern frontier region, which greatly
differed from that of the imperial center.
I hope this study as a case will shed some light on the relationship between the
imperial center and the regions with different cultures and the variations of the
conceptions of such a relationship in Chinese history.
As an introduction, this chapter will be divided into three sections (though they are
uneven in length): The first gives my reasons of investigating the Later Han period,
provides an overview of the Later Han studies, and situates this project in modern
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scholarship; the second sketches the role of the northwestern frontier region in early
China and introduces the militarized nature of this frontier society; the third section
introduces the main sources used in this work and provides an outline of the chapters.

Studying the Later Han3
The original span of time in Chinese history I chose to study was the period from the
third through sixth century, which is commonly called “Early Medieval” 4 (also known as
“Six Dynasties”) in English-language literature or Wei-Jin-Nanbeichao 魏晉南北朝
(Wei, Jin and the Southern and Northern Dynasties) in Chinese historical tradition. It is a
period roughly corresponding to the last years of the Later Han dynasty, which unveiled a
long-term political disunion since the beginning of the first centralized empire in 221BCE,
and the early years of the Sui dynasty (589-618CE), which marked the re-establishment
of a unified and centralized Chinese empire. In the course of my studying of the early
medieval Chinese sources, I realized that I could not fully understand the origins and

3

Limited by the space, this section cannot provide detailed narrative of the Later Han political history, for
details, see Hans Bielenstein, “Wang Mang, the restoration of the Han dynasty, and Later Han,” in Denis
Twitchett and Michael Loewe eds., The Cambridge History of China vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires,
221 B.C.–A.D. 220. (hereafter CHOC v.1)(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 223-290;
Michael Loewe, “The Conduct of Government & the Issues at Stake A.D. 57-167,” in CHOC v.1, 291-316;
B. J. Mansvelt Beck, “The Fall of Han,” in CHOC v.1, 327-330.
4
The term “early medieval” is borrowed from European history and is now commonly accepted by
historians of Chinese history. For the nature of “medieval” in Chinese history, see Keith Knapp, “Did the
Middle Kingdom have a Middle Period? The Problem of ‘Medieval’ in China’s History,” Education about
Asia 12.3 (2007): 1-32.
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trajectory of the period of disunion without reference to the history of the Later Han. My
central concern of exploring the dynamics underpinning the drastic changes in early
medieval China led me to start on a new front, examining the process of decline and fall
of the Later Han, and investigating the factors contributed to the process. Thus began
what started as the present study.
Emperor Guangwu 光武 (r. 25-57CE), founder of the Later Han dynasty, and his
supporters proudly proclaimed that their empire was Han and that it was the continuation
and heir of the Former Han dynasty (also known as the Western Han dynasty,
206BCE-8CE), which was said to be usurped by Wang Mang 王莽 (d. 23CE) whom
named his own dynasty Xin 新 (9-23CE). The founding fathers of the Later Han
claimed that their victory in the civil war during the 20s and 30s CE and their re-conquest
of the realm of the Former Han were divinely ordained. 5 Therefore, they had achieved a
rightful restoration of the Han after the interregnum of Wang Mang. 6 Historians of the
5

For the theories employed by the Later Han rulers to legitimize their succession to the Former Han, see
Yang Quan 楊權, Xin wude lilun yu liang Han zhengzhi: "Yaohou huode" shuo kaolun 新五德理論與兩
漢 政 治 ─ ─ 「 堯 後 火 德 」 說 考 論 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006). A general English-language
introduction of those theories can be seen in Hok-lam Chan, Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions
under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984),
30-33.
6
A comprehensive study on the reasons for Wang Mang’s fall is Homer H. Dubs trans., The History of the
Former Han Dynasty, Volume Three (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1955), 112-124. For detailed research on
the revolts against Wang Mang and the civil war between the two Han dynasties, see Hans Bielenstein,
“The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: with Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou Han shu,”
BMFEA 26 (1954): 82-165, and “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, volume II: the Civil War,” BMFEA
31 (1959): 11-256. On the background of the civil war contenders and the founding members of the Later
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Later Han have commonly accepted this claim and therefore treated the history of Later
Han as a sequel to the Former Han. The dynastic title “Han” is usually used as a
synecdoche for the two Han dynasties. 7 However, the two Han regimes do not receive
equal treatment in modern scholarship. Academic works under the name of Han history
are generally assumed to cover both dynasties but, in fact, a lion’s share is devoted to the
Former Han. 8 As one eminent Japanese scholar on Han history pointed out that,
Han, see Yü Ying-shih 余英時, “Dong Han zhengquan zhi jianli yu shizu daxing zhi guanxi” 東漢政權之
建立與士族大姓之關係, in idem, Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shilun: gudaipian 中國知識階層史論：古代篇
(Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980), 109-203; Kojima Shigetoshi 小嶋茂稔, Kandai kokka tōchi
no kōzō to tenkai: gokan kokkaron kenkyū josetsu 漢代国家統治の構造と展開：後漢国家論研究序說
(Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2009), 73-123.
7
In fact, the role of the Later Han as a continuation or restoration of the Former Han was not beyond any
question. Considering the backgrounds of the founding members of the Later Han, they were very different
from the ruling elites of the Former Han and lacked direct connection with the Former Han imperial court.
When the Former Han was replaced by Wang Mang’s regime, it was both nominally and substantively
ended. The very fact that all the plotted coups d’état and revolts in the name of the Han against Wang Mang
lacked popular support and were easily suppressed reveals that Wang had received significant support to
replace the Han. It was only when natural disasters, external warfare, and maladministration, inter alia,
caused popular unrest that brought down the Xin regime. Meanwhile, certain contenders for imperial power
made use of the name of the Han for political propaganda. Among them, Emperor Guangwu was a distant
member of the Former Han imperial household, but he was indeed an outsider of the Former Han
government. Furthermore, the members who constituted the Later Han ruling cohort were either regional
magnates who did not occupy important positions in the Former Han or incumbent regional officials of the
Xin dynasty. The case of the Later Han ruling elites was totally different from those of the Eastern Jin 晉
(317-420CE) and the Southern Song 宋 (1127-1279CE) dynasties. These, in turn, are best understood as
continuations of their predecessors, namely the Western Jin (265-316CE) and the Northern Song
(960-1127CE), respectively.
8
To list only a few examples will suffice to show the imbalance of the studies on the two dynasties: Qian
Mu 錢穆 ended his work on Qin-Han history in the Xin dynasty, and without any entries of the Later Han,
see his Qin Han Shi 秦漢史 (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye gongsi, 1994); Nishijima Sadao 西嶋定生
spent nearly 300 pages on the Former Han but only less than 100 pages on the Later Han in his Shikan
teikoku 秦漢帝国 (Tōkyō: kōdansha, 1974); although its title indicates that it is a study on Qin-Han
empire, Yoshinami Takashi 好並隆司, Shikan teikoku shi kenkyū 秦漢帝国史研究 (Tōkyō: Miraisha,
1978) has no single chapter for the Later Han; in his two-volume work on Han China Chun-shu Chang
rarely mentioned the Later Han, see his The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume One: Nation, State, &
Imperialism in Early China, ca. 1600 B.C.-A.D. 8. and The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume Two:
Frontier, Immigration, & Empire in Han China, 130 B.C.-157 A.D. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 2007); in his recently published general history of the Qin-Han period, Mark Edward Lewis spilled
more ink over the Former Han than the Later Han, see his The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han
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comparatively speaking, studies on Former Han are both quantitatively and qualitatively
higher than that of Later Han, which is a rather underexplored field. 9 Among the studies
on the Later Han per se, it is the works of Japanese scholars contributed greatly in
expanding the field and laying the theoretical framework for further studies. I have no
ambition for this section to chart every contour of the Japanese scholarship, as this would
need a specific review article; I will only provide an overview of three main themes of
Japanese scholarship, as well as relevant Chinese and Western literature.
A Regime of Powerful-families. The nature of the Later Han state and society is a core
topic in the field. Ever since the foremost Sinologist Yang Lien-sheng’s 楊聯陞 seminal
article on the powerful families (haozu 豪 族 in Chinese and gōzoku 豪 族 in
Japanese) 10 of the Later Han in 1936, 11 numerous Chinese and Japanese scholars have

(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007).
9
Goi Naohiro 五井直弘, “Gokan ōchō to gōzoku” 後漢王朝と豪族, in idem, Kandai no gōzoku shakai
to kokka 漢代の豪族社会と国家 (Tōkyō: Meicho Kankōkai, 2001), 228. Although Goi made his
comment in 1970 and works on the Later Han has increased thereafter, his comment is still valid today if
comparing the studies on the two Han dynasties. Examples can be found in the bibliography on Han studies
in Tonami Mamoru 礪波護, Kishimoto Mio 岸本美緒 and Sugiyama Masaaki 杉山正明 eds., Chūgoku
rekishi kenkyū nyūmon 中国歴史研究入門 (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), 371-377.
10
The “Powerful Families” were never a single and unified group. There are various terms in the Han texts
to name those powerful families. Also, different types of powerful families can be seen in the sources.
However, for the purpose of simplicity, I will follow the customary usage of most Chinese and Japanese
scholars and adopt the term haozu/gōzoku 豪族 in a broad and encompassing sense, with “powerful
family” as its equivalent in English. On different names and types of powerful families in Han history, see
Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi 宇都宮淸吉, “kandai gōzoku kenkyū” 漢代豪族研究, in his Chūgoku kodai
chūseishi kenkyū 中囯古代中世史硏究 (Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1977), 376-382; Lai Ming-Chui 黎明釗,
“Handai haozu daxing de yanjiu huigu” 漢代豪族大姓的研究回顧, in Zhou Liangkai 周樑楷 ed.,
Jiewang erbian 結網二編 (Taipei: Dongda tushu gufenyouxiangongsi, 2003), 93-133; Patricia Buckley
Ebrey, “Toward a Better Understanding of the Later Han Upper Class,” in Albert E. Dien ed., State and
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followed Yang’s path on studying the development of Later Han powerful families and
their relationship with the state.12 A powerful family, according to Yang’s definition, was
a strong local based family that commanded numerous dependent households and
individuals. Yang’s article suggests that the origins of the political elites of the Jin and
Northern and Southern Dynasties (265-581CE) could be traced back to the powerful
families of the two Han dynasties. During the Later Han, the powerful families that
sprouted in the Former Han reached their zenith and became the dominant power in both
political and social arenas. Emperor Guangwu and most, if not all, of his supporters were
from powerful families. In other words, the Later Han was a regime established and
dominated by powerful families. Their members occupied central, regional, and local
government posts, owned tremendous amounts of landed property, acted as leaders of
their own communities, and commanded various kinds of retainers and dependents. Some
of them expanded their economic benefits through wielding their political power, while

Society in Early Medieval China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1990), 49-72.
11
Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞, “Donghan de haozu” 東漢的豪族, Qinghua xuebao 清華學報 11:4 (1936):
1007-1063; an English version is “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” in E-Tu Zen Sun and John de
Francis eds., Chinese Social History: Translations of Selected Studies (Washington, DC.: American Council
of Learned Societies, 1956), 103-136.
12
The literature on the Han powerful families is vast. For a detailed review of the twentieth century
Chinese studies on the topic, see Lai, “Handai haozu daxing de yanjiu huigu,” 93-133; for overview of
Japanese studies, see Momiyama Akira 籾山明, “kandai gōzokuron he no ichi shikaku” 漢代豪族論への
一視角, Tōyōshi kenkyū 東洋史研究 43.1 (1984): 165-173 and Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to
tenkai, 11-15.
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others acquired political positions by using their abundant economic resources. They not
only constituted the mainstream of the bureaucracy but also acted as leaders of local
communities. The development of and struggles among powerful families became the
main thread runs through Yang’s analysis. 13
Yang’s basic arguments have widely been accepted by academic circles and
especially echoed in the writings of his Japanese colleagues. Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi 宇
都宮淸吉, albeit questioning Yang’s classification of powerful families, held that
powerful families constituted the dominant power of the Later Han. His studies greatly
advanced scholars’ knowledge of powerful families in terms of socio-economic history. 14
Yoshikawa Mitsuo 吉川美都雄 found fault with Yang’s view on the relationship
between Emperor Guangwu and powerful families in the early years of the dynasty but
also agreed that powerful families gradually penetrated into and became important
stakeholders of the regime. 15 Japanese scholars even coined the term Gōzoku rengō
seiken 豪族連合政権 (Powerful-family coalition regime) to characterize the Later Han
13

Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” 1007-1063 and “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” 103-136.
Utsunomiya, “Dōyaku kenkyū” 僮約研究, “Ryōshū to nanyō” 劉秀と南陽, and “Kandai niokeru ka to
gōzoku” 漢代における家と豪族, in idem, Kandai shakai keizai shi kenkyū 漢代社會經濟史硏究
(Tōkyō: Shibundō, 1967), 256-374, 375-404, and 405-472, respectively; also idem, “Kandai gōzoku
kenkyū” and “Kandai kenkyū gūkan” 漢代研究偶感, in Chūgoku kodai chūseishi kenkyū, 351-388 and
389-401, respectively.
15
Yoshikawa Mitsuo 吉川美都雄, “Gokan shoki niokeru gōzoku taisaku nitsuite” 後漢初期に於ける豪
族対策に就いて, Rekishigaku kenkyū 歴史学研究 7.9 (1939): 644-668.
14
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state as a regime constituted and controlled by powerful families. Another term Gōzoku
kyōdōtai 豪族共同体 (Powerful-family community) was coined to describe the local
communities dominated by powerful families. 16
Although the important role played by powerful families is generally recognized, not
every Japanese scholar is satisfied with the thesis of Gōzoku rengō seiken. Criticisms
have been raised against this line of interpretation. Taking a perspective different from his
colleagues who emphasize socio-economic factors, Goi Naohiro 五井直弘 has diverted
scholars’ attention to the political aspect of the relationship between state and powerful
families. He stressed that state power was absolutely over the powerful families, whose
political positions and social prestige were at the imperial mercy. Hence, the powerful
families, albeit resourceful and influential, were not as powerful and equal as the emperor.
They were no more than the privileged subjects of the emperor. 17 In a recent study,
Kojima Shigetoshi 小嶋茂稔 has challenged the thesis of Gōzoku rengō seiken as an
overstatement of the influence of powerful families and a serious underestimation of state
power. With a meticulous examination of the various participants of the civil war, Kojima
16

A recent review of Japanese scholarship on these two concepts is Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to
tenkai, 6-35. The discussion over the concept of kyōdōtai (community) is especially intense among
Japanese scholarship on the Six Dynasty period, for a concise English-language overview of the debate till
1970s, see Tanigawa Michio, Medieval Chinese Society and the Local “Community” translated, with an
introduction by Joshua A. Fogel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), xv-xxix.
17
Goi, “Ryōkan kōtaiki no hanran” 両漢交替期の叛乱, in idem, Kandai no gōzoku shakai to kokka,
141-160; “Gokan ōchō to gōzoku,” 228-281.
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has argued that the success of Emperor Guangwu was greatly due to the collaboration of
incumbent regional and local officials and Guangwu’s capacity for controlling the state
machine rather than the cooperation of powerful families. 18 However, both Goi’s and
Kojima’s analyses only explain the relationship between the emperor and powerful
families in the formative years of the dynasty; for the situations of the succeeding years,
further research is needed.
Among the English-language literature, the Sinologist Hans Bielenstein spent great
efforts in studying the saga of the formation of the Later Han and produced a series of
book-length papers under the title of “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty,”19 in which
he analyzes the role that powerful families, or what he terms “influential clans,” played in
the process of toppling the Xin dynasty and establishing the Later Han. 20 In Han Social
Structure, Ch’ü T’ung-tsu 瞿同祖 pieces together from the extant documentary evidence
the history of powerful families during the Later Han period and provides detailed
translations of the extant sources.21 Following the studies by Yang and Utsunomiya, Ch’ü
18

Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai,73-123.
Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: with Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou
Han shu”; “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume II, the Civil War”; “The Restoration of the Han
Dynasty: volume III, the People,” BMFEA 39 (1967): 1-198; “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume
IV, the Government,” BMFEA 51 (1979): 1-300.
20
Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: with Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou
Han shu,” 94-98.
21
Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, Han Social Structure (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1972),
160-247 and 393-506.
19
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also holds that powerful families “dominated the government to such an extent that the
history of the Later Han may be seen as the history of powerful families.” 22 However, he
reminds his readers that the emperor was the only source of political and military power
and was able to remove any powerful family from the power hierarchy.23 Patricia Ebrey
has depicted a vivid picture of the development of an “aristocratic family” from the Han
times to the Tang dynasty (618-907CE). 24 Although her book focuses mainly on the Six
Dynasties and the period of Later Han only occupies a small portion, it echoes the
conventional theme that the roots of Six Dynasties society should be traced to the Later
Han. Furthermore, in an article on the Later Han upper class, Ebrey points out the cultural
aspect of the powerful families and the stratification within them. 25 The cultural attributes
of powerful families will bring us to the next topic.
Confucian State (Jukyō kokka 儒教国家). 26 As the eighteenth century Chinese
22

Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 202.
Ibid., 212.
24
Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Aristocratic Families of Early Imperial China: A Case Study of the Po-ling
Ts’ui Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
25
Ebrey, “Toward a Better Understanding of the Later Han Upper Class,” 49-72. Another work focuses on
the cultural background of Han powerful family is Chen Chi-yun, Hsun Yueh (AD 148-209): The Life and
Reflections of an Early Medieval Confucian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
26
Here, the term “Confucian State” is an English translation of the Japanese term Jukyō kokka 儒教国家,
by which the Japanese scholars refer the rubric Ju 儒 (Ru 儒 in Chinese) to the school of Confucius, his
disciples, and later generations of followers, and Jukyō kokka is to coin the state which upholds the
teachings and classics of the Confucian school as orthodoxy and is also filled up by officials with
Confucian educational background. In short, the English terms “Confucian” and “Confucianism” used in
this context is in the most conventional way as the self-identified followers of Confucius and the teachings
of Confucius, his disciples, and the later thinkers who regarded themselves and/or were regarded by others
as followers of this tradition.
23
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scholar Zhao Yi 趙翼 acutely pointed out that many founding members of the Later Han
had Confucian educational background, 27 modern scholars also pay close attention to the
relationship between the Later Han state and Confucianism. Such a relationship is
indispensable for understanding the development of powerful families in the Han times.
By the last decades of the Former Han, Confucianism had already its status as a
crucial component of the state-sanctioned education curriculum and political orthodoxy.
The Later Han inherited and advanced this tradition. 28 Training of Confucian education
became a key to attain government positions. With their economic and intellectual
resources, members of powerful families gained easy access to Confucian education and
Some Western scholars, with Michael Nylan as the foremost proponent, suggest that the rubric
“Confucian” is not a suitable English translation of the Chinese term Ru 儒 in the context of Han times, as
Ru was a heterogeneous group with different intellectual orientations in the Han dynasty and there was no
necessary connections between Ru and Confucius. According to Nylan, Ru could refer to three groups of
people: classicists, Confucians, and bureaucrats, with distinct intellectual orientations and diverse political
views. Ru is thus a category broader than “Confucian.” For detailed discussions, see Michael Nylan, “A
Problematic Model: The Han ‘Orthodox Synthesis,’ Then and Now,” in Kai-wing Chow, On-cho Ng, and
John B. Henderson eds., Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 17-56, and idem, The Five “Confucian” Classics
(New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2001), 1-41; Nicolas Zuferey, To the Origin of Confucianism: The Ru
in Pre-Qin Times and During the early Han Dynasty (New York: Peter Lang Pub Inc, 2003); Anne Cheng,
“What Did It Mean to Be a Ru in Han Times?” Asia Major 14.2 (2001): 101-118. For brief review of and
questions about the relevant discussions, see Liang Cai, “In the Matrix of Power: A Study of the Social and
Political Status of Confucians (Ru 儒) in the Western Han Dynasty (206 BCE-8 CE).” (Ph.D. dissertation,
Cornell University, 2007), 7-10; Paul R. Goldin, Confucianism (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2011), 4-5.
I agree with Nylan that those people who claimed themselves and were regarded as Ru in the Han times
were not necessarily Confucians. However, as this section aims mainly to review the works of Japanese
scholars, the conventional rubrics “Confucian” and “Confucianism” will be suitable for the translation
purpose.
27
Zhao Yi 趙翼, Nianershi zhaji xiaozheng 廿二史箚記校證, annotated by Wang Shumin 王樹民
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), 90-91.
28
For the growth of Confucian education in the Later Han times, see Higashi Shinji 東晋次, Gokan jidai
no seiji to shakai 後漢時代の政治と社会 (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995), 143-193.
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then official posts. Meanwhile, individuals without strong family background would still
try to access Confucian education and make themselves eligible for official appointments.
Once entered government service, no matter who they were, office-holders would invest
their descendants in the required education in order to attain, preserve, and extend
political influence, economic privilege, and social status, which would accumulate as
invaluable asset to their families. 29 Against this backdrop, powerful families gradually
monopolized the main source of Han official recruitment system and transformed
themselves into hereditary official families. 30
It is no doubt that Confucianism played a significant role in shaping Later Han culture
and politics and germinating powerful families. Japanese scholar Watanabe Yoshihiro 渡
邉義浩 coined the term Jukyō kokka 儒教国家 (Confucian state) to characterize the
Later Han state as a regime highly integrated with state sanctioned/canonized
Confucianism. 31 According to Watanabe, the Confucian state fully developed during the
first two reigns of Later Han when Confucianism was canonized under the imperial
29

For the Later Han official recruitment system and its relation to powerful families, see Higashi Shinji,
“Gokan jidai no senkyo to chihō shakai” 後漢時代の選挙と地方社会, Tōyōshi kenkyū 東洋史研究 46.2
(1987): 33-60.
30
On the relationship between Confucian officials and powerful families, see Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji
to shakai, 143-193 and 247-290; Watanabe Yoshihiro 渡邉義浩, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō 後漢囯
家の支配と儒敎 (Tōkyō: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1995), 124-142.
31
Watanabe’s two books focus on this topic: Gokan ni okeru J"ukyō kokka" no seiritsu and Gokan kokka no
shihai to jukyō and Gokan ni okeru J"ukyō kokka" no seiritsu 後漢における「儒教国家」の成立 (Tōkyō:
Kyūko Shoin, 2009).
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auspices and was institutionalized as the orthodox ideology; Confucians dominated
different levels of government positions and Confucianism permeated down to local
communities. 32 Although Watanabe’s definition of “Confucian state” is not generally
accepted by scholars, 33 it fashions another perspective on investigating the relationships
between politics and culture as well as state and society in the Later Han times. 34
The Collapse of Early Empire. As the short-lived Qin dynasty (221-206BCE) marked
the establishment of the first unified empire in Chinese history and the Former Han
basically inherited the imperial system and further consolidated it, scholars always
examine the two dynasties as a unit for understanding the formation of ancient Chinese
empire; on the other hand, the failure of the Later Han showcase the demise of the
ancient Chinese empire, and the study on this topic is called Kodai teikoku hōkai ron 古
代帝国崩壊論 (Thesis of the collapse of the ancient empire) by Japanese scholars.
Following the logic of development of powerful families, scholars suggest that
powerful families were the force not only founded the Later Han but also undermined the
regime. Yang Lien-sheng asserted in his pioneering survey that the political chaos during
the last decades of Later Han was caused by the infighting among great families,
32

Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, 422-425; Gokan ni okeru "Jukyō kokka" no seiritsu, 23-25.
Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 39-44.
34
Miranda Brown, The Politics of Mourning in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press,
2007) also focuses on the relationship between politics and culture in the Later Han times.
33
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including imperial consort families, eunuchs and their dependents, and scholar-officials. 35
Vicious political struggles finally resulted in the two Great Proscriptions (danggu 黨錮,
166 and 169CE), which Yang called “internal strife among the great families” (haozu
neizheng 豪族內爭), 36 imposed by the eunuch-dominated imperial court in order to
purge and proscribe the anti-eunuch officials, scholars, and their followers in the imperial
academy to access government office. The Later Han imperial court thus frustrated many
scholar-officials, who in turn chose to preserve their power for familial rather than
imperial interests. Ch’ü T’ung-tsu held the same point of view. 37 Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi,
although criticized Yang for including consort families and eunuchs into the category of
powerful family, agreed that powerful families contributed to the downfall of the
empire. 38 Focusing on the socio-economic aspect, he made the point that the growing
strength of powerful families undermined the imperial power as they gradually became
autonomous or semi-autonomous forces and encroached upon the economic base of the
empire by grabbing taxpayer households from state control.39
Later scholars basically follow the above theses, albeit there is no agreement on

35
36
37
38
39

Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” 1042-1063; “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” 122-136.
Yang, “Donghan de haozu,” 1052 and 1056; “Great Families of the Eastern Han,” 129 and 131.
Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 210-229 and 232-243.
For Utsunomiya’s critique of Yang’s article, see his “Kandai kenkyū gūkan,” 389-401.
Utsunomiya, “Kandai niokeru ka to gōzoku,” 405-472 and “Kandai gōzoku kenkyū,” 395-401.
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whether the entire ruling class should be included in the category of powerful families as
Yang suggested. 40 Both Hsu Cho-yun 許倬雲 and Rafe de Crespigny concern the role of
powerful families played in the rise of regionalism, which finally caused the
fragmentation of the Later Han. 41 Hsu has clearly stated that regionalism was “a
significant factor in causing members of the Han elite to place local interest above the
imperial interest.” 42 It was the political and social elites with strong sense of regionalism
who gave up their loyalty to the imperial house that brought the dynasty to an end.
Closely related to the attitudes of powerful families toward the imperial center, the
two Great Proscriptions especially attracted scholarly attention since they are said to be
greatly undermined imperial authority and shattered the scholar-officials’ confidence and
loyalty towards the imperial court.43 In addition, being regarded as the struggles between
40

For studies on the Later Han consort families and eunuchs, see Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 210-229 and
232-243; Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō, 271-366.
41
Hsu Cho-yun, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty,” in Norman
Yoffee and George L. Cowgill eds., The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations (Tucson: University of
Arizon Press, 1988), 176-195; Rafe de Crespigny, “Provincial Gentry and the End of Later Han,” in
Schmidt-Glintzer, hrsg. von Helwig ed., Das andere China - Festschrift für Wolfgang Bauer zum 65.
Geburtstag (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995), 533-558.
42
Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty,” 190.
43
For analyses of the two Great Proscriptions, see Masubuchi Tatsuo 増淵龍夫, “Gokan tōko jiken no
shihyō ni tsuite” 後漢党錮事件の史評について, in idem, Chūgoku kodai no shakai to kokka 中囯古代
の社会と囯家 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 296-317; Watanabe, Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō,
367-418; Higashi, Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai, 291-326; Rafe de Crespigny, “Political Protest in Imperial
China: The Great Proscription of Later Han, 167-184,” Papers in Far Eastern History 11 (1975): 1-36 and
“Politics and Philosophy under the Government of Emperor Huan 159-168 A.D.” T’oung Pao 66 (1980):
41-83; Mansvelt Beck, “The Fall of Han,” 327-330. Christopher Leigh Connery, however, has questioned
to what extent did the two proscriptions contribute to the collapse of the Later Han, see his The Empire of
the Text: Writing and Authority in Early Imperial China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
1998), 86-92.
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corrupted political power and protesters mainly formed by intellectuals, the two incidents
generally earn sympathy of historians, ancient and modern. By examining the proscribed
scholar-officials, some Japanese scholars argue that a certain number of powerful families
survived the two crises and expanded and transformed themselves. Their descendants
successfully overcame dynastic changes and kept their positions as leading elites in the
successive centuries, which constituted the ruling class of the “Six Dynasties aristocratic
society” (Rikuchō kizokusei shakai 六朝貴族制社会). 44
Compared with the two Great Proscriptions, the widespread religious-colored Yellow
Turban Rebellion, another significant incident in the late Later Han, has received lesser
attention from scholars. The Yellow Turbans rose up in a large-scale revolt in 184CE and
once posed a serious threat to the empire, but the rebellion lasted only one year and failed
abruptly since the imperial state was still capable of gathering support from the powerful
families, whose members contributed great efforts in suppressing the rebels. The Yellow
Turbans were therefore a sign of the dynasty’s decline rather than a cause of its
collapse. 45 In fact, it is not the rebellion per se, but its impact of devolution of military
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power during the campaigns of suppression and the message of widespread popular
discontent more threatened the existence of the dynasty, and hence deserve scholarly
attention. 46
Apart from internal factors such as political infighting among powerful families and
popular rebellions resulted from official corruption, maladministration, and natural
disasters, external factors also interest scholarly investigation in the decline of the Later
Han. Compared with the Former Han, which was an expansionist empire, the Later Han
showed a defensive mode of dealing with its neighbors. In fact, the Later Han faced a
much more complicated situation than its predecessor. Beside the Xiongnu 匈奴, which
was the prime rival of the Former Han, the Later Han had to spend a vast amount of
resource to cope with the Qiang 羌, the Wuhuan 烏桓, and the Xianbei 鮮卑. To what
extent did the threats posed by non-Han peoples contribute to the downfall of the Later
Han? Rafe de Crespigny has provided the hitherto most detailed study on the subject,
suggesting that the failure of the Later Han was greatly due to its inefficient frontier
policies that single-mindedly pursued the destruction of the Xiongnu confederacy without
46

For an overview of Japanese works on this topic, see Wantanabe Yoshihiro, Sangokushi Kenkyū nyū mon
三 国 志 研 究 入 門 (Tōkyō: Nichigai Asoshietsu, 2007), 146. Among Western scholarship, for
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thorough consideration and well preparation for the ensuing power vacuum along the
northern frontier, which finally let other alien peoples took advantage of invading the
Chinese realm and left heavy political and financial burden to the Later Han empire. 47
Benefit from the aforementioned scholarly research, we know that infighting of
powerful families, popular rebellions, and warfare with non-Han peoples culminated in
serious political, social, and economic malaise and the Later Han empire was in shambles
in the second century CE. Against this backdrop, the present study attempts to provide a
new perspective in regional context to answer why it is the northwesterners played the
role of harbinger of destroying the empire.
Numerous scholars have shown the significant role played by powerful families in the
Later Han politics and society; nevertheless, it is not beyond doubt that powerful families
could represent all the political elites of the empire. Some scholars have already pointed
out that powerful families were largely concentrated in certain areas of the empire.
Although local powerful families might exist everywhere in the imperial territories, the
ones had empire-wide influences and close connections with the imperial center were
47
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mainly found in the central and eastern regions where the political, cultural, and
economic cores of the empire located. The powerful families appeared in the extant
historical sources were mainly from those areas. 48 Unlike the powerful families rooted in
the areas of prosperous and “advanced” economy and culture, Dong Zhuo and his
followers were from a frontier society with comparatively “backward” culture and
economy in the eyes of the contemporaries. Eastern-based powerful families usually
provided well-educated scholar-officials for the imperial state; on the other hand, the
northwestern frontier region where Dong and his men came from was a land well-known
for breeding warriors, with multi-ethnic background. Dong and his men was a
conglomeration of Han and non-Han soldiers and were outsiders of the refined culture
prevailing among the eastern elites. The contrast between the east and the northwest
marked the conflict between the imperial center and its periphery.
Needless to say, the so-called “Confucian state” was mainly confined in the imperial
center and other Confucian cultural prosperous regions but not covered the whole empire.
48

For the regional variation of the powerful families, see Utsunomiya, “Kandai gōzoku kenkyū,” 383-388;
Masubuchi Tatsuo, “Gokan gunkensei no chiiki betsuteki kōsatsu” 後漢の郡県制の地域別的考察, in
idem, Chūgoku kodai no shakai to kokka, 537-566; Ueda Sarae 上田早苗, “Gokan makki no sōyō no
gōzoku” 後漢末期の襄陽豪族, Tōyōshi kenkyū 東洋史研究 28.4 (1970): 283-305; Tsuruma Kazuyuki
鶴間和幸, “Kandai gōzoku no chiikiteki seigaku” 漢代豪族の地域的性格, Shigaku zasshi 史学雑誌
87.12 (1978): 1-38; Satake Yasuhiko 佐竹靖彥, “Kandai jyūsanshū no chiikisei ni tsuite” 漢代十三州の
地域性について, Rekishi hyōron 歴史評論, 357 (1980): 37-65 and 79; Tada Kensuke 多田狷介, “Kōkin
no ran zenshi” 黄巾の乱前史, in idem, Kan Gi Shin shi no kenkyū 漢魏晋史の研究 (Tōkyō: Kyūko
Shoin, 1999), 49-76.
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As Chapter Three will show, while the eastern-based elites with Confucian educational
background triumphed in the official recruitment system, the “barbarous” and
“backward” Northwesterners would have no hope to compete with them on political
advancement, 49 which triggered the estrangement between the two sides.
This work does not aim to study the powerful families and “Confucian state,” but
focuses on the group of people who were in the frontier society outside the orbit of the
“Confucian state” and were in conflict with the powerful families dominated imperial
center. This work can therefore supplement past scholarship by expanding our horizons
beyond the powerful families and Confucian scholar-officials, and fashion a different
view for understanding the processes and factors of the decline and fall of the Later Han
empire. It can be aligned with the theme of Kodai teikoku hōkai ron.
Why the relationship between the northwesterners and the imperial center matters in
the decline and fall of the Later Han empire? To distinguish the “decline” and “fall” of an
empire, Arther Ferrill points out in his book on the fall of the Roman empire that “the
reasons for decline need not be the same as the reasons for the fall, which can be sought
in a somewhat different and more immediate context.” Hence, “many problems can be
49

Higashi, “Gokan jidai no senkyo to chihō shakai,” 33-60; Hsing I-tien 邢義田, “Dong Han xiaolian de
shenfen beijing” 東漢孝廉的身分背景, in idem, Tianxia ijia: Huangdi,guanliao yu shehui 天下一家：皇
帝、官僚與社會 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011), 285-354.
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avoided by keeping the distinction between decline and fall sharp.” 50 When investigating
the collapse of ancient states and civilizations, anthropologist Norman Yoffee draws a
concise distinction between the two concepts that “terms such as decline, decay, and
decadence on the one hand and, on the other hand, terms such as fall, collapse,
fragmentation, and death [italics in original]” are different in meanings. “Those in the
former group imply changes that are somewhat for the worse, especially morally or
aesthetically inferior, but are not necessarily the end of anything. Those in the latter group,
however, imply that some meaningful entity ceased to exist.” 51 It is clear that although
corrupted government, power struggles at the imperial court, popular rebellions, and
foreign invasions all deteriorated the situations, they only marked the decline of the Later
Han which was still staggering forward. Here, I adopt Yoffee’s definition of collapse as “a
drastic restructuring of social institutions in the absence of a political center,” 52 and it
was after Dong Zhuo and his northwestern fellows controlling the imperial court that
various regional power-holders refused to recognize the imperial center and unveiled the
disintegration of the empire. Therefore, I will argue that the regional conflict between the
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northwest and the imperial center not only precipitated the decline but, most importantly,
brought the empire to an end. This is the reason why the present study focuses on the
northwestern region.

Studying a Militarized Frontier Society
It is erroneous to look at a map of modern China and then assume that its national
boundaries are consistent with that of the ancient times. In fact, the physical space of
what we called “China” today is the product of a long and irregular process of conquest
and coalescence inherited from an enduring imperial tradition. The boundaries of
historical China were ever-changing and China itself resembles a jigsaw puzzle that is
formed by different regions (as diverse as the whole of Europe in terms of culture and
ethnicity) and took a long time to complete the full picture.
The invention of national boundaries is a modern apparatus comes with the birth of
nation-state, 53 scholars who are interested in the nation/state-building process of modern
China are also obliged to study how different regions at the eastern tip of the Eurasian
landmass have coalesced into being China, especially during the last half millennium, and
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Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
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how the modern political boundaries have been demarcated. 54 In recent decades, with
frontier studies as a growing field, 55 there are quite a number of English-language works
focus on the period of late imperial or early modern China (roughly from the tenth or
fourteenth to the eighteenth century) 56 and study how have various frontier areas been
conquered by and coalesced into the Chinese empires, such as the modern provinces of
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3-6.
For a general overview of the field in Chinese studies, see James A. Millward, “New Perspectives on
the Qing Frontier,” in Gail Hershatter et al., eds., Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 113-129. For the traditional Chinese political theories on the
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2007), 11-28.
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Yunnan 雲南 and Guizhou 貴州 in the southwest, 57 Taiwan in the east, 58 Manchuria in
the northeast, 59 and modern province of

Xinjiang 新疆 (officially named Xinjiang

Uyghur Autonomous Region) in the northwest. 60 Most, if not all, of these works study
how the frontier areas became Chinese through the processes of territorial expansion,
migration, and colonization. They encompass topics including political economy,
nation-building, empire-building, and ethnicity.
With scholars’ efforts, the scope of Chinese frontier studies have been greatly
expanded and have no longer been confined to the “Inner Asian Frontiers” (which refer to
Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet) model set by Owen Lattimore, the pioneer of
the field. In his work, Lattimore points to differences in topography, climate, economy,
57
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languages, and ethnicities to argue that what he called “the general line of the Great Wall”
was “one of the most absolute frontiers in the world.”61 Under the influence of Lattimore,
it has once been widely accepted that the so-called “Great Wall of China” marked a linear
dividing line in Chinese history between the Chinese sedentary peoples and its Inner
Asian nomadic neighbors. 62 However, as recent studies have shown that the frontiers of
historical China were not limited to the line along the so-called “Great Wall,” but varied
over time and also included other peripheral areas. If we put the temporal factor into
consideration, we will have a slightly different picture. In fact, the “Great Wall” was not
always the boundary between China and its neighbors. 63 For example, during the Qing
dynasty (1644-1912CE), the “Great Wall” zone was no longer a political frontier of
China as the imperial territories had greatly extended beyond it.
Nevertheless, by considering the temporal (late imperial/early modern China) and
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spatial (the frontier areas mentioned above) frameworks of these frontier studies, it is
clear that there is a common premise that a “China proper” is at the center, mainly
inhabited by the ethnic Han Chinese, and expands outward to the frontier areas. The
words of one researcher of modern Chinese frontiers can tell us such kind of
understanding,

The core of the empire, or China proper, bounded by oceans on the east and south, the
Tibetan Plateau on the west, and the Great Wall on the north, came together more than
two millennia ago. Territories of equal size, including Manchuria, Inner and Outer
Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan, were attached to this core in the seventeenth
and eighteenth century. 64

Hence, the formation of late imperial Chinese empire is a China proper plus Manchuria,
Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, as well as Taiwan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. This process of
conquering and integrating frontier areas is an outward expansion from the center
towards the peripheries. Also, it is a process of colonization mainly marked by the ethnic
Han presence (or, to a certain degree, a process of Sinification/Sinicization). 65
It is true that the ethnic Han Chinese people have long held the notion that a Central
64
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Country/State/Province/Plain was the origin or cradle of Chinese civilization and thus the
center of Chinese empires. 66 Since the notion of centrality has been ingrained in the mind
of ethnic Han Chinese by the late imperial period, it is therefore feasible to employ this
center-and-periphery model in explaining the process of incorporating new territories into
the existing Chinese regimes. 67
However, the frontiers of Chinese empires advanced and receded, and were not
necessarily consistent. For example, neither the area of the modern provinces of Gansu
甘肅 and Ningxia 寧夏 in the northwest nor the northern part of modern Hebei 河北
province in the north was the territories of a centralized ethnic Han Chinese regime
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between the tenth and thirteenth century. 68 They were frontiers between the ethnic Han
and non-Han regimes at that time, although being regarded as part of China proper in the
Ming (1368-1644CE) and Qing times. Although some parts of modern Sichuan 四川
province have long been regarded as portion of China Proper since its conquest by the
Qin state during the first millennium BCE, 69 still other parts of the province were treated
as frontiers in the thirteenth century. 70
Therefore, if we extend the observation to the early imperial period—the Qin-Han
times, the aforementioned center-and-periphery model has to be adjusted. It was a time
when the Chinese empire was newly born, the entity of China proper was still under the
course of formation and smaller than which recognized by the late imperial Chinese, and
the Inner Asian and southwestern frontiers have not yet been or were too remote to be
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part of the Chinese empire. Hence, by considering the temporal factor, there is a
two-layer division of the frontier zones of historical China: the Inner Asian Frontiers,
Yunnan, Guizhou, and Taiwan are the modern, newer, and outer frontiers, whereas
regions like modern Gansu, Ningxia, Sichuan, and certain areas in south China are the
ancient, former, and inner frontiers. This classification should not be a strict one as those
frontier zones would be overlapped in certain time and space in history; nevertheless, it is
basically compatible with the process of imperial territorial expansion and the transition
of frontiers in Chinese history.
From the vantage point of the present, we can see how the Chinese empires from the
Qin-Han period onwards expanded outward from the center to the inner frontiers and
finally conquered the outer frontiers in modern times. We can borrow the American
historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s words from his seminal article on the frontier in
American history to describe the frontier in Chinese history as “a continually advancing
frontier line.” 71
What is called China proper in Chinese historical tradition is a product of gradual
development that was initially based on the realm of the Zhou 周 dynasty (ca. 11th -3th
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c.BCE), which largely corresponded to the area from the North China Plain in the east to
the Wei 渭 River valley west of the bend of the Yellow River. The Zhou was a political
entity very different from the territorial empires of the Qin and Han. Radiating from the
dominion of the Zhou king, it is claimed in the ancient texts that there were something
like hundreds of regional states (or what some scholars called “City-states”) 72 widely
distributed on the area which is roughly equivalent to the central and eastern parts of
modern China. Under the Zhou Fengjian 封建 system, 73 the regional polities were
subjects of the Zhou king (even though some of them were only nominally under the
authority of the Zhou royal house), basically shared the same rituals, government
structure and other institutions, and surrounded by peoples who did not. With a common
cultural background, a new and common identity was gradually forged among the
regional states. 74 This common identity allowed the concept of centrality to emerge and
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endure, which became the embryonic form of China proper.
While the power of the Zhou king declined and some regional states became much
stronger, the king’s role vis-à-vis the regional states and the relationships among the
regional polities gradually changed. During this process of transformation, a kind of
political Darwinism was at work with the politically fit surviving at the expense of the
weak, the number of states continuously declined until there were only a handful of them
survived in the Warring States period (475-221BCE). The weaker states were being
swallowed up by the stronger ones that had undergone successful political and economic
reforms and territorial expansion. Among those expanding states, it was the Qin at the
westernmost that successfully strengthened itself through drastic reforms and finally
overcame all rivals and established the first centralized empire in Chinese history.75 The
establishment of the Qin empire and the ensuing expansion launched by the Qin and the
succeeding Former Han dynasty brought new meaning to what is “China” by basically
delimited and demarcated the essential part of the Chinese empire. 76 The conception of
75
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China proper was mostly shaped by the existence of such an integral core area, which
became a place that ancient Chinese people believed where empire building began and
from which the empire extended its territory.
The Qin state rose to power in stages. It first established itself on the west of the Zhou
realm and then gradually penetrated to the east. Not only expanded eastward, the Qin also
directed its military might to other directions. In the fourth century BCE, the Qin
marched southwards and finally conquered the regions of Ba 巴 and Shu 蜀, in modern
Sichuan province. 77 On its northwestern front, the Qin incessantly struggled with the
various Rong 戎 peoples, 78 who were the western neighbors of the Zhou court and were
regarded as barbarians in Chinese historical tradition. In 771BCE, the Rong sacked the
Zhou capital, brought down the Zhou rule in the west, and forced the royal court move to
the east. 79 The Qin, initially a small regional polity in the Zhou Fangjian hierarchy, filled
the vacuum left by the Zhou court, engaged into long-term battles with the Rong, and
gradually seized lands from them. 80 As the next chapter will show, the territories that the
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Qin conquered from the Rong constituted the northwestern region of the Han dynasties. 81
Based on the northwestern frontier, the Han empires further projected power to the
Western Regions (Xiyu 西域, roughly an equivalent to the present-day Xinjiang). 82
Before turning to the historical account of the formation of the northwestern region of
the Han dynasties in the next chapter, it behooves us to define the meanings of the terms
“border,” “boundary,” “frontier,” and “borderland” used in this study. “Border” is a linear
dividing line or line of partition that clearly demarcated boundary between polities or
peoples; 83 “boundary” is used in the same meaning as a well establish limit or border line
of the given political unit. 84 Therefore, these two terms will be used interchangeably. In
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contrast, “frontier” differs from boundary and border by virtue of its flexibility and
diversity. Frontier refers to a much more loosely defined area, a zone of transition, and “a
region that forms the margin of a settled or developed territory, a politico-geographical
area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit.” 85 Hence, frontier forms an
outer edge or peripheral zone of a polity. It is also a zone of interaction as Lattimore
pointed out that, in the Chinese case, the Inner Asian frontier was not “fully homogenous
with China or the steppe” and could influence or be influenced by both. 86 As a zone
in-between and full of uncertainty, frontier is usually an area in which expansion can take
place by either side and through which boundaries are drawn. Both “frontier” and
“borderland” has zonal quality, 87 but slight differences still exist between the usages of
the two terms in certain circumstances. 88 Frontier emphasizes the imperial territorial limit
and is usually subject to the imperial military presence, as we will see the Han
northwestern frontier advanced and receded depended upon the balance of power with
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neighbors. On the other hand, borderland refers to the newly conquered area with the
existence of autochthonous societies after the frontier has pushed forward. Hence, there
will be a process of transformation of frontiers into borderlands. 89 Nevertheless, due to
various reasons, frontier customs and cultures would persist even after the region went
through such a transformation. The northwestern region in this study, no matter it was a
frontier zone or borderland, was distinct from the imperial center in terms of culture and
customs. This phenomenon meshes with what a frontier historian pointed out that “each
frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still
partakes of the frontier characteristics.” 90
When regarding the northwestern frontier zone of the Han dynasties, most studies
center on a vast stretch of land called “Hexi 河西 Corridor” in present-day northern
Gansu province. Hexi, literally “west of the river,” lies for the most part west of the
Yellow River. It is a long shaped area located in the mountainous terrain which connects
China proper and the Western Regions. Several points on the Hexi Corridor formed
transportation and commercial hubs for pre-modern Inner Asian economic and cultural
exchange. With the groundbreaking excavation of Han period wooden and bamboo strips
89

Baud and van Schendel have classified different types of borderlands and their different paths of
development, see idem, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,”220-229.
90
Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” 4.

40

in the area named Juyan 居延 (also known as the Edsen-gol region) at the northern tip
of Hexi Corridor in the early twentieth century and the subsequent decades, which
provide new information of the local government functionaries and livelihood of people
within the enclave, 91 the role of the region in Han history is highly emphasized. For
example, in his two-volume work on the development and expansion of the Han empire,
Chang Chun-shu 張春樹 focuses mainly on the Han penetration into and establishment
on the Hexi Corridor. In a similar tone of Frederick Jackson Turner, Chang highly praised
the achievement of the Han expansion to the “new world”—Hexi region and its
contribution to the development of Chinese civilization.92
However, the geographic focus of the present study is the whole northwestern region
of the Han dynasties, which is largely commensurate with largely correspond to
present-day provinces of Gansu and Ningxia, with the addition of small portions of
northeastern Qinghai 青海 province and western and southern Inner Mongolia; the Hexi
Corridor in northern Gansu is only a piece of the whole jigsaw. As the subsequent
chapters will show, the northwestern region of the Han times went through a process of
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expansion and coalescence to bring together several areas that sharing common
topographical, ethnic, socio-economic, and cultural features but differing considerably
from the imperial center; the geographic concept of Han northwest should not be
confined to the Hexi Corridor. Focus of this study lies especially in the area corresponds
to present-day southern Gansu, where Dong Zhuo and many other northwestern military
elites of the two Han dynasties flourished.
To study the relationship between the northwestern region and China proper in the
Han times and to investigate how the early Chinese empire dealt with regions with
different cultural tradition and ethnic composition, some models for regional studies
merit particular emphasis as points of departure for the present study. The most famous
and influential regional system for studying China is the one devised by G. William
Skinner. Skinner first applied the analytical methods of central place theory to study the
marketing system and social interactions of nineteenth-century China. 93 Later, he devised
a macroregional system in a panoramic survey to explain the socio-economic
transformation of late imperial China. 94 Skinner divided China into nine “macroregions”,
namely Northeast China, Northwest China, Upper Yangzi, Middle Yangzi, Lower Yangzi,
93

G. William Skinner, Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian
Studies, 2001).
94
G. William Skinner, “Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies,
44.2 (Feb., 1985): 271-292.

42

Gan Yangzi, Southeast Coast, Lingnan, and Yungui, 95 and explained that “each
macroregional economy took shape in and was wholly contained within a physiographic
macroregion that can be defined in terms of drainage basins. Each was characterized by
the concentration in a central area of resources of all kinds.” 96 Skinner focused not only
on the macroregions but also on the subregional systems within macroregions and
adopted the concept of center and periphery to understand the evolution of a region over
time. He pointed out that “the integral wholeness of Chinese history cannot be
approached by generalizing across diversity or by striking an average of the various
regional systems. Rather, a history of the civilizational whole must rest on
comprehension and reconciliation of the distinct but contingently interrelated histories of
its component parts.” 97 Inspired by Skinner’s research, the historian Robert Hartwell also
applied the concepts of center-periphery and subregion in producing a very important
study on the transformation of various aspects of Chinese society during the 800 years
between the ninth and sixteenth century. 98
To employ regional system in studying the Han period, Hsu Cho-yun has made a
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significant contribution. 99 Hsu adopted the concept of core and periphery to construct his
network model of the Han empire, in which he divided Han China into the core areas, the
peripheries, and the borderlands. He described the network of nodes, routes, markets, and
patterns of circulation that channeled the movement of people, goods, and information
within the empire and contributed to political unity. However, he also pointed out that the
Han exchange network was built upon a fragile balance of regional interdependence,
which could be easily upset by disturbances such as war and natural disasters and led to
the breakdown of the national network into regional networks. 100
The aforementioned models offer insightful understanding of the processes of
empire-building and, even, empire-destroying in ancient China. The diversity of regions
shows that the Chinese empire was built on a diverse foundation. Different regions have
their own paths of development and serve different functions in the empire. 101
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This study aims to explore how the regional diversity served as a dynamics of
disintegration of the empire. Skinner has noticed how the regional diversity badly
affected political unity that “in practice policies were often spatially differentiated or
regionally specific, and in any case policy implementation varied radically from one
region to another. Within regions, moreover, policy differences declined as one moved
from inner core to far periphery.” 102 As this study on the northwestern frontier zone will
show, not only policies and regulations but also political culture and vision of empire
were not always in a uniform manner everywhere in the empire as the imperial center
would expect. Compared with the imperial court, perspectives were different in a frontier
region and moved at a regional tempo that regional interests and conditions determined.
Cohesion was desirable from the center, but loose and slow implementation, delayed
responses, discordant practices, and centrifugal inclination were often the realities.
Furthermore, the Han northwestern frontier region in our case was mostly incorporated
風與生計──兼論秦統一天下之背景, in idem, Gengwang shixue lunwen xuanji 嚴耕望史學論文選集
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through conquest and, once became part of the empire, was highly militarized to serve
military purposes; on the other hand, the central and eastern parts of the empire mainly
served as the major sources of fiscal and material supplies. Therefore, they produced
distinctive forms of regional culture and spatial organization. To borrow the sociologist
Charles Tilly’s words, there is a distinction between military and fiscal geographies. 103
The militarized nature of the northwestern region was commonly recognized by the
Han contemporaries. During the Han times, the region was set to be a highly militarized
zone to serve three strategic functions. First, for offensive, it was a military base to
launch attack against the western sector of the Xiongnu empire; for defensive, it posed a
threat to the western flank of the Xiongnu and therefore deterred them from invading the
imperial realm from northwest. Second, it served as a bridgehead for supporting the
imperial ventures to the Western Regions, which was also a crucial part of the grand
strategy against the Xiongnu since the Han statesmen believed that controlling over the
Western Regions would “cut off the right arm of the Xiongnu.” Third, it acted as a wedge
between the Xiongnu and Qiang and hence fended off any possible contact and coalition
between the two peoples, which would otherwise threaten the security of the Han.
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As will be discussed in detail in later chapters, the natural geography and composition
of population all ushered militarization of the region. In such a frontier zone, only the
tough could survive, and not surprisingly it came to have the largest concentration of men
of martial background. The autochthonous population was composed of various groups of
non-Han peoples who were regarded by the Han statesmen as natural-born warriors. The
ethnic Han people in there were also good at military skill. The northwest was the main
source of providing cavalry and military talents in the Han times. Beside garrison soldiers,
the majority of Han population in the area was composed of re-settled refugees, convicts,
and other people whom were regarded by the officials as would-be social harm. They
were sent to the northwest to take up colonization duties and lessen the pressure they
would exert on the interior of the empire. The influx of ethnic Han people, on one hand,
intensified ethnic conflict and resource competition among different groups and finally
led to the outbreak of large-scale armed confrontation; on the other hand, for various
reasons, the process of assimilation took place between the Han colonizers and
autochthonous peoples and consequently forged a new identity of northwesterner, which
finally fostered a military force to challenge the imperial center. No matter it was due to
state sponsorship or for the pursuit of survival, people of the northwest were willing and
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able to resort to military means to dissolve their problems and hence accelerated the
militarization of such a frontier society.
Militarization is in fact not only a military process but also a social phenomenon. 104
In this study, militarization refers to the condition that most institutions and sectors of a
society are shaped to support the exigencies of war and the preparation of war and all
kinds of resources are appropriated for military purposes. Militarization can be divided
into two types: “sanctioned militarization” and “spontaneous militarization.”
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Sanctioned militarization is a top-down process, which is initiated and controlled by the
state to transform society into an efficient military force to serve its military purposes. It
represents the strengthening of state authority over society and constitutes a centripetal
force. By contrast, spontaneous militarization is a bottom-up process, which is initiated
by local armed communities to serve their own purposes and will act as a centrifugal
force to undermine the state authority and military monopoly. Both processes can be

104

In his study of militarism, Emilio Willems has shed light on understanding the process of militarization,
see A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism: An Anthropological
Approach (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1986), 1-13. Militarization and militarism are not
necessarily the same thing, for the differences between the two concepts, see Michael Szonyi, Cold War
Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 247-248.
105
My definition and classification of militarization is benefited from the relevant discussions in Willems,
A Way of Life and Death; Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1970), especially 32-35 and 64-65; Szonyi, Cold War Island; Huang Jinlin 黃金
麟, Zhanzheng, shenti, xiandaixing : jindai Taiwan de junshi zhili yu shenti, 1895-2005 戰爭、身體、現代
性 : 近代臺灣的軍事治理與身體, 1895-2005 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxiangongsi,
2009).

48

found in Chinese history and the nature of their relationship is in relative terms as strong
sanctioned militarization would keep the spontaneous one in bay and vice versa. For
instance, the Qin state adopted various political and social measures to militarize its
population and finally achieved the conquest of its rival states. 106 In contrast, when the
spontaneous militarization of the northwest grew stronger than the sanctioned effort of
the Later Han state, it became the harbinger of dismembering the empire.
As a frontier zone, the northwest was doubtlessly being militarized under the imperial
sponsorship. However, the mixed demographic composition and the ensuing struggles
among the inhabitants unavoidably enhanced locally initiated militarization. Especially
after the outbreak of the Qiang wars in the second century CE, most of the northwest
turned into battlefield; violence was widely spread and became an integral part of
everyday life, which fostered rapid militarization among the northwestern people. 107
Worse still, when the Qiang got the upper hand in the confrontations, the desperate
imperial court was tempted to give up the northwest and let the local people to defend
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themselves if they did not evacuate with the local functionaries. While facing the chronic
violence without adequate support from the imperial center, local communities could
only rely on themselves. As a result, the war-ridden northwest became a hotbed of
spontaneous militarization, which in turn de-legitimized the imperial court and gave rise
to ambitious men like Dong Zhuo.

Sources and Organization
In recent decades, studying archaeological findings, unearthed wooden and bamboo strips
in particular, has become the mainstream of Qin-Han scholarship. In many recent studies,
the role of new findings even overshadows that of the traditional textual sources.
However, in order to have a big picture of the Qin-Han history, both received textual
sources and archaeological findings have to be used. For certain topics such as the
present study, traditional textual sources still play the primary role while excavated
sources only provide supplementary information.
This study depends primarily on received Chinese textual sources, especially three
traditional Chinese “standard histories,” namely (1) Shiji 史記, compiled by the official
historians of the Former Han Sima Tan 司馬談 (d. 110BCE) and his son Sima Qian 司
馬遷 (ca. 145-86BCE). It spans from the mythical period to the early first century BCE,

50

covering the reigns of the first five emperors of the Former Han; (2) Hanshu 漢書, a
work collectively compiled by a famous Later Han literati family of which Ban Gu 班固
(32-92CE) as representative. It records history of the Former Han dynasty; (3) Hou
Hanshu 後漢書, compiled by Fan Ye 范曄 (398-445CE), and contains the treatises by
Sima Biao 司馬彪 (240-306CE). It is the history of the Later Han dynasty. Needless to
say, Hou Hanshu is the most essential one in studying the history of Later Han. 108
Besides, Sanguozhi 三 國 志 , a standard history compiled by Chen Shou 陳 壽
(233-297CE), which covers the last decades of the Later Han and the ensuing Three
Kingdoms period (220-265CE) provides important information of the men who took part
in the turmoil happened in the last years of Later Han and witnessed the demise of the
empire.
A wide span of other traditional textual sources also serve important function in the
present study, to name only a few, such as Jijiu pian 急就篇, a primer of the Han times;
Qianfu lun 潛夫論, a collection of essays written by a Later Han scholars in the midst of
the dynasty; Fengsu tongyi 風俗通義, a work compiled by a scholar-official in the last
years of the Later Han; and Dushi Fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要, a seventeenth century
108
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geographical work.
Apart from the above received textual sources, epigraphic sources, especially stone
steles and epitaphs, are critical body of evidence for studying the Later Han world. 109
Modern collections compiled by Chinese and Japanese scholars such as Hanbei jishi 漢
碑集釋 and Kandai sekkoku shūsei 漢代石刻集成 provide extremely valuable help in
using those sources. This study also takes into account relevant archaeological sources
from the period and region under question as possible; in certain cases, some unearthed
bamboo and wood strips will be used to support my arguments.
This Introduction, as Chapter One, has provided an overview of the themes and lays
out the general framework that guides this study.
Chapter Two focuses on the natural and political landscapes of the northwestern
region. It adopts a longue durée approach of tracing the trajectory of development of the
region since the pre-Han period and stretches how the northwestward expansion of
Chinese regimes re-structured the region in various aspects.
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While Chapter Two focuses on the land, Chapter Three centers on the people. It
analyzes both the elites and common people of the northwest and their political and social
status during the two Han dynasties. Special attention is given to the changing status of
the northwestern military elites and their deteriorating relationship with the imperial
center during the Later Han.
Chapter Four first investigates the background and course of the protracted military
confrontation between the Later Han and the so-called Qiang people and its devastating
impact on the empire; then analyzes the debates over abandoning the northwestern region
and the ensuing forcible withdrawals, which intensified the estrangement and conflict
between the northwesterners and the scholar-officials at imperial center.
The final chapter summarizes the main themes of this study, provides a full picture of
the role that the northwestern region played in the Later Han empire, and considers the
implications of this work to our understanding of early medieval Chinese history.
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2
Opening New Territory & Partitioning the Space:
Natural and Administrative Geographies of the
Han Northwest

When Zhang Qian 張騫 (fl. 140s-110s BCE) first set foot on the soil of Longxi 隴西,
then the westernmost commandery (jun 郡; one level of Han administrative divisions;
the whole empire was divided into dozens of commanderies) of the Former Han dynasty,
sometime during the 130s BCE, he must have seen a scenery very different from that of
Chang’an, the imperial capital, and Hanzhong 漢中, his native commandery in the
southwest. As Zhang traveled northwestward through Longxi, he left the Former Han
territory and entered the Xiongnu dominated Hexi region. Zhang was captured by the
Xiongnu and detained for over a decade until he was able to flee and continue his journey
to Inner Asia.
Zhang Qian was well known in Chinese history as a pioneer and explorer in
establishing official diplomatic relationship between the Han empire and various Inner
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Asian states. His saga of exploration was set against the backdrop of the Han-Xiongnu
confrontation. 1 When Emperor Wu 武 (r. 140-87BCE) of the Former Han learned that
the Yuezhi 月氏 2 people were defeated and expelled by the Xiongnu from the Hexi
Corridor, he called for volunteers to take up a mission to the Yuezhi, in the hopes of
forming an alliance with them and launching joint attack on the Xiongnu. Zhang, an
attendant of the imperial court, responded to the emperor’s call with others. By recruiting
volunteers instead of appointing officials to lead a formal emissary, it reveals that the
mission was a secret diplomacy in its nature. Crossing boundaries to conduct a diplomatic
mission without Xiongnu authorization was obviously an act violated contemporary
“international” norms, as the Xiongnu Chanyu 單于 3 questioned Zhang Qian when the
latter was under custody, “The Yuezhi is to our north, how could the Han send mission to
there? If I want to send mission to the Yue [the southern neighbor of the Han], would the
1
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Cultural and Political Relations (I),” 74. Also, for the origins and history of the Yuezhi, see Craig Benjamin,
“The Origin of the Yuezhi,” in Craig Benjamin and Samuel N. C. Lieu eds., Walls and Frontiers in Inner
Asian History (Sydney: Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, 2002),
101-130.
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English-language literature adopt the term “Shanyu.” In fact, according to the ancient Chinese lexicon
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Han let me to do so?” 4 月氏在吾北，漢何以得往使？吾欲使越，漢肯聽我乎？ Also,
such a stealth mission only played an auxiliary role in the Han’s grand strategy against
the Xiongnu (as Zhang’s long-term detention in the Xiongnu and then his failure of
reaching agreement with the Yuezhi did not hinder the Han military campaigns against
the Xiongnu); the main thrust that the Han relied on was military forces. Although Zhang
Qian failed his mission, the knowledge about Inner Asia that he acquired during the
journey contributed valuable information to the Han westward expansionist policy.
Not long afterwards did the situation change. Within two decades after the Chanyu
questioned Zhang Qian, the Former Han conquered the Hexi Corridor and the Xiongnu
was forced to retreat from the region. When Zhang proceeded to Inner Asia for his second
mission in 119BCE, he was safe from the Xiongnu to travel through the Hexi Corridor.
The Former Han gradually set up garrisons and administrative units in the Hexi Corridor.
The northwestern region, which included the newly conquered Hexi region and the
neighboring commanderies, formed a unit called Liang province (Liangzhou涼州) in the
late years of Emperor Wu when the whole empire was divided into thirteen inspectoral
jurisdictions called province (zhou 州; each includes several commanderies), which

4

Sima Qian 司馬遷, comp., Shiji 史記 (hereafter SJ), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), 123:3157.
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gradually transformed into full-fledged administrative region equipped with its own
military forces in the Later Han times.5 The word Liang literally means “cool” or “chilly”
and the province was designated as “Liang” because “it is located in the west and [its
weather] is always severely chilly.” 6 地處西方，常寒涼也. Such a description sheds
light on the Han people’s perception of Liang province in terms of its natural
geographical characteristics.
Climatic and topographical features provide us a geographical setting for
understanding the character and development of this northwestern borderland. Beside the
physical landscape, the political landscape of Liang province also constitutes an integral
part of our studying of this frontier society. As most geographers and geographical
historians would agree, “Administrative geography─the way a state divides space─can
also tell us much about conceptions of political community and its modes of inclusion
and exclusion.” 7 Such is the case of Liang province. The establishment and evolution of

5

For recently published comprehensive studies on the evolution of the function of province in the Han
dynasties, see Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 167-243; Zhou Changshan 周長山, Handai
difang zhengzhishi lun: dui junxian zhidu ruogan wenti de kaocha 漢代地方政治史論 : 對郡縣制度若干
問題的考察 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006), 76-93; Xin Deyong 辛德勇, “Liang Han
zhouzhi xinkao” 兩漢州制新考, in idem, Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu 秦漢政區與邊界地理
研究 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009), 93-177. Xin has proposed a new theory that the province system
and the inspectoral jurisdictions were two separate institutions and not until the last decades of the Former
Han did the two systems merge.
6
Fang Xuanling 房玄齡, et al., comp., Jinshu 晉書 (hereafter JS), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974),
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administrative jurisdictions in the Qin-Han northwest tell us not only the increased
penetration or retrenchment of the imperial state in the region but also the imperial
conceptions of territory and political community over the region. On the other hand, the
creation of administrative space also influenced the identity of the members of local
society and their attitudes toward the imperial center. After introducing the natural
geography, the remainder of this chapter will provide a chronological account of the
formation of political landscape of the northwestern borderlands in a longue durée
perspective from the pre-Han period to the Later Han times.

Physical Landscape
In terms of both natural environment and culture, the northwestern borderland is a
transitional or intermediate zone linking up China proper and Inner Asia. With such
background, the northwestern region was never fully integrated with China proper and
was persistently regarded by the Chinese regimes as a perilous area full of uncertainty
and potential rivalry. Hence, the northwestern frontier zone had been a prime security
concern of the imperial states and an important topic among statecraft writings until the
late nineteenth century. However, as a modern Chinese historical geographer has pointed

Twentieth-Century China (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 1.
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out, there are minor differences in the definition and delimitation of the northwest in
different historical periods, and it is important to study the northwestern region in a
contemporary context. 8 This study focuses on Liang province, which was the
northwestern region of the Han dynasties, for which the geographical area is not exactly
the same as what is called northwestern provinces in China today. 9 The territories of
Liang province largely correspond to present-day provinces of Gansu and Ningxia, with
the addition of small portions of northeastern Qinghai province and western and southern
Inner Mongolia. Although it is somewhat anachronistic to call the territories “Liang
province” before its formal establishment during the reign of Emperor Wu, this chapter
will sometimes employ the term to roughly refer to the whole area for convenient
description. Considering the ecology and environment of the region have been changing
since antiquity under the influence of natural and human-induced changes, such as
desertification and deforestation, the following descriptions can only be in general terms
and aim to portray some salient geographical features of the region.
Chinese geographers have generalized four salient features of the natural environment

8

Li Xiaocong 李孝聰, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili 中國區域歷史地理 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe,
2004), 10. Tighe has also pointed out that “Exactly what the term Northwest included was imperative.
Different writers and users of the term intended different spatial meanings.” See idem, Constructing
Suiyuan, 92.
9
They include Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xingjiang. See Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 10.
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in the northwestern region. First, it is an arid area with an average annual precipitation of
less than 200 millimeters per year. There are micro-regional variations with the amount of
rainfall diminishes from east to west. Second, the terrain is generally flat as most parts of
the region are constituted by semi-desert, sand desert, stony desert (specifically referring
to the Gobi Desert), mountain desert, and terrene flatland. These areas have been
subjected to long term erosions under the arid climate, which in turn contributes to the
coarse soil texture of the region. Third, this region has long been suffering from the
problem of scarce water resources. Except for the drainage areas of the Yellow River,
most areas only have in-ward flowing rivers which lack permanent flow. Streams source
from the glacier on the surrounding mountains are quickly absorbed by the arid soil once
they reach the flatland below the mountains. Fourth, layers of vegetation in this region
are thin and scattered. Except for certain areas of pasture and forest, most areas are
covered by desert shrubs. 10
The natural landscape of Liang province can be divided into four sectors, namely
southeast, northwest, northeast, and southwest.
1. The southeast sector is roughly equivalent to the southeastern part of present-day

10

Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 11.
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Gansu province. It is on the eastern bank of the Yellow River and is part of the loess
plateau of North China. The deepest layer of the loess reaches 400 meters, which is
also the thickest in the world. Compared with other sectors, this one enjoys a lower
altitude (800-2200 meters in elevation), warmer weather, and larger amount of
rainfall. 11 According to the archaeological and phytogeographic studies, the loess
plateau was more humid and more fertile in ancient times than it is today. During the
Qin-Han period, lush forests existed over large areas in this sector. Although the
whole sector gradually underwent a process of deforestation from the pre-Qin period
onwards, dense forests could still be found in some areas no later than the
mid-eleventh century CE. 12 This sector was suitable for both agricultural and pastoral
activities. Therefore, conflicts between farmers and pastoralists over land resources in
this sector persistently happened in Chinese history. 13 During the Qin-Han period,
11

Ibid, 13-15.
Shi Nianhai 史念海, “Huangtu gaoyuan jiqi nonglinmu fenbu diqu de bianqian” 黄土高原及其農林牧
分佈地區的變遷, in idem, Huangtu gaoyuan lishi dili yanjiu 黄土高原歷史地理硏究 (Zhengzhou:
Huanghe shuili chubanshe, 2001), 386-391.
13
The contenders of conflicts over land resources in this sector cannot be easily placed in the conventional
and yet questionable dichotomy between Inner Asian pastoral nomads from the steppes and sedentary
Chinese farmers. As those pastoralists were not necessarily nomads, nor did they all come from the Inner
Asian steppes. In fact, in order to adapt to the natural conditions, most people of this sector practiced mixed
economy with various degree of reliance on agriculture and animal breeding. For the pastoralists,
pastoralism was the predominant economic activity, but agriculture was still in a secondary and
supplementary capacity. On the other hand, farmers also practiced animal husbandry to a certain extent.
Conflicts between the two groups were mainly caused by farmers’ encroachment, usually under state
sponsorship, on the grazing lands and attempted to turn them into arable lands.
For the definitions and classifications of nomadism and pastoralism, see Anatoly M. Khazanov, Nomads
and the Outside World. Julia Crookenden trans. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994),
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with the help of irrigation works under state sponsorship, this sector was capable of
producing a considerable amount of agricultural products. On the other hand, the
pastures provided an excellent environment for horse breeding. The Former Han state
therefore set up a certain number of horse ranches as a major source of supplying war
horses. Needless to say, this sector was an important base of supporting military
logistics for Liang province.
2. The northwest sector is the famous Hexi Corridor. As mentioned in Chapter One, it is
on the western bank of the Yellow River and therefore corresponds to the western part
of present-day Gansu province. Being confined by the mountain ranges on its north
and south, Hexi Corridor is a long and narrow stretch of land with east-west distance
of around 1000 kilometers and south-north distance varies from several kilometers to
a hundred strong kilometers. The average altitude of this sector varying from 1000 to
1500 meters and the altitude increases from south to north and east to west. This
sector forms a flat passageway between mountain ranges. Within this passageway,
desert and semi-desert areas are studded with oases. 14 Although precipitation rate of
this area is low, some rivers flowing down from the mountains sustain the oases,

15-25.
14
On the natural landscape of this area, see Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, 163-168.
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which provide good havens for both human and animals. 15 According to the Hanshu,
during the Former Han dynasty, the good pastureland there provided the most
abundant sources of cattle, sheep, and horses in the empire. 16 This sector was an
important land of strategic sources for the Xiongnu and became their great loss when
it was captured by the Former Han.
3. The northeast sector corresponds to present-day Ningxia province. This sector is
located between desert and loess plateau and its climate is under the joint influence of
the monsoon zone to its east and the arid zone to its northwest. The mountainous
terrain and the widely scattered basins make the area looks like a checkerboard. It is
an area of dry weather, little rainfall, high evaporation, and strong sandy wind, with
an annual average temperature of 5-9 degrees centigrade. Generally speaking, it is a
semi-desert area and not suitable for agricultural activities. 17 However, after
conquering this area, the Former Han put great efforts to send labor forces in, digging
ditches at certain locations for irrigation and setting up military and farming
settlement points; certain parts of this area were therefore capable of providing a
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Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 13-15.
Ban Gu 班固, comp. Hanshu 漢書 (hereafter HS), (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 28B:1645.
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considerable amount of farm produce. 18
4. The southwest sector occupies the northeastern portion of present-day Qinghai
province, where is also the northeastern tip of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. The
average annual temperature of this area is between 3-9 degrees centigrade. Under the
influence of the easterly monsoon, this area enjoys a relatively warmer temperature
and higher amount of rainfall than its environs. As the Yellow River and its tributary
Huang River (Huangshui 湟水) pass through this area, the river valleys also provide
ideal places for both agricultural and pastoral activities. 19 Therefore, the He-Huang
河湟 (Yellow River and Huang River) region had long been a focal point for
resource struggles in Chinese history between autochthonous peoples and Han settlers.
In the Han times, as will be shown in Chapter Four, it was the area where military
conflicts between the Qiang people and the Han settlers usually broke out.
As we now have a general picture of the natural landscape of the northwestern region,
we can turn to the political landscape in the following sections. I will first give a general
description of the human geography in the northwest in prehistoric era. Then, it will be
followed by a chronological account of the processes of expansion in the northwestern
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Li, Zhongguo quyu lishi dili, 18-21.
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frontier during the Qin-Han period. Based on the division of the four sectors mentioned
above, we will start from the southeast sector, which was close to the Jing 涇 River and
Wei River valleys where the political centers of the Western Zhou (ca. 1045-771BCE),
Qin and Former Han located and was therefore the first northwestern frontier zone during
those periods. Then, we will follow the footprints of the Han armies and advance
northwestward to the Hexi Corridor. Since the following sections focus mainly on the
political landscape of the northwestern borderlands, the cultural and ethnic characteristics
will only be briefly mentioned if necessary and we will return to these features in the
succeeding chapters.

Political Landscape before the Former Han
Archaeologists have generally accepted that, from the Bronze Age onward, a broad
cultural belt in which lifestyle, economic activities, social customs, religious beliefs, and
style of bronze tools all distant from the civilization of China proper gradually formed
along the northern frontier of China. This distinct cultural region is called the “Northern
Zone,” or “Northern Bronzes Complex” of China. 20 Geographically speaking, this

20

For general survey of the Northern Zone from the remotest antiquity to the Warring States period, see
Nicola Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” in Michael Loewe and Edward L.
Shaughnessy eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.
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cultural belt extends from the present-day provinces of Heilongjiang 黑龍江, Jilin 吉林,
and Liaoning 遼寧 in the east, through Inner Mongolia, Hebei 河北, northern Henan
河南, Shanxi 山西, Shannxi 陝西, Gansu, Ningxia, and parts of Qinghai, to Xinjiang in
the west, comprising various natural landscapes such as forest, steppe, and desert. 21
Scholars have pointed out that the Northern Zone is a cultural complex in which
“different communities shared a similar inventory of bronze objects across a wide area”
and “cannot be regarded as a single culture.” 22 In fact, it served as a cultural transition
zone between the civilization of China proper and bronze cultures of Inner Asia and
South Siberia. The socioeconomic systems of this broad cultural belt were mixed in
nature and varied from pastoralism and agriculture in different degrees. 23 Liang province
was on the Northern Zone and under the influence of the northern cultural complex. 24
Archaeological research has clearly demonstrated that traces of human activities and
The most recent and comprehensive English-language archaeological research on the Northern Zone in
prehistoric times is Gideon Shelach, Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China:
Archaeological Perspectives on Identity Formation and Economic Change during the First Millennium
BCE (London: Equinox Publishing Ltd, 2009). A recent Chinese work on this topic is Yang Jianhua 楊建
華, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de xingcheng 春秋戰國時期中國北方文化帶的
形成 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2004).
21
Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 885-888. For detailed analysis of the
territorial extent of the Northern Zone, see Yang, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de
xingcheng, 8-95.
22
Di Cosmo, “The Northern Frontier in Pre-imperial China,” 886.
23
On the different forms of pastoralism, see Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, 17-25.
24
The artifacts excavated in Northwest China such as Ningxia and Gansu display the influence from Inner
Eurasian steppes, for details, see Emma C. Bunker, Nomadic Art of the Eastern Eurasian Steppes: The
Eugene V. Thaw and Other New York Collections (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2002),
24-29 and passim; Yang, Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de xingcheng, passim..
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evidence of agriculture had already existed in the northwestern region as early as around
6000BCE. Various sites of two Neolithic cultures, namely the Majiayao 馬家窰 culture
(ca. 5800-4000BCE) and the Qijia 齊家 culture (ca. 2100-1800BCE), 25 were found
broadly scattered over the He-Huang valley, Hexi Corridor, and their environs. They were
settled and agrarian-based cultures, with pig raising seems to have played an important
role to the Qijia culture. 26 Another important feature of the Qijia culture is the presence
of domesticated horses. 27 Some archaeologists proposed that, based on the metal artifacts
discovered, the Qijia culture might have connection with Siberian and Inner Asian
cultures. 28 The proportion of agriculture found in Qijia sites is lower than that in
Majiayao sites; on the other hand, the proportion of pastoral activities in Qijia sites is
higher than that in Majiayao’s. It shows that the importance of pastoral activities in the
region was increasing during the Neolithic Age. 29
There are four archaeological cultures found in the northwestern region which dated
later than the Qijia culture and roughly corresponds to the period of Shang (ca.
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For the dates and locations of the archaeological cultures mentioned in this section, see Shelach,
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1570-1045BCE) and Western Zhou. They are known as Siba 四垻 (ca. 1900-1500BCE)
in the western Hexi Corridor; Xindian 辛店 (ca. 1600-600BCE), which spread along the
Tao 洮 River, the Huang River, and the upper course of the Yellow River; Siwa 寺窪
(ca. 1300-600BCE), mainly in present-day eastern Gansu province; Kayue 卡約 (ca.
1600-600BCE) in the He-Huang valley. The territorial distribution of these cultural sites
is limited when compared with those of the Qijia culture. 30 However, the large amount of
animal remains, such as dogs, pigs, horses, sheep, and cattle, excavated from human
graves reveals the importance of animal husbandry among these cultures. According to
archaeological research, for example, the Kayue culture, which lasted from the Shang to
Han period, “shows a gradual evolution from a mixed farming and pastoral culture with
settled life to a predominantly nomadic economy. This transition is reflected not only in
an increased number of animal bones and sacrifices, but also in the composition of the
animal stock.” 31 Scholars proposed that it is probably the climatic change that contributed
to the demise of the agrarian-based Qijia culture and the rise of these four pastoral-based
cultures, which practiced migration to certain extent and had crop farming played an
ancillary role. 32 In other words, as the climate turned cold in the late second millennium
30
31
32
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BCE, a gradual transition from agrarian-based to pastoral-based economy took place in
the region. 33 Through comparisons, some Chinese archaeologists even suggest that the
Majiayao and Qijia cultures probably were culturally related to the ethnic Han Chinese
while the other four cultures had a very close relationship with the Qiang and other
non-Han peoples, 34 although further evidence will be needed to prove these hypotheses.
In the Shang times, there were groups of people named Gongfang 工方, Guifang 鬼
方, and Tufang 土方 35 probably located to the north and northwest of the Shang in the
area corresponds to present-day northern Shaanxi and Shanxi, and even extends to the
western fringe of Gansu and Ningxia. Qiangfang 羌方, or simply Qiang, on the
northwest also consistently posed threat to the Shang The wars between these peoples
and the Shang clearly demonstrate that the Shang was facing a rival northern frontier.

factor contributing to the socio-economic change in the Northern Zone is not as important as past
scholarship have led us to believe. See Shelach, Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China,
62-68.
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According to the traditional account, it was the Zhou who overthrew the Shang in the
eleventh century BCE. As its political center was located in the Wei River valley, which
near its western border, the Western Zhou state faced potential threats from its western
neighbors such as the Xianyun 玁狁 and/or the Quan Rong 犬戎. 36 In the last decades
of the Western Zhou, when relations with the Rong quickly deteriorated, military
confrontations broke out in the area between the lower reaches of the Jing and Luo 洛
Rivers and the Wei River valley, which was very close to the Zhou capital. The
relationship between the two sides was complicated since the Zhou was not always a
victim of “barbarian” invasions as later Chinese people believed. In fact, on one hand, the
Rong repeatedly launched deep incursions into Zhou territory and it was the Quan Rong,
located north of the Wei River valley, who finally toppled the Western Zhou state; on the
other hand, the Zhou not only incorporated the Rong within its domain but also expanded
northwestward to conquer the Rong and their lands outside the Zhou realm. 37
In the process of northwestward expansion, the northwestern frontier of Zhou was
36

The relationship between the Xianyun and Quan Rong has long been a debatable topic among scholars.
In a recent research, Li Feng suggested that the name Quan Rong was a term used in the later texts to refer
to the same people who were called Xianyun in the Western Zhou sources. In short, Quanrong and Xianyun
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actually carved out of the territory of the Siwa culture, which was developed in the upper
Wei River and Tao River valleys in eastern Gansu. Archaeologists have pointed out that
the Zhou and Siwa cultures “overlapped each other both temporally and spatially as their
sites were often located side by side, together forming an important aspect of the
landscape in these regions.” 38 Also, “although the Zhou culture was predominant during
the early Western Zhou as a result of territorial expansion, the Siwa culture constituted
another important cultural layer that coexisted with the Zhou culture throughout the entire
Western Zhou period. Some non-Zhou elements in the bronze culture of the upper Jing
River valley were clearly associated with the northern steppe region. By the late Western
Zhou, even tombs with overwhelming northern features began to appear in the region.” 39
Although there is no strong link between the Siwa culture and the historical Xianyun,
both written sources about the Xianyun and archaeological findings of the Siwa culture
clearly depicted a crescent-shaped alien cultural sphere along the northwestern frontier of
the Western Zhou. 40 The war between the Western Zhou and the Xianyun not only
showed the conflicting nature of the northwestern frontier but also presaged the
38
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consistent conflicts between the expanding Chinese state and the autochthonous peoples.
In 771BCE, the Quan Rong sacked the Western Zhou capital and killed the Zhou
King, a new Zhou King moved to Luoyang and left the former royal domain to
competition between the Rong and Qin, the westernmost regional polity in the Zhou
fengjian hierarchy. In fact, the Qin had a long history of dealing with the western
“barbarians.” 41 According to the Shiji, the Qin leader had marriage relationship with the
Western Rong since the mid-Western Zhou period. Later, King Xuan 宣

(r.

827/25-782BCE) of the Western Zhou appointed a Qin leader named Qinzhong 秦仲 as
military commander to attack the Western Rong. However, Qinzhong was killed. With
military aid from King Xuan, Qingzhong’s five sons avenged their father and defeated the
Western Rong. 42 Thereafter, military confrontation between the Qin and the Western
Rong never ceased. 43
With the Zhou royal court retreated from the Wei River basin, the Qin gradually
developed into a strong state and assumed a leading position in the region. The new
41
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situation intensified conflicts between the Qin and Rong. On one hand, the collapse of the
Western Zhou state stirred up a large-scale migration of the Rong into the erstwhile royal
domain and now Qin territory; on the other hand, the Qin launched military campaigns to
the north and northwest against the various groups of Rong and annexed their lands, for
which the Qin was called as “the hegemon of the Western barbarians.” Both ways
resulted in large presence of non-Zhou people in the region. That might have been one of
the crucial reasons why the Qin was denigrated as savage “barbarians” by the
contemporary politicians in the east.
Over the long course from the eighth century BCE onward, the Qin penetrated into
the northwestern area and later constructed long walls to enclose the newly conquered
northwestern areas which extended west into Gansu and Ningxia. 44 With the completion
of long walls along the northern and northwestern borders, the Qin possessed “huge areas
that had never before been part of the Zhou culture sphere, but had for centuries been
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According to some archaeologists, people of the Xindian culture were forced to retreat to the Huang
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inhabited by nomadic or semisedentary livestock-raising populations. The original
inhabitants were presumably either pushed out or forced under the repressive,
revenue-producing agricultural regime of Qin.” 45
In order to exercise effective administration, the Qin establish counties (xian 縣) in
the new lands. Commanderies were established later to coordinate the military forces of
the counties and to assume the military, mainly defensive, duty. 46 Many counties
established by the Qin had close relationships with the Rong and other non-Qin people,
which marked the achievements of the westward conquest.
45
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Chūgoku kodai kokka to gunken shakai 中国古代国家と郡県社会 (Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2005), which
includes many recently released wooden and bamboo slips, and Shimoda Makoto 下田誠, Chūgoku kodai
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uses bronze weapons as historical evidence to examine the development of commanderies in some Warring
States regimes. There is only a handful of English-language studies on this topic, for a general study, see
Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Chapter
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For the most recent examinations on the Qin commanderies and counties, see Hou Xiaorong 后曉榮,
Qindai zhengqu dili 秦代政區地理 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2009); Xin Deyong, “Qin
Shihuang sanshiliu jun xinkao” 秦始皇三十六郡新考, in Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu, 3-92.
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In 688BCE, according to the Shiji, Duke Wu 武 (r. 697-678BCE) of the Qin
conquered the Gui 邽 Rong and the Ji 冀 Rong and established probably the first two
counties in Qin history over the two places. 47 During the reign of Duke Mu 穆 (r.
659-621BCE), the Qin reached its first peak of westward expansion by launching
large-scale expeditions against the Rong and annexing a vast size of new territory. 48 The
reign of King Zhaoxiang 昭襄 (r. 306-251BCE) marked another tide of Qin’s westward
expansion. In 271BCE, the Qin conquered the territory of Yiqu 義渠, a strong power
among the Rong. The newly acquired land was so vast that the Qin divided it into the
three commanderies of Beidi 北地, Longxi, and Shang 上. 49
The historical records leave some traces of the fact that many Qin counties were
established at the expense of the “barbarians.” In Neishi 內史, the metropolitan area
covering the Qin capital and its vicinity, 50 there were counties set up on the former Rong
domain. For example, Linjin 臨晉 county was captured from the Dali 大荔 Rong and
Liyi 驪邑 from the Li 驪 Rong. 51 Although there is no clear evidence to show that
those former Rong places still included Rong inhabitants (they probably did), it is beyond
47
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doubt that the jurisdiction of Didao 翟道 had a dominant “barbarian” population since
dao 道 was a county-level special district, which was probably invented by the Qin and
inherited by the Han, for administrating “barbarians.” 52 In addition, the character di 翟
is probably a variant form of the character di 狄, a gross term referred to the northern
“barbarians.” In Beidi commandery, there was Yiqu county that was named after the Yiqu
Rong and also Wuzhi 烏支 county named after the Wuzhi Rong. In Longxi commandery,
besides counties named after the Rong such as Shanggui 上邽, Ji, and Mianzhu 綿諸,
there were many dao: Didao 狄道, Didao 邸道, Gudao 故道, Yuandao 獂道, Biandao
辨道, Rongdao 戎道, Wududao 武都道, Yudao 予道, and Bodao 薄道. 53 Some of their
characters such as Di, Yuan, and Rong obviously carry “barbarian” connotations.
As the westernmost commandery, Longxi marked the furthest extent of the westward
territorial expansion of the Qin. Long walls were constructed in the commandery during
the reign of King Zhaoxiang to delineate the western boundaries. 54 In 220BCE, the
following year of the establishment of Qin empire, the First Emperor (r. 246-221BCE as
king; 221-210BCE as emperor) embarked on a tour to the commanderies of Longxi and
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Beidi, probably for the purposes of imperial aggrandizement and inspection of
fortifications in the northwestern frontier. 55 Later, the First Emperor launched an
enterprise of building long walls, pushing the northwestern walls forward to reach the
western bank of the Yellow River, 56 hence enclosing the northwestern territory of the
empire. 57 The completion of the First Emperor’s long walls signaled an end of the
long-term tide of Qin’s westward expansion, and the Chinese empire would not cross the
northwestern boundaries set by the Qin until the reign of Emperor Wu of the Former Han.

Political Landscape in the Former Han period
In the Hanshu chapter on the Western Regions (Xiyu zhuan 西域傳), there is a neat
account of the advance of the northwestern frontier during the Qin and Former Han
times:

Since the decline of the Zhou, the Rong and the Di had lived intermingled in the north
of the Jing and Wei rivers. When the First Emperor of the Qin expelled the Rong and
55
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Di, [he] built the long walls and demarcated a boundary for the Central State, but did
not cross Lintao to the west.
When the Han arose and till the time of the Filial Emperor Wu, [he] launched
punitive expeditions against the barbarians in the four directions, extending his mighty
power, and Zhang Qian began to open up the tracks of the Western Regions. Thereupon,
the General of Rapid Cavalry captured the territory of the Right Sector of Xiongnu,
bringing the surrender of the Kings of Hunye and Xiuchu, and emptying [the Xiongnu]
out of the land. The construction [of Han fortifications] thus began west from Lingju.
At first, Jiuquan commandery was established; later, migrants were gradually sent in to
fill it. The land was then divided and established [the commanderies of] Wuwei,
Zhangyi, and Dunhuang. The four commanderies were set and two passes were held. 58
自周衰，戎狄錯居涇渭之北。及秦始皇攘卻戎狄，築長城，界中國，然西不過臨
洮。
漢興至于孝武，事征四夷，廣威德，而張騫始開西域之迹。其後驃騎將軍擊破
匈奴右地，降渾邪、休屠王，遂空其地，始築令居以西，初置酒泉郡，後稍發徙
民充實之，分置武威、張掖、敦煌，列四郡，據兩關焉。

This quoted passage states the significant events that happened in the process of the
Qin-Han northwestward expansion and hence provides a good outline for this section to
follow.
As mentioned in the previous section, the Qin expanded its territory at the expense of
the “barbarian” neighbors. Under the efforts of King Zhaoxiang and the First Emperor,
the Qin pushed territorial boundary greatly westward and then built long walls to enclose
the newly conquered lands. 59 Both monarchs’ long walls ended at Lintao 臨洮 county in
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Longxi commandery, which therefore marked the westernmost point of Qin’s frontier. In
fact, not only the west but also other directions did the First Emperor expand his newly
created empire. To the north, in 215BCE, he dispatched General Meng Tain 蒙恬 with a
huge army to expel the Xiongnu from the Ordos region. 60 The Qin army successfully
drove out the Xiongnu and crossed the loop of the Yellow River (Hetao 河套). A good
number of fortified counties were established and settled with soldiers and convicts. Long
walls were also built along the new northern frontier and connected with the western ones.
Upon the time of the completion of the First Emperor’s long walls, the territorial limit of
the Qin empire was clearly defined. 61
Taking advantage of the turmoil between the fall of the Qin and the establishment of
the Former Han, the once being expelled Xiongnu fought back. They re-conquered the
lost territories in the Ordos region, pushing southward, and thus posed threats to the
political center of the Former Han dynasty, which located its capital in the same area as
the Qin. Facing such a formidable enemy to the north, the Former Han could only adopt a
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defensive posture on its northern frontier. 62 Needless to say, the Former Han would have
neither intention nor capability to follow the Qin’s path of westward expansion.
From the sources available, it is difficult to reproduce the exact territorial boundaries
of the northwestern commanderies in the early years of the Former Han. However,
several features of the situations of the region and its environs can still be learned. First,
the Han basically retained the Qin administrative divisions of Longxi, Beidi, and Shang
commanderies in the northwestern region. Second, after the Xiongnu re-conquest, the
boundaries of Beidi and Shang were forced to retreat southward and the sizes of the two
commanderies greatly shrank. 63 Third, the commanderies of Longxi, Shang and Beidi
were facing the Right/Western Sector of the Xiongnu confederacy, 64 and therefore
became a main way through which the Xiongnu made their inroads into the Han
territories. According to the historical records, Longxi was heavily devastated by the
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Xiongnu. 65 Some exact dates of the Xiongnu invasions were marked. For instance, the
Right King of the Xiongnu invaded Shang commandery in 177BCE, and the most critical
moment came in 166BCE when the Xiongnu Chanyu personally led cavalry invaded
Beidi and killed the commandant of the commandery. The contingent of the Xiongnu
forces burnt the Huizhong Palace 回中宮 in Beidi and the cavalry scouts even intruded
a long way into the Ganquan Palace 甘泉宮 in the vicinity of the Han capital. To
respond to the crisis, Emperor Wen 文 (r. 180-157BCE) appointed three officials as
General of Shang commandery, General of Beidi, and General of Longxi to station along
the northwestern defense line of the metropolitan area. The commanderies of Shang and
Beidi would remain the areas subjected to the Xiongnu harrying until Emperor Wu
launched large-scale counterattack and the ensuing northwestward expansion.
The Qin and Former Han metropolitan area was located in and formed the core of an
area called Guanzhong 關中 or Guannei 關內, literally “within the passes,” which in a
strict geographical sense refers mainly to the southern portion of modern Shannxi
province, especially the Wei River valley, but in its greatest extent is an area largely
corresponds to the whole Shannxi, with the addition of eastern Gansu and Ningxia,
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northern Sichuan, and the southern portion of Inner Mongolia within the Yellow River
loop. 66 The name Guanzhong tells the special position of the area as it was surrounded by
formidable natural barriers of mountains and rivers and could only be accessed through
several strategic passes and fords. The guan (pass/gate) in the name Guanzhong refers to
the Hangu 函谷 Pass, literally the pass at a box-shaped gorge, and Guanzhong was the
area west of the pass. Therefore, the area was sometimes called alternatively as Guanxi
關西 (west of the pass). On the other hand, the area east of the pass was called
Guandong 關東. The Guanxi area was also known as Shanxi 山西 (west of Mount Yao
崤山; different from present-day Shanxi province), and Guandong as Shandong 山東
(east of Mount Yao, including but not limited to modern Shandong province). The
separation between Guanzhong/Guanxi/Shanxi and Guandong/Shandong constituted a
very important pair of geographical concepts of the Qin-Han period. 67 The relationship
between these two halves within the empire and how they situated in the Han politics and
society will be an important thread in the next chapter. For here, only brief mention of the
relationship between the northwestern borderlands and Guanzhong area will suffice.
66
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Since the founders of both Qin and Former Han depended on Guanzhong as power
base and then underwent a west-to-east conquest to accomplish their empires, both
dynasties adopted a consistent policy of promoting the prominence of Guanzhong and
relying on it to control the whole empire. While numerous kingdoms and fiefs of marquis
were established in Shandong to award imperial kinsmen and meritorious aristocrats
during the Han dynasties, 68 it was not the case in Guanzhong. 69 The whole Guanzhong
region, with the metropolitan area as the core, was under direct control of the Han court.
The commanderies in Liang province, as the western flank of Guanzhong, were also
under direct imperial control. During the reign of Emperor Wu, direct imperial control of
the northwest was vital for commanding further northwestward expansion, coordinating
territorial defense, and supporting the Han presence in the Western Regions.
Thanks to the frontier nature, the northwestern commanderies of Longxi, Beidi,
Tianshui 天水, Anding 安定, 70 Shang, and Xihe 西河 all had close relationships with
the Rong and Di. People of these six commanderies were accustomed to preparing for
warfare and fighting against the “barbarians.” They were especially good at archery and
68
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hunting. During the Former Han dynasty, therefore, military talents of good family
background from these six commanderies were recruited to form the elite corps of the
cavalry who held the responsibility of safeguarding the emperor. 71 They were called the
Liujun liangjiazi 六郡良家子, literally “Good Sons of the Six Commanderies,” and
usually had bright career futures. Many of the famous generals of the Former Han were
from this group of people. 72 Moreover, these areas also constituted the main source of
cavalry of the Former Han. The details of the martial background of the six
commanderies and the role of the LJLJZ in Han history will be given in the next chapter,
and now we should return to the process of northwestward expansion and the ensuing
establishment of new administrative regions.
Until the second decade of Emperor Wu’s reign, Longxi and Beidi were the two
westernmost commanderies of the dynasty, but the situation changed when the Former
Han suddenly captured the Hexi Corridor from the Xiongnu. In fact, it was quite a
dramatic incident in the history of Han-Xiongnu confrontation. In 133BCE, the young
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Emperor Wu determined to turn the table on the Xiongnu and thus plotted to ambush the
Chanyu in a northern frontier town, 73 but he failed as the Chanyu escaped. From 129BCE
onward, Emperor Wu launched a series of expeditions against the Xiongnu. In 127BCE,
General Wei Qing 衛青 (d. 106BCE) made a great achievement by driving the Xiongnu
out of the Ordos region and re-conquering the lost lands of the Qin empire south of the
Yellow River loop. As a result, the Former Han basically resumed the northern territories
of the Qin dynasty. In 121BCE, Huo Qubing 霍去病 (d. 117BCE), the emperor’s most
favored general and the General of Rapid Cavalry mentioned in the quotation at the
beginning of this section, led a cavalry force, departed from Longxi, and marched
northwestward to attack the Xiongnu. He achieved remarkable success. Later, General
Huo launched another successful attack from Longxi and Beidi. While General Huo
obtained successive victories in the western sector of the Xiongnu domain, the angered
Chanyu summoned the King of Hunye 渾邪 and the King of Xiuchu 休屠, the two
kings governed the region, to his court. Knowing that they would be executed by the
Chanyu, the two kings plotted to surrender to the Han. The Han emperor then sent
General Huo to escort the two kings to the Han territory. However, when the King of
73
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Xiuchu saw the Han forces, he changed his mind. The King of Hunye then killed his peer
and surrendered the two tribes to the Han. 74 Suddenly, the former territories of the two
kings—the Hexi Corridor was at the Han’s disposal. In the long term, such a dramatic
incident not only tipped the balance of power between the Han and Xiongnu but also
profoundly changed the geographical composition of China forever.
However, it seems that the Han court at first had no intention of imposing direct
governance on the former territories of the two kings. More precisely, the Han court had
no idea what to do with the surprisingly great spoils. 75 Since the Xiongnu had been
expelled from the Ordos region and the Hexi Corridor, the pressure that they could exert
on the commanderies of Longxi, Beidi, and Xihe was greatly reduced. Therefore, the Han
court moved the paupers from Guandong to fill in the newly restored Ordos region on the
one hand, and reduced half of the garrison soldiers from the west of Beidi on the other.76
Nevertheless, the Han court left the status of Hexi Corridor ambiguous. The different
management between the two regions was probably due to their different values in the
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eyes of Han policy makers. The Ordos region was not only a strategic zone of protecting
the metropolitan area but also a former territory of the Qin empire that the Han might feel
obliged to restore and to strengthen control there. On the contrary, the Hexi Corridor was
beyond the Qin boundaries and had never been part of the Chinese realm. It was a virgin
land to the Former Han with no precedent for governing.
Although the Han captured the Hexi Corridor in 121BCE, it was only in 112BCE that
the Han state established formal administrative units in the region. Shortly after the
conquest of the Hexi Corridor, the Former Han basically left the region intact and only
constructed fortifications along the west bank of the Yellow River. It shows that the
sudden acquisition of a new territory did not arouse immediate interests of the Han policy
makers and they had no further intention to the territory beyond the fortified boundaries.
The extension of direct administration could only be justified and materialized if the new
territory were crucial to the imperial defense strategy or other benefits to the state. During
the interlude of nine years, the war with the Xiongnu and Zhang Qian’s second mission to
Inner Asia were two factors that would influence the formulation of the imperial policy
towards the Hexi region.
The conquest of Hexi region was only one stage in the Han-Xiongnu War, and
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fighting went on after 121BCE. 77 Suffering from a series of defeats, the Xiongnu Chanyu
was forced to move westward and left the Former Han time and space to consolidate its
control over the Ordos region by constructing irrigation facilities, establishing farming
colonies, and moving people to fill in. 78 Since the center of the Xiongnu confederacy had
moved west, the focal point for the Han-Xiongnu struggle accordingly moved, and the
strategic importance of the Hexi region was realized by the Han policy makers.
Meanwhile, in order to fill in the vacuum left by the Xiongnu in the Hexi region,
Zhang Qian submitted his proposal in 119BCE and suggested inviting the Wusun 烏孫
people in the Western Regions to move in to the Hexi Corridor and to form alliance with
the Han against the Xiongnu. 79 With the emperor’s permission, Zhang started his second
mission to the Western Regions in the same year. Why did Zhang Qian have such an idea?
We learn from the Chinese records of the Han period that it was the Yuezhi who were the
dominant inhabitants of the Hexi Corridor before the Xiongnu’s conquest. Although the
origin and identity of the Yuezhi was a great question of ancient Inner Asian history and
77
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scholars have different theories about that, 80 it is basically accepted that by the second
century BCE, the Yuezhi people had established themselves in the Hexi Corridor. In the
same region, there was a smaller group named Wusun. When the Yuezhi were strong,
they killed the Wusun king and captured his land. The Wusun people then fled to the
Xiongnu. 81 Between 200s-170sBCE, the Xiongnu launched severe attacks on the Yuezhi
and drove them from the Hexi Corridor. The majority of the Yuezhi moved further west to
the Amu River valley, where Zhang Qian made his first mission to visit them. Some of
the Yuezhi fled south into present-day Qinghai and others dispersed the neighboring areas.
As Zhang Qian had failed to secure an alliance with the Yuezhi, this time he turned to the
Wusun and tried to bring them back to the Hexi Corridor. If he could succeed, the Wusun
would occupy the region and provide the Han an ally on its western flank. In such
situation, the Former Han could establish a form of hegemonic control over the Wusun
and treat it as a vassal state.82 However, the Wusun were too afraid of the Xiongnu and
had no intention of going back to the Hexi region. 83 When Zhang brought the refusal
back to the Han court in 115BCE, it left the Han no choice but to consider the possibility
80
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of ruling the Hexi Corridor directly and imposing territorial control.
In 112BCE, two matters helped materialize the formal establishment of administrative
units in the Hexi Corridor. In 112BCE, the associates dispatched by Zhang Qian during
the second mission returned with delegates of various Inner Asian states and the frequent
formal communications between the Han and the Western Regions thereupon started. 84
The importance of Hexi Corridor serving as the main route connected Inner Asia was
recognized by the Han state. In the same year, the Qiang who had dispersed along the
western frontier revolted. Emperor Wu dispatched army to suppress them, and sent tens
of thousands of labors crossed the Yellow River to build fortified towns on the west bank.
The situation now required a more dense military presence, new administrative units had
to be created to anchor state activities. According to the Shiji, thereafter, the
commanderies of Zhangye 張掖and Jiuquan 酒泉were established. Large-scale state
farms and fortifications were also set up in the frontier commanderies; in total six
hundred thousand people were moved in for garrison and farming. Vast amount of
resources were delivered from the interior of the empire to support the newly established
northwestern frontier. 85 It is clear that the revolt of the Qiang people enhanced the
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awareness and determination of the Han state to establish formal governance over the
Hexi region. One of the purposes of this decision was “to segregate the Qiang from the
Xiongnu and cut off the communications between the north and the south.” 隔絕羌胡，使
南北不得交關. 86 The Hexi corridor thus served as a wedge between the Xiongnu to the
north and the Qiang to the south and prevented any possibility of collaborative attack
against the Han. Furthermore, Liang province as a whole and the Hexi Corridor in
particular served as an artery connecting the imperial center and the newly explored
Western Regions. For such purpose, Liang province became a vein providing manpower
and other resources, whether extracted locally or transferred from other parts of the
empire, to support the Han outposts in Inner Asia.
Although the four commanderies of Hexi, namely Wuwei 武威, Zhangye, Jiuquan,
and Dunhuang 敦煌 were famous in Chinese history, their exact dates of establishment
are still debatable. Standard histories such as Shiji, Hanshu, and Hou Hanshu have no
accurate data provided. Before the excavation of the Han bamboo and wooden strips
along the northwest from the early twentieth century onward, scholars could only depend
on their interpretations on the relevant entries in standard histories to infer the date. With
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the introduction of the unearthed new sources, historians can re-examine and narrow the
time span of founding dates of the four commanderies, although clear-cut answers are
still far from obtained. Since the exact dates of establishment is a question beyond the
thesis of this study, I will just list some representative views held by Japanese, Chinese,
and Western scholars in the following table for reference.
Michael Loewe 89

Hibino Takeo

Chang Chun-shu

日比野丈夫 87

張春樹 88

Hexi 河西 90

115BCE

──

──

Jiuquan 酒泉

111BCE

111BCE

104BCE

Zhangye 張掖

108-107BCE

111-109BCE

104BCE

Dunhuang 敦煌

100-97BCE

98 or 94BCE

Certainly before
91BCE

Wuwei 武威

67BCE

78-67BCE

81-67BCE

(most likely 72BCE)

Table 1: Founding dates of the four Hexi commanderies

No matter when the four commanderies were set up exactly, their establishments
marked the real annexation of the region into the Han empire and the gradual
development of the region. In order to implement the imperial policies of development
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and colonization, the Former Han moved people from Guandong to fill up the Hexi
region. The practices of compulsory and recruited migrations and setting farming
colonies in the newly conquered frontiers could be traced at least back to the Qin dynasty
and were commonly seen in the Former Han times.91 When the Qin expelled the Xiongnu
from the Ordos region, large numbers of people were moved in to sustain the defensive
works, new towns, and state farms. 92 Except for soldiers, most of the people who moved
to the new borderlands were the poor, convicts, and other groups of low social status.
New counties were established to strengthen the imperial control over the area. With the
downfall of the Qin dynasty, however, most newly set up frontier counties were exposed
to the Xiongnu attack and most inhabitants fled to the interior. When the Former Han
came into power, the reestablishment of the whole northern frontier line became an
urgent topic. 93 Under the efforts of the first few emperors, the borders between the
Xiongnu and the Han were basically delimited. The next step was to strengthen defensive
measures. During the reign of Emperor Wen, an official named Chao Cuo 鼂錯 (d.
155BCE) put forwarded his proposals of founding permanent settlements on the frontier
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with encouraging policy to enhance the migrant families’ motivation for staying there. 94
Chao also suggested employing surrendered “barbarians” to serve on the frontiers since
they were good at fighting and had good knowledge of the northern borderlands and the
practices of the Xiongnu. 95 Chao’s plans were endorsed by the emperor, though we do
not know much about how the measures were put into action.
When the tide of expansion came in Emperor Wu’s reign, even larger numbers of
people were moved from Guandong to the new frontier zones. Local resources were
nevertheless inadequate to support the new migrants, countless labor forces, corps, and
other kinds of resources were mobilized from the east to back up the colonization
enterprises. A historian of Emperor Wu’s court stated that the costs were so huge that the
imperial coffers were thus empty. 96 It might be exaggerated to a certain degree but not
completely fictional. Since the newly conquered northwestern borderlands were not
productive arable lands that would be able to sustain a large agrarian population, it
required enormous investment to set up all the fortifications, farming settlements, local
government seats, and other relevant facilities. For example, Emperor Wu once moved
700,000 Guandong people, who suffered from flooding and ensuing famine in their home
94
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regions, to the Ordos region and the southern part of modern Gansu, and they all relied
upon government subsidies. 97 Although such a large-scale migration would lessen the
pressure from which the natural disaster inflicted on Guandong, it still caused huge
spending from the state.
In economic terms, the revenue/benefits of the new territories were certainly minimal,
if any at all, when compared with the costs of acquisition and control. For the emperor
and the officials who supported the expansionist policy, the costs were bearable to serve
strategic needs. The pattern of Guandong financially supporting the newly conquered
northern and northwestern borderlands reminds us Charles Tilly’s classification of
financial/fiscal and military geographies and his notion of contradiction between spatial
organization for civil and military needs. 98 In our case, it also implied the possibility that
if the imperial policy makers changed concerns, they might have different calculation and
perceptions of the costs spent on the northwest, and their attitude toward holding the
region might change. It was what happened in the Later Han period, and we will return to
this in the succeeding chapters.
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Beside the four Hexi commanderies, a commandery named Jincheng 金城 was set
up in 81BCE that straddled the Yellow River by detaching two counties each from the
commanderies of Longxi, Tianshui, and Zhangye. The establishment of Jincheng was
mainly due to the needs of managing and supervising the Qiang people. Jincheng would
be an important area and battlefield in the Han-Qiang relationship, for which details will
be given in Chapter Four. Apart from commanderies, Dependent States (Shuguo 屬國) 99
were established

along the frontier by Emperor Wu and his successors to settle

surrendered “barbarians.”
When Emperor Wu divided the imperial realm into various provinces, the
commanderies along the northwestern frontier, including Longxi, Tianshui, Anding,
Jincheng, Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiuquan, and Dunhuang, 100 coalesced into Liang province.
The whole northwestern frontier zone was thus formed as a single inspectoral, and later
administrative, unit. Except for Longxi, a very old administrative unit that could be traced
back to the Qin times, all the commanderies in Liang province were new establishments
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by Emperor Wu and his great-grandson Emperor Xuan 宣 (r. 73-49BCE). The territories
of Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiuquan, and Dunhuang, as well as a portion of Jincheng were the
first time became part of the Chinese empire; their Han population all moved from the
interior of the empire. It is also worthwhile to note that the establishment and finalization
of the commanderies in Liang province spanning the reigns from Emperor Wu to
Emperor Xuan, covering the period when the Former Han experienced both the peak of
power and the onset of decay. Expansion ended with Emperor Xuan’s demise. 101
As the migrant population was the backbone of the imperial control over the
borderlands, the management of the population became an important aspect of imperial
governance. The “Treatise on Geography” (Dili zhi 地理志, literally “Treatise on
Terrestrial Organization”) of the Hanshu contains figures of the population census carried
out in 2CE, which provides data of demographic distribution of the Former Han in its last
decade. 102 Based on the data, we can have a general picture of the administrative units of
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Liang province and its population figures as the table below shows. 103
Number of
Counties

Number of
Households

Population

Longxi 隴西

11

53,964

236,824

Tianshui 天水

16

60,370

261,384

Anding 安定

21

42,725

143,294

Jincheng 金城

13

38,470

149,648

Wuwei 武威

10

17,581

76,419

Zhangye 張掖

10

24,352

88,731

Jiuquan 酒泉

9

8,137

76,726

Dunhuang 敦煌

6

11,200

38,335

Table 2: Data of Northwestern Commanderies in 2CE

The above data gives a general picture that the more southern the region, the larger
the population and the number of counties, and vice versa. The household and population
figures are, of course, only the number of people registered by the state; people who were
not on the official register, especially the tribal people, is nowhere to be known. Besides,
there were several dependent states established in the jurisdiction of Liang province for
settling the surrendered “barbarians,” but no population figure existed. Although the Han
histories stated that the Hexi Corridor was empty of the Xiongnu sometime around
112BCE, 104 it might just be the rhetoric of describing the withdrawal of Xiongnu military
forces from the area. It would be hard to imagine that the area became a “no-man’s-land”
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and no single Xiongnu or other autochthonous peoples stayed there. The same situation
should be true in the southern commanderies such as Jincheng, Longxi, etc., since those
commanderies not only had a long tradition of autochthonous societies but also were
permeable to the “barbarians” lived along or beyond the Han political boundaries. On the
other hand, most, if not all, of the population registered in the newly established
commanderies should be the people who moved from other parts of the empire and
responsible for the duties of garrison, farming, and other relevant colonization tasks. The
combination of new migrants with lower social status from different parts of the empire,
old inhabitants of the area, and autochthonous tribal peoples made Liang province an
ethnically complex frontier society, which in turn contributed to the estrangement
between the northwestern borderlands and the imperial center in the Later Han period.
The importance of population registration is also showed by another fact in the
Treatise and other historical records. Although the Treatise has listed all the number and
name of counties under every entry of commandery, it does not clearly indicate the
territorial limits of the empire. From both textual and archaeological sources, we know
that boundary stones within and/or between commanderies were common all over the
empire to serve as markers of the boundaries of jurisdictions and especially the taxable
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areas. 105 However, the territorial boundaries of the empire as a whole were mentioned
only in a vague manner in the historical records, by describing the farthest extent of a
region or referring to some topographical features. When comparing the detailed data of
the population census with the vague description of the territorial limits of the empire, it
may tell us that the empire might not be thought of as a territorial entity but rather in
terms of the peoples that were subject to the imperial rule. Population census and
household registration were thus important means of imperial governance as through
them the imperial state could control the mobility of its subject and know who the
potential soldiers and taxpayers were and where they could be found. Hence, the
boundaries of the empire were not the territorial boundaries but the boundaries of the
people subject to the state. 106 This might also help to explain why the Later Han state
easily inclined to give up the northwestern territories and only to pull the officials and
registered households out of the area when the Qiang wars seemed to be uncontrollable.
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Political Landscape in the Xin and Later Han period
As the tide of northwestward expansion of the Former Han receded with the death of
Emperor Xuan, large-scale migration and colonization to the northwest was halted. The
establishment of administrative units within Liang province was also finalized, and the
province enjoyed a period of prosperity and stability till the end of the dynasty. This was
mainly benefited from two achievements made by Emperor Xuan. First, the suppression
of the Qiang rebellion in 61BCE temporarily solved the Qiang problem and consolidated
the Han control over the province. Secondly, the submission of Xiongnu Chanyu to
Emperor Xuan in 51BCE assured the ensuing peace between the two powers and thus
greatly reduced the defensive pressure of Liang province, especially along the Hexi
Corridor. 107 In the period of relative stability, which lasted nearly five decades, the Han
military forces even retreated from some outposts along the northwestern borders and left
those fortifications deserted. 108
Liang province as an administrative unit was intact until Wang Mang was in power
and launched a series of programs reshaping the administrative geography of the empire.
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In 4CE, Wang Mang divided the whole empire into twelve provinces and renamed some
of them according to the records of officially sanctioned canon. Accordingly, Liang
province lost its independent status and was coalesced into the metropolitan area and its
vicinity to form a Yong 雍 province. In 12CE, Wang Mang adopted the names in the
classics to reformulate and rename the provinces into nine. 109 Liang province was still
part of Yong province under the new division. 110
Wang Mang’s foreign policy also went hand in hand with the restructuring of
administrative geography. Shortly before his establishment of the twelve provinces, Wang
Mang forced some Qiang tribes to surrender their land which contiguous to Liang
province. A new commandery called Xihai 西海, literally West Sea, was thus set up.
According to the Hanshu, Wang was eager to acquire the land and give it the name of
Xihai since the Former Han empire had already had the commanderies of Donghai 東海
(East Sea), Nanhai 南海 (South Sea), and Beihai 北海 (North Sea), and Wang was
109

For Wang Mang’s reforms of regional administrative units, see Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,”
144-161. For general studies on Wang Mang’s classics-orientated reforms, see Dubs, The History of the
Former Han Dynasty, Volume Three, 506-536; Rudi Thomsen, Ambition and Confucianism: A Biography of
Wang Mang (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1988); Hans Bielenstein, “Wang Mang, the restoration of
the Han dynasty, and Later Han,” in CHOC v. 1, 223-290; Michael Puett, “Centering the Realm: Wang
Mang, the Zhouli, and Early Chinese Statecraft,” in Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern eds., Statecraft
and Classical Learning: The Rituals of Zhou in East Asian History (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 129-154; Higashi
Shiji, Ō Mō: juka no risō ni tsukareta otoko 王莽：儒家の理想に憑かれた男 (Tokyo: Hakuteisha, 2003).
110
In fact, Wang was completely obsessed with the nomenclature of administrative unit as an integral part
of his classics-orientated blueprint of the ideal world. As a result, not only the names of provinces but also
those of most commanderies and counties were subjected to frequent changes, which finally threw the
administrative system into chaos. For details, see HS, 99B: 4136-4137.

102

strongly inclined towards the completion of the “Four Seas” commanderies as a proof of
his majesty and benevolence covering the whole known world. 111 The new Xihai
commandery was added to Liang province and then became part of Yong province. It also
served as a place where Wang exiled tens of thousands of people who committed offenses
under his new law code. 112 However, the Qiang were in fact reluctant to make the
submission and thus tried to retake the land by coercive means. 113 Later, Wang broke the
stable relationship with the Xiongnu and deployed numerous soldiers and laborers along
the northern and northwestern frontiers in the hope of conquering the northern enemy.
Zhangye commandery served as one of the important depots for the campaign. 114
Needless to say, military operations stirred up instability within Liang province.
Wang Mang’s Xin dynasty only lasted fifteen years, and the imperial order had
already devolved into chaos when its days were numbering. Various regional military
powers arose to take advantage of such situation. Among those contenders, Wei Ao 隗囂
(d. 33CE), Dou Rong 竇融 (fl. 5-30sCE), and Lu Fang 盧芳 (fl. 10s-40sCE) were
related to Liang province. 115
111
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Wei Ao was from a magnate family in Tianshui commandery and had been serving
various government offices since his youth. When the Xin dynasty was in turmoil, a
paternal uncle of Wei Ao gathered clansmen and other local strongmen to raise a rebel
army. Because of his reputation and knowledge, Wei Ao was elected to be the leader. 116
Wei quickly became the strongest power in Liang province. When Emperor Guangwu of
the Later Han started to extend power to the west, initially, he tried to pacify Wei and
seek his support by showering him with lavish honors and acknowledging him as the
supreme commander of the west. 117 However, the honeymoon period did not last long.
Wei was ambitious to be an independent ruler and would not wholeheartedly endorse the
imperial unification project; on the other hand, Emperor Guangwu would not allow any
Former Han territory break away from his “restored” Han dynasty. Conflicts between
them were unavoidable. To defeat Wei, the emperor would need Dou Rong to be an ally.
During the civil war, Liang province was in fact partitioned between Wei Ao and Dou
Rong. While Wei based his power in the southern part, Dou controlled the Hexi Corridor.
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Although a native of Fufeng 扶風 commandery, a part of the Former Han metropolitan
area, Dou Rong had a very close relationship with Liang province and had inherited a
solid power base in the Hexi Corridor since two of his family members had been grand
administrators of commanderies in Laing province and one had been military officer
supervising the Qiang. Besides, Dou himself was appointed by the Xin dynasty as
Commandant of the Zhangye dependent state (Zhangye shuguo duwei 張掖屬國都尉)
and was on intimate terms with other prominent officials, local strongmen, and the Qiang
tribal leaders along the Hexi Corridor. 118 Prestigious family background and social
networks enabled Dou easily to assume leadership in the Hexi region during the chaotic
period. Dou differed from Wei as he was willing to follow the Later Han emperor. This
resulted in different fates for the two men. Dou Rong surrendered to the emperor and
contributed greatly in the final conquest of Wei Ao. Dou himself therefore received great
honors and held a high position in the imperial court, and his family would become one
of the most influential consort families in the Later Han history.
Another Liang province origin contender was Lu Fang, who was a native of Anding
commandery. 119 According to the official history, which unquestionably took a stand on

118
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HHS, 23: 795-797.
HHS, 12: 505.
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the Later Han, Lu Fang was an imposter who claimed himself a descendent of Emperor
Wu and thus gathered followers around him. Lu established very close relationship with
the Xiongnu, the Qiang, and other “barbarian” groups. Later, under the auspices of the
Xiongnu, Lu was named Han emperor though in fact acted as a proxy for the Xiongnu by
harrying along the Later Han northern and northwestern frontiers. 120 When Emperor
Gunagwu consolidated its governance over the empire, Lu saw there was no hope to
challenge the Later Han. He then sought asylum in the Xiongnu and stayed there over a
decade until his death.
The death of Wei Ao and Lu Fang and the submission of Dou Rong marked the full
incorporation of Liang province into the newly formed Later Han dynasty. In its early
years, the Later Han basically followed the regional administrative division of the Former
Han. Liang province officially restored its name and status as a top level regional
administrative unit. 121 It was during the reign of Emperor Xian 獻 (r. 190-220CE), the
young emperor installed by Dong Zhuo and also the last Later Han sovereign, that Liang
province as an administrative unit faced another time of abolition. In 194CE, as the
southern part of Liang province was occupied by rebels and out of the Later Han control,
120

HHS, 12: 506.
For the development of province system in the Later Han period, see Xin, “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao,”
162-176; Kojima, Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai, 244-271.
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the imperial court announced the separation of the Hexi Corridor from Liang province
and renamed it as Yong 廱 province, probably for the purpose of separating the Hexi
region from the rebellious area. Later, in 213CE, Chancellor Cao Cao 曹 操
(155-220CE), who was now the de facto ruler controlled Emperor Xian, launched a
program of reformulating the whole empire into nine provinces. Since only the northern
part of the nominally existing Later Han was under his control, the effect of Cao’s reform
was limited. Nevertheless, Liang province was abolished and became part of the
reinstated Yong province. Several years later, the last Later Han emperor was deposed by
Cao’s son, who then proclaimed himself the founding emperor of a new dynasty and the
province division would turn over a new leaf.
During the Later Han times, Liang province still served the important military
function as it did in the Former Han dynasty. First, in the early years of the Later Han,
inherited the worsening foreign relations from Wang Mang, the whole northern and
northwestern frontiers, as well as the Western Regions once again became the frontline of
military confrontation between the Chinese regime and the Xiongnu. Liang province was
a component of the imperial defensive line in general and a depot for launching
expedition against the Xiongnu to the northwest in particular. Secondly, it served as an
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artery connecting the imperial center and the Western Regions. As the struggles between
the Later Han and the Xiongnu over the control of the Western Regions grew fierce,
Liang province took up the role of supplying manpower and other resources for the Han
presence in Inner Asia. For these reasons, as a usual practice of the Former Han, vast
numbers of soldiers, convicts, labors, and their families were voluntarily or involuntarily
sent to the northwest. Thirdly, conflicts between the empire and the Qiang became intense
from the early years of the Later Han and devastating wars with the Qiang lasted from the
middle period to the last years of the dynasty. The southern part of Liang province thus
became battlefield. When the Qiang gained the upper hand, the Later Han state even
evacuated its officials and people from the war-ridden area and left southern Liang
province at the mercy of its enemies. Liang province was consequently devolved into
chaos in the last decades of the Later Han and was one of the first regions which resisted
the authority of the imperial center. Meanwhile, ambitious military strongman like Dong
Zhuo took advantage of the complicated situation, accumulated his power, took control of
the imperial court, and finally triggered the disintegration of the Later Han empire.
Comparing with the Former Han times, Liang province was often in turmoil during
the Later Han. Its administrative divisions and population also underwent sea changes.
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We are fortunate to have data of population census that conducted in 140CE and
information of the administrative units in the “Treatise on Commandery and Fief-state”
(Junguo zhi 郡國志) of the Hou Hanshu, 122 which provide us a general picture of the
administrative geography and demography of Liang province in the middle period of
Later Han. 123
Number of
Counties

Number of
Households

Population

Longxi 隴西

11

5,628

29,637

Hanyang 漢陽

13

27,423

130,138

Wudu 武都

7

20,102

81,728

Jincheng 金城

10

3,858

8,947

Anding 安定

8

6,094

29,060

Beidi 北地

6

3,122

18,637

Wuwei 武威

14

10,042

34,260

Zhangye 張掖

8

6,552

26,040

Jiuquan 酒泉

9

2,706

----

Dunhuang 敦煌

6

748

29,170

Zhangye Shuguo
張掖屬國

5

4,656

16,952

Zhangye Juyan Shuguo
張掖居延屬國

1

1,560

4,733

(formerly Tianshui, name changed in
74CE)

Table 3: Data of Northwestern Commanderies in 140CE
122

HHS, 19-23: 3385-3533. For the Later Han population, see Bielenstein, “The Census of China during
the Period 2-742 A.D,” 125-163; Lao, “Population and Geography in the Two Han Dynasties,” 83-102; Ge,
Zhongguo renkoushi, v.1, 399-425 and 493-500. For a general survey of the Junguo zhi in a
historiographical perspective, see Mansvelt Beck, The Treatises of Later Han, 175-195.
123
B. J. Mansvelt Beck has pointed out that there is a problem of anachronism in the treatise as it does not
reflect the actual situation, for instance, in the northwestern provinces in the 140’s but the situation of the
empire at its greatest extent. See B. J. Mansvelt Beck, The Treatises of Later Han, 193-194.
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According to the Treatise, the Later Han province of Liang consisted of twelve
administrative units: ten commanderies and two dependent states. The population and
household numbers only refer to those on the government register, as already mentioned
in the analysis on the 2CE data; even the numbers of the two dependent states would not
contain all of the surrendered “barbarians” in the jurisdictions, not to mention those not
registered by the state. Moreover, the treatise does not fully reflect the actual situation in
Liang province in 140CE. For example, under the threats of the Qiang, the commanderies
of Anding and Beidi were moved inland in 111CE, moved back in 129CE, and moved
inland again in 140CE. The Treatise does not mention these administrative changes and
only provides “the situation of the empire at its greatest extent—even if it entails
anachronisms.” 124
Nevertheless, if we compare the 140CE data with the 2CE data, we will see the
changes over the one century and realize some features of the Later Han Liang
province. 125

124
125

Mansvelt Beck, The Treatises of Later Han, 194.
HHS, 23: 3516-3521.
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Former Han

Later Han

Counties

Households

Population

Counties

Households

Population

Longxi

11

53,964

236,824

11

5,628

29,637

Tianshui/
Hanyang

16

60,370

261,384

13

27,423

130,138

Anding

21

42,725

143,294

8

6,094

29,060

Jincheng

13

38,470

149,648

10

3,858

8,947

Wuwei

10

17,581

76,419

14

10,042

34,260

Zhangye

10

24,352

88,731

8

6,552

26,040

Jiuquan

9

8,137

76,726

9

2,706

----

Dunhuang

6

11,200

38,335

6

748

29,170

Wudu

----

----

----

7

20,102

81,728

Beidi

----

----

----

6

3,122

18,637

Zhangye
Shuguo

----

----

----

5

4,656

16,952

Zhangye
Juyan
Shuguo

----

----

----

1

1,560

4,733

Total

Household

Population

Household

Population

362,636

1,517,573

92,491

409,302

Table 4: Comparison of the two sets of data

By roughly comparing the total population numbers of the equivalent region between
the two Han dynasties, it is very obvious that the population of Later Han Liang province
lost more than 1,100,000 registered people.
For the twelve administrative units of the Later Han Liang province, the
commanderies of Wudu and Beidi were newly added from the neighboring Yi 益
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province and Bing 并 province, respectively, and the two dependent states were newly
established along the northwestern-most tip of the province. Therefore, we will focus
mainly on the commanderies which already existed in the Former Han period in order to
see the changes over the region. Among those “old” commanderies, it is clear that there
was a very drastic population drop, especially in the southern portion. The commanderies
of Longxi, Tianshu/Hanyang, Anding, and Jincheng suffered tremendous population loss;
county numbers of Tianshu/Hanyang, Anding, and Jincheng also dropped, and
particularly drastic in Anding. Those once-populated areas became, numerically, sparsely
populated. The main reason for these tremendous changes was due to the Qiang wars. As
the southern portion of Liang province (i.e. the commanderies of Longxi,
Tianshu/Hanyang, Anding, and Jincheng) was the battlefield of the Qiang wars, it went
without saying that large numbers of people fleeing the province or taking advantage of
the chaotic situation to hide away and erase themselves from the taxpayer roster. Pulling
out the commandery seats of Anding and Beidi twice during the Qiang wars, details will
be given in Chapter Four, only aggravated the situation. Besides, great casualties could be
expected in the incessant chaos. Along with the tremendous loss of registered population
was diminishing state control of the affected area. In contrast, a large number of Qiang
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people and other “barbarians” who had previously lived along the borders rushed into
Liang province, especially the southern portion. The massive influx of non-Han peoples
finally resulted in their overwhelming population in Guanzhong and the ensuing chaotic
situation of the area in the period after the fall of Later Han. 126
This chapter has already outlined the salient features of natural geography and
development of administrative geography of the region equivalent to Liang province in
the Later Han period, and also touched upon the militarized nature and complex ethnic
characteristics of the frontier society. With this background knowledge, we shall move to
the next chapter to examine how the friction between the northwestern region and the
imperial center grew, intensified, and influenced the fate of the empire.

126

de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, 417-437.
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3
Being Peripheralized:
The Northwesterners in the Later Han Empire

In 167CE, General Zhang Huan 張奐 (104-181CE) might be relieved when his request
to transfer his registered place of residence from the northwestern frontier to the interior
of the empire was granted. Transference of registered residence from a frontier
commandery to an inner commandery was prohibited by the Later Han law; it was only
Zhang’s astonishing military feats that earned him such an unprecedented imperial favor.1
Known in the Later Han history as one of the three greatest heroes of the Qiang wars,
Zhang Huan, whose style name (zi 字) was Ranming 然明, was a native of Yuanquan
淵泉 county in Dunhuang commandery; with Huangfu Gui 皇甫規 (104-171CE),
whose style name was Weiming 威明, and Duan Jiong 段熲 (d. 179), whose style name
was Jiming 紀明, the three men were all from Liang province and were given by their
contemporaries the moniker the “Three Brilliants of Liang Province” (Liangzhou

1

HHS, 65: 2140.
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Sanming 涼州三明). 2 It was not merely because the word Ming 明 in their style names
means “brilliance” and “brightness” but also a compliment regarding them as the three
brilliant men of Liang province.
As a famous general who had just successfully quelled the Qiang rebels spreading
across three provinces, Zhang Huan was undoubtedly an icon of Liang province.
However, Zhang was unwilling to have his household registered in his native province
and dared to ask for the imperial favor of transferring to Huayin 華陰 county of
Hongnong 弘農 commandery near the Later Han capital as a special reward to his
military achievements. 3 Later, when Duan Jiong assumed the position of superintendent
of the metropolitan region and Hongnong was in his jurisdiction, he intended to move
Zhang’s household back to Dunhuang as a means to avenge their conflicts during the
Qiang wars. Zhang Huan was terrified and promptly wrote a very humble letter to appeal
to Duan’s mercy. Duan was deeply moved by the letter and therefore spared the
supplicant and his family. 4

2

The three generals’ biographies were in the same chapter of Hou Hanshu, see HHS, 65: 2129-2154. For a
full English translation of the three biographies, see Gregory Young, Three generals of Later Han
(Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1984). On the three generals in Later
Han politics, see Chen Yong 陳勇, “Liangzhou sanming lun” “涼州三明”論, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 中國史
研究 1998.2: 37-48.
3
HHS, 65: 2140.
4
HHS, 65: 2141-2142.
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Zhang Huan’s story compels us to ask: Why did such an eminent man so detest being
registered in a frontier commandery and was so desperate to move to an inner one? What
made him eager to move out from his native Liang province? What was the advantage(s)
or benefit(s) of being a registered resident of an inner commandery? What was the
motivation behind his move? The prohibition of transferring registered residence from the
frontiers to the interior of the empire implied that the central authority felt the need to
curb any potential movement; otherwise a large amount of transference would be
expected. Furthermore, by trying to move Zhang Huan and his family back to Dunhuang,
Duan Jiong’s means of revenge was intriguing, and Zhang Huan’s plea for pardon
showed how desperate he was in an attempt to save himself and his family from returning
to the frontier. Zhang Huan’s success might be a unique case, but his desire to move
might not be exceptional and might be shared by some of his compatriots. Zhang Huan’s
story provides us clues to understand the contemporary perception of the northwestern
commanderies and their residents and their status vis-à-vis the Later Han empire. Also,
the fact that the three greatest war heroes of the Qiang wars were all from Liang province
cannot be treated as a mere coincidence. It is a compelling evidence of the militarized
nature of the northwestern borderlands.
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Unlike the previous chapter, which focuses on the land, this chapter focuses on the
people. In the following sections, I shall first introduce the settlers and their descendants
in the northwestern borderlands during the two Han dynasties and the military nature of
this frontier society. Then, I shall discuss the factors which influenced the change of
political status of the northwest and its military cohort in the Later Han period and
analyze how the change affected their relations to the imperial center. Given the limited
historical sources for studying the northwestern settlers, I shall focus mainly on the
military elite of the region and give a try to depict the lives of those nameless common
settlers if possible.

Peopling a Borderland
As shown in Chapter Two, most of the territories of Liang province were the spoils of the
northwestward expansion of the Qin-Han empire. From the Spring and Autumn period
onwards, accompanied with the gradual territorial sprawling, not only were the remaining
autochthonous peoples, willingly or unwillingly, subjected to the Qin-Han suzerainty, but
also substantial numbers of people were moved from the east to the newly conquered
lands to support the territorial control of the state. In this long course of several hundred
years, a great variety of migrants, including soldiers, cashiered officials, political exiles,
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amnestied convicts, 5

economic refugees, adventurers, slaves, and their families

constituted waves of migrations to the northwestern borderlands and took up the roles of
garrison soldiers, pioneers, and colonists. They formed the backbone of the imperial
projects of expansion and consolidation of the region. Even after the tide of
northwestward expansion ebbed, the Han state still kept sending migrants in. The influx
of substantial numbers of Qin-Han settlers into the northwestern borderlands
fundamentally changed the political, economic, cultural, and ethnic compositions of the
region. Meanwhile, the settlers were also influenced by the environment and neighbors of
their new home. Certainly, the origins and social backgrounds of the settlers were
extremely complicated as they were from different places with different local cultures,
had different social status, and arrived the northwest at different times. However, after
several generations, they gradually took root in the region and fostered their own regional
identities.
Although extant literary and non-literary sources preserve only small scraps of
information about the Qin-Han settlers in the northwest, especially about the period
5

Amnesty here does not mean that the state set the convicts free but commutes sentence of death to hard
labor or exile. For the punishments, including death penalty, hard labor, and exile, and amnesty of the
Former Han, see A. F. P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, volume 1: Introductory Studies and Annotated
Translation of Chapters 22 and 23 of the History of the Former Han Dynasty (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955),
102-134 and 225-250. Although the abundant evidence unearthed in recent decades has made the book a bit
dated, Hulsewé’s work is still the most comprehensive English-language introductory study of the received
textual sources on the topic.
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before the large-scale expansion during the reign of Emperor Wu, it is still possible to
have a sketch of the settlers by digging into the available sources. Among the settlers,
based on the development of their political status and family fortunes in the Qin-Han
period, two categories can be roughly distinguished, namely the elite group and the
non-elite group. Surely, there was no strict dichotomy between the two groups as in the
process of social mobility non-elite men could establish themselves as elites and elite
families could lose their status for various reasons. Such a distinction is made on the basis
of the sources available. Needless to say, the extant histories provide comparatively
detailed stories of the elites and slender information of the non-elite group. I shall
introduce the elites first and the non-elite group later; the autochthonous peoples is a
topic of the next chapter.
In a land with tough natural environment and plagued by incessant struggle with alien
peoples like the northwest, the most common and quickest way of achieving upward
social mobility would be through military merit. The Qin-Han state also encouraged and
sanctioned militarization of the region as a means to strengthen territorial control, not to
mention launching further expansion. Serving both functions of the frontier between the
Han and the Xiongnu and the strategic artery connecting the interior of the empire and
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the Western Regions, needless to say, the northwestern commanderies were highly
militarized as the Hanshu describes that the grand administrators of the area “all put
military affairs as their top priority.” 6 咸以兵馬為務. The Former Han not only repaired
and strengthened the Qin long walls in the old commanderies but also extended the walls
to and set up dense defense networks in the newly founded Hexi commanderies. 7 Besides
the garrison soldiers, a significant portion of the settlers were potential fighters, the
“barbarous” autochthonous peoples notwithstanding. Violence was an everyday life of the
settlers and the prevalence of martial spirit became a custom of the region during the two
Han dynasties. Remember Zheng Tai’s speech, quoted in Chapter One, that Liang
province produced the strongest and fiercest soldiers of the empire and even women and
girls there were accustomed to wielding weapons. 8 A Han primer named Jijiu pian 急就
篇 also retains the Later Han people’s impression of the northwest as the battlefront
against the alien enemies: “The strong crossbows of Jiuquan and Dunhuang, stationed
along the frontier and upholding the bastions to guard against the Hu and the Qiang, from
near and afar all come to kill the king of the Rong, the realm of the Han will be

6

HS, 28B: 1645.
For good summary of the Former Han’s efforts on building defensive works along the northwestern
frontier, see Wang, Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan, 116-149. Loewe, Records of Han Administration, vol. 1
studies the unearth documents from some spots on the defense line.
8
HHS, 70: 2258-59.
7
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prosperous and all under Heaven will enjoy peace.” 酒泉彊弩與敦煌，居邊守塞備胡羌，
遠 近 還 集 殺 戎 王 ， 漢 土 興 隆 天 下 安 . 9 Liang province, with both old and new
commanderies, was designed as a bastion to protect the western flank of the empire.
It went without saying that military value would be particularly prevalent among
people of the region. In fact, well before the reign of Emperor Wu, when the power of the
Qin-Han empire was still limited to the east bank of the Yellow River, some of the early
settlers in the western commanderies, such as Longxi, Tianshui, and Beidi, were already
skilled in archery and horsemanship and therefore established themselves as the military
elites of the region. Their golden age came with the imperial expansion under Emperor
Wu and his successors. Their splendid military prowess enabled them to climb the social
and political ladder and establish prosperous military careers. As the “Treatise on
Geography” of Hanshu describes,
Tianshui, Longxi… as well as Anding, Beidi, Shang commandery, and Xihe, are all
closely located to the Rong and the Di, [their people] are in a state of warlike
preparedness, admire bravery and martial prowess, and pay utmost attention to the
skills of shooting and hunting. Therefore, the Odes of the Qin says… “The king
9

Si You 史游, Jijiu pian 急就篇, in Siku Quanshu 四庫全書 vol. 223 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji
chubanshe, 1987), 61. Most contents of the Jijiu Pian were written by Si You in the Former Han times, but
the last 128 words in the extant version, including the above quotation, were added by anonymous Later
Han author(s). For the introduction of the text, see Zeng Zhongsha 曾仲珊 annotated, Jijiu Pian 急就篇
(Changsha: Yuelu shushe ,1989). For a recent study of the excavated version of the Jijiu pian, see Zhang
Nali 張娜麗, Seiiki shutsudo monjo no kisoteki kenkyū : Chūgoku kodai ni okeru shōgakusho dōmōsho no
shosō 西域出土文書の基礎的研究 : 中国古代における小学書・童蒙書の諸相 (Tōkyō : Kyūko
Shoin, 2006), 85-131.
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mobilizes the troops, polishes our armors and weapons, and goes for campaigns with
the sons [of the region].” When the Han arises, the good sons of the six
commanderies are selected and recruited to be [the royal guards of] the Yulin and the
Qimen. Their martial prowess makes them officers, and many famous generals come
out from among them. 10
天水、隴西……及安定、北地、上郡、西河，皆迫近戎狄，修習戰備，高上氣
力，以射獵為先。故《秦詩》曰……「王于興師，修我甲兵，與子偕行」……
漢興，六郡良家子選給羽林、期門；以材力為官，名將多出焉。

It is clear that valor and martial prowess were prevalent in the six commanderies which
spreading along the north and northwest of the Former Han metropolitan region: Longxi,
Beidi, Tianshui, Anding, Shang, and Xihe. Their people were good at fighting. The
military elites among them, known as the Liujun liangjiazi (Good Sons of the Six
Commanderies), briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, were especially recruited by the
imperial court to form the royal guards, which produced many famous generals of the
Former Han dynasty.
As shown in the previous chapter, the Qin-Han people commonly held a view on the
difference between the areas of Shanxi/Guanxi (the west of Mount Yao or the Hangu Pass)
and Shandong/Guandong (the east of Mount Yao or the Hangu Pass) as the former was
the area known for martial prowess and producing military men while the latter was

10

HS, 28B: 1644.
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known for refined culture and breeding civilians. 11 The six commanderies of Longxi,
Tianshui, Beidi, Anding, Shang, and Xihe were important components of the region of
Shanxi/Guanxi and critical sources of providing military men. Among the six
commanderies, Longxi, Tianshui, Beidi, and Anding were all within the jurisdiction of
Liang province and played a crucial role in the military history of the Former Han
dynasty. Besides the aforementioned “Treatise on Geography,” the complier of the
Hanshu also made another comments on the martial atmosphere in these four
commanderies,
Since the times of the Qin and Han, [the region of] Shandong produces civil
ministers and [the region of] Shanxi produces military generals.… The Han arises,
Wang Wei and Gan Yanshou of Yuzhi [county], Gongsun He and Fu Jiezi of Yiqu, Li
Guang and Li Cai of Chengji, Su Jian and Su Wu of Tuling, Shangguan Jie and Zhao
Chongguo of Shanggui, Lian Bao of Xiangwu, Xin Wuxian and [Xin] Qingji of
Didao, were all well known for their valor and martial prowess. The fathers and sons
of the Su’s and Xin’s were famous and were thus recorded with praise. However,
besides them, there were still innumerable [fathers and sons like them but were not
recorded]. Why [were there so many of them]? [The commanderies of] Tianshui,
Longxi, Anding, and Beidi of Shanxi region are closely located to the Qiang and the
Hu. The people [of these commanderies] get used to be in a state of war
preparedness, honor valor and the skills of horsemanship and archery. As the Odes
of the Qin says, “The king mobilizes the troops, polishes our armors and weapons,
and goes for campaigns with the sons [of the region].” It is the traditions and
customs since antiquity. As the legacy of such culture, its folk songs are still
enthusiastic today. 12
11

Fu, “Handai de Shandong yu Shanxi,” 65-80; Xing, “Shishi Handai de Guandong, Guanshi yu Shandong,
Shanxi,”180-210.
12
HS 69: 2998-99.
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秦漢已來，山東出相，山西出將。……漢興，郁郅王圍、甘延壽，義渠公孫賀、
傅介子，成紀李廣、李蔡，杜陵蘇建、蘇武，上邽上官桀、趙充國，襄武廉襃，
狄道辛武賢、慶忌，皆以勇武顯聞。蘇、辛父子著節，此其可稱列者也，其餘
不可勝數。何則？山西天水、隴西、安定、北地處勢迫近羌胡，民俗修習戰備，
高上勇力鞍馬騎射。故《秦詩》曰：
「王于興師，修我甲兵，與子皆行。」其風
聲氣俗自古而然，今之歌謠慷慨，風流猶存耳。

As the compilation of the Hanshu was completed in the reign of the third emperor of the
Later Han dynasty, to a certain degree, it shows that the compiler(s) and even the
contemporary people held the view that Shanxi region, especially the four commanderies
mentioned, was famous for producing military men in the Qin-Former Han period.
Furthermore, in the Hou Hanshu, it is said that an official named Yu Xu 虞詡 quoted in
his memorial an adage, “Guanxi produces military generals and Guandong produces civil
ministers,” 13 關西出將，關東出相. These all reveal that the civil and military dichotomy
between the regions of Shanxi/Guanxi and Shandong/Guandong was commonly held by
the Han people and hence forged a stereotype of the two regions.
The names mentioned in the above passage were all those of famous military officials,
general officers, and diplomats of the Former Han dynasty. Except for Su Jian and his son
Su Wu, who were natives of Tuling county in the Former Han metropolitan region (and
yet still part of Shanxi/Guanxi region), all of the people on the list were of northwestern
13

HHS 58: 1866.
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provenance. The following biographical vignettes introduce these and some other military
icons and celebrities of Liang province in both Han dynasties, so that we can have a
general impression of their military career path and the role that the Liang province
military elites played in the period under discussion.
For the men of the Former Han times, I listed them in the order that their names
appear in the Hanshu passage quoted above.
1. Wang Wei 王圍 was from Yuzhi 郁郅 county in Beidi commandery. Although no
details of his life were given in the Hanshu, according to the “Treatise on Arts and
Letters” (Yiwen zhi 藝文志, which is basically the catalogue of the imperial library)
of Hanshu, there was a book called Shefa 射法 (The Method of Archery) by a Wang
Wei who had the title of General of the Strong Crossbow (Qiangnu Jiangjun 強弩將
軍). 14 Considering the fact that Wang Wei of Yuzhi was a famous military man and
the people of the northwest were good at archery, it is highly possible that he was a
master of archery, a commander of crossbowmen, and a writer on archery skills.
2. Gan Yanshou 甘延壽 (d. 24BCE), also from Yuzhi, earned his fame in the Han
history because of a remarkable military achievement. Gan was a typical Liujun
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liangjiazi as he started his career by serving in the elite royal guards of the Yulin 羽
林 and, later, the Qimen 期門. He was good at archery and horsemanship and had
unusual physical strength. In 36BCE, he was appointed Protector General of the
Western Regions (Xiyu Duhu 西域都護), which was the superintendent of Han
forces in the Western Regions. 15 Following the plan designed by his associate Chen
Tang 陳湯 (d. 12BCE), Gan mobilized the Han and non-Han troops at his disposal
to unleash a pre-emptive strike on Zhizhi 郅支 Chanyu of the Xiongnu, who was
staying at a makeshift fortress in Inner Asia after his failure in the power struggle
among the leadership of the Xiongnu. After a fierce battle, Gan and Chen killed and
beheaded the Chanyu, which was an unprecedented victory over the Xiongnu. Gan
was therefore ennobled as a marquis. 16
3. Gongsun He 公孫賀 (d. 91BCE), a native of Yiqu county in Beidi, was a grandson
of Gongsun Hunye 公孫昆邪 (fl. 150s-140s BCE), who was a famous general
during the reign of Emperor Jing 景 (r. 157-141BCE). 17 As examined in the previous
chapter, Yiqu county was named after the Yiqu people of the Western Rong. The
15
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Gongsun family was good at fighting and horsemanship and the name Hunye was
perhaps a transliteration of a non-Han name (given that one of the Xiongnu kings who
surrendered the Hexi region was the King of Hunye), the Gongsun family was
possibly alien in origin. Gongsun He served with credit as a cavalryman when he was
young. He was promoted rapidly during the reign of Emperor Wu and achieved
outstanding military merits by taking part in the expeditions against the Xiongnu and
was thus ennobled. In his old age, Gongsun He was appointed Chancellor. In a
response to the appointment, Gongsun He described himself as “a man who grew up
in rustic periphery, and became official because of horsemanship and archery.” 18 本
邊鄙，以鞍馬騎射為官. However, Gongsun He and his son, who was also a senior
official, were implicated and executed in the notorious case of witchcraft (Wugu 巫
蠱), which caused a large-scale purge in the last years of Emperor Wu. 19
4. Fu Jiezi 傅介子 (d. 65BCE), another native of Yiqu, started his career by serving in
the military and made his name in two adventurous diplomatic missions. About
77BCE, Fu as the Inspector of the Imperial Stables was sent to the Western Regions

18
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as the delegate to interrogate the kings of Qiuzi 龜茲 and Loulan 樓蘭 for the
liability of killing the Han envoys. The two kings surrendered and Fu took the
advantage of killing the Xiongnu envoys who were visiting Qiuzi. Fu was rewarded
and promoted after his return to the imperial capital. He then persuaded the regent
Huo Guang 霍光 (d. 68BCE) to have the kings of Qiuzi and Loulan put to death in
order to prevent any potential trouble. With Huo’s permission, Fu went on his second
mission and beheaded the king of Loulan. He was hence ennobled as a marquis.20
5. Li Guang 李廣 (d. 119BCE) was a native of Chengji 成紀 county in Longxi
commandery. Well known as the “Flying General” (Fei Jiangjun 飛將軍), Li Guang
was not only one of the most famous generals of the Former Han dynasty but also a
renowned military figure in Chinese history. He was a famous archer grew up in a
family with a long military tradition. According to the “Treatise on Arts and Letters,”
a work entitled General Li’s Art of Archery (Li Jiangjun Shefa 李將軍射法) was
attributed to him. 21 He served the emperors Wen, Jing, and Wu, and spent nearly his
whole life on fighting against the Xiongnu. His three sons were all military officers. 22
6. Li Cai 李蔡 (d. 118BCE), also from Chengji, was a cousin of Li Guang and served
20
21
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the court with him in the same period. Although not as famous as his cousin, Li Cai
had a more prosperous career. During Emperor Wu’s reign, Li Cai was appointed
General of Light Chariots (Qingju Jiangjun 輕車將軍) under the command of the
Grand General Wei Qing and was granted a marquisate as a reward of his
achievements. In 121BCE, he was appointed Chancellor. 23
7. Shangguan Jie 上官桀 (d. 80BC), a native of Shanggui 上邽 county of Tianshui
commandery, served in the royal guards of the Yulin and the Qimen when he was
young. He impressed Emperor Wu with physical strength and was then promoted
Director of Palace Stables and later Minister of Transport (Taipu 太僕). 24 He might
have taken part in a large-scale military expedition to the Western Regions. 25 When
Emperor Wu was on deathbed, he entrusted his eight-year-old successor to Huo
Guang, Jin Midi 金日磾 (d. 86BCE), Shangguan Jie, and Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊
(152-80BCE). In order to secure his prominent position, Shangguan Jie even married
his granddaughter to the young emperor. However, the fortune of the Shangguan
family did not last long. Shangguan Jie and his son lost in the power struggle with
23
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Huo Guang and were both sentenced to death. 26
8. Zhao Chongguo 趙充國 (137-51BCE) was from a family of Shanggui provenance
and later moved to Lingju 令居 county in Jincheng commandery when it was
established in the reign of Emperor Zhao 昭 (r. 87-74BCE). He started his career as
a cavalryman and was later recruited to the royal guard of Yulin in the name of Liujun
liangjiazi with skillful archery and horsemanship.” 27

六郡良家子善騎射. He

served successively emperors Wu, Zhao, and Xuan. While still a young military
officer, Zhao Chongguo engaged in the war against the Xiongnu and suffered severe
wounds in the battle. Being impressed by his bravery and courage, Emperor Wu
summoned Zhao to the court to show his wounds and rewarded him with promotion.
Thereafter, Zhao gradually rose to be a prominent official and finally reached the top
echelon as General of the Rear (Hou Jiangjun 後將軍). In 73BCE, Zhao was
ennobled for his contribution to the establishment of Emperor Xuan. Even though he
was seventy years old, Zhao was still in charge of a campaign against the Qiang
rebels, which will be treated in its appropriate place in the next chapter. He died in
51BCE at the age of 86. To commemorate him, Emperor Xuan had Zhao’s portrait in
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the palace and Emperor Cheng 成 (r. 33-7BCE) asked a famous writer to compose a
eulogy for his achievements in defeating the Qiang. 28
9. Lian Bao 廉襃 (fl. 10sBCE-3CE) was from Xiangwu 襄武 county in Longxi.
According to the fragmented records in the Hanshu, Lian Bao was once Protector
General of the Western Regions and was promoted to be senior official as General of
the Right (You Jiangjun 右將軍) in 13BCE. 29
10. Xin Wuxian 辛武賢 (fl. 60s-50sBCE), a native of Didao 狄道 county in Longxi
commandery, was Governor of Jiquan commandery when he was appointed General
who Crushes the Qiang (Po Qiang Jiangjun 破羌將軍) by Emperor Xuan to
collaborate with General Zhao Chongguo in the Qiang campaign. 30 Later, Xin led a
force to pacify the state of Wusun in the Western Regions which was in turmoil. 31 His
younger brother Xin Tang 辛湯 (fl. 50sBCE) was Colonel Protector of the Qiang
(Hu Qiang Xiaowei 護羌校尉), which was a position responsible for supervising the
Qiang people within and without the Han realm. 32 It is clear that the Xin brothers
28
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were specialists in the Qiang affairs.
11. Xin Qingji 辛慶忌 (d. 11BCE), the son of Xin Wuxian, was granted his first official
position through his privilege as the son of a senior official. While he was serving at a
Han colony in the state of Wusun, which his father once pacified, he fought
successfully against the enemy and was promoted to colonel. In the reign of Emperor
Yuan 元 (r. 48-33BCE), Xin Qingji was widely admired by the court officials for his
ability and was promoted to various important posts, including grand administrators
of Zhangye and Jiuquan. He also earned a good reputation among the Xiongnu and
the Western Regions. At the peak of his career, Xi Qingji was appointed General of
the Right. His three sons were all military talents and officials, and the eldest one was
appointed Protector General of the Qiang. With the solid foundation laid by Wuxian
and Qingji, the Xin clan developed into a strong local magnate in Longxi
commandery and even Liang province. However, such a prosperity provided an
excuse for Wang Mang, the man who would usurp the Former Han, to charge the
Xins and put Qingji’s three sons and other important members to death. The Xin
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family was thus ruined. 33
Besides the above names, there were still several famous northwesterners recorded in the
other places of the Hanshu:
12. Li Xi 李息 (fl. 140s-110sBCE), of Yuzhi county in Beidi commandery, started his
career by serving Emperor Jing. He was appointed General of Infantry (Caiguan
Jiangjun 材官將軍) by Emperor Wu and engaged in the war against the Xiongnu. 34
13. Gongsun Ao 公孫敖 (fl. 130s-90sBCE), a native of Yiqu county of Beidi, entered
service as Palace Attendant at the court of Emperor Jing. During the reign of Emperor
Wu, Gongsun Ao was a senior military officer in a series of campaigns against the
Xiongnu. He was appointed General for four times. However, it was said that his wife
implicated in a case of witchcraft, Gongsun Ao and his family were therefore all
sentenced to death. 35
14. Li Ling 李陵 (d. 74BCE) was a grandson of the renowned “Flying General” Li
Guang. While still in his young age, Li Ling had already been appointed as Palace
Attendant and supervisor of the palace cavalry. Like his grandfather, Li Ling was
famous for his skillful horsemanship and archery and was highly regarded by
33
34
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Emperor Wu for his prestigious military family background. In the late reign of
Emperor Wu, Li Ling was responsible for training archers stationed at the
commanderies of Jiuquan and Dunhuang. In 99BCE, Li Ling took part in a
large-scale expedition against the Xiongnu but was assigned to lead only 5,000
infantry as an auxiliary force. Nevertheless, Li Ling’s small force accidentally
encountered the main force led by the Xiongnu Chanyu. After an epic battle, Li Ling
surrendered to the Xiongnu. The Chanyu highly respected Li Ling, gave him his
daughter to marry and granted him a title of king. Li Ling spent the rest of his life in
the Xiongnu. Since Li Ling chose to surrender rather than to die for the imperial
honor, which was in contrast to the expectation of Emperor Wu, his family was
exterminated by the imperial order. The famous Li family in Longxi commandery was
thus ruined and military men of the commandery all felt shame at such a disgrace. 36
15. Duan Huizong 段會宗 (d. 3CE?), a native of Shanggui in Tianshui, was promoted
from Magistrate of Duling county to Protector General of the Western Regions in the
reign of Emperor Cheng. During his tenure, Duan earned great respect from the Inner

36

SJ, 109:2877-78; HS, 54: 2450-2459. For the legend of Li Ling in Chinese history, see Tomiya Itaru,
Gobi ni ikita otokotachi: Ri Ryō to So Bu ゴビに生きた男たち：李陵と蘇武 (Tōkyō: Hakuteisha, 1994).
Sima Qian, the compiler of the Shiji, was castrated as a punishment of his expressing sympathy for Li
Ling’s surrender during a court meeting with the irate Emperor Wu.

134

Asian states. After several years of other postings, he was re-appointed the same
office as the imperial court’s response to the request from those states. Duan was
ennobled for his achievement of leading a small force to suppress the rebels in the
state of Wusun. When he died in Wusun at the age of 75, some states of the Western
Regions built shrines to memorialize him. 37
As will be discussed in the next section, although the political and social status of the
northwesterners greatly declined in the Later Han, there were still some prominent
figures played important roles in the history of the dynasty. Their brief biographies are
given below in chronological order.
16. Liang Tong 梁統 (d. 40CE) was from Wushi 烏氏 county in Anding commandery.
His great-grandfather moved from Hedong 河東 commandery to Beidi commandery
and then his grandfather moved twice and finally settled in Anding. During the civil
war broke out in the last years of Wang Mang, Liang Tong joined Dou Rong, the
strongman of the Hexi Corridor, and was appointed Grand Administrator of Wuwei
commandery. Liang Tong finally surrendered to Emperor Guangwu and was ennobled.
In the rest of his life, Liang Tong held senior official positions and established
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prestigious status of his family through marriage with the imperial house. Thereupon,
the Liang family gradually developed into one of the influential consort families of
the Later Han. 38
17. Liang Qin 梁 慬 (d. 115CE) was a native of Geju 弋 居 county of Beidi
commandery. His father was a military officer in the campaign against the Xiongnu in
89CE. Liang Qin himself was renowned for his courage and bravery. He served in the
military and was appointed Vice-Colonel of the Western Regions in 106CE. During
his military career, Liang Qin played an active role in the Qiang wars and the
campaigns against the Southern Xiongnu and the Wuhuan in the northeast. 39
18. Huangfu Gui, one of the “Three Brilliants of Liang Province,” grew up from a
military family at Chaona 朝那 county in Anding commandery, with his grandfather
was a general and father a commandant. Huangfu Gui initially entered the
government via civil position, but he quickly showed his military talent and was
assigned to suppress local bandits. From 161CE onward, Huangfu Gui served a series
of commanding positions in the northwestern and northern frontiers, and was hence
remembered as a famous general of the Later Han dynasty. 40
38
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19. Zhang Huan, the protagonist of the story at the beginning of this chapter, was a native
of Yuanquan county in Dunhuang commandery. He started with a civil-service
position but turned to the military later. During his military career, Zhang Huan
mainly served as frontier commander and dealt with alien peoples such as the Qiang,
the Wuhuan, and the Xianbi. 41 It was his great achievements in the Qiang wars
caused him to be rewarded with the unprecedented permission to transfer his
registered residence, as we have already learned.
20. Duan Jiong, one of the “Three Brilliants,” was from Guzang 姑臧 county of Wuwei
commandery. His great-great-uncle was claimed to be Duan Huizong of the Former
Han. Since his youth, Duan Jiong was a skillful archer and horseman; however, he
started his career via civil position and only shifted to the military later. He had been
commandant against the invasion of the Xianbi people in the northeast and
suppressed local rebels in the eastern commanderies. Later, he was appointed Colonel
Protector of the Qiang and had long service in the Qiang Wars. In his later years,
Duan Jiong ingratiated himself with the eunuchs who controlled the imperial court
and therefore reached the top echelons of the bureaucracy. However, he was forced to
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kill himself when his eunuch patron was defeated by another eunuch clique. 42
21. Fu Xie 傅燮 (d. 187CE), a native of Liangzhou 靈州 county in Beidi commandery,
entered the government through civil office. Like those aforementioned names, Fu
Xie finally established himself in military service. In the last decades of Later Han,
Fu took part in the campaigns for suppressing the Yellow Turban rebellion (broke out
in 184CE), which spread across the eastern part of the empire. Later, when Liang
province was in chaos and fell in the hand of local rebels, prominent officials at the
imperial court suggested giving up the province, Fu Xie was the staunchest opponent
of such a plan. He was later appointed Grand Administrator of Hanyang commandery
in Liang province, and was besieged by the rebels and finally died in battle. 43
22. Gai Xun 蓋勳 (140-190CE) was from an old official family in Guangzhi 廣至
county in Dunhuang commandery. Starting his career with a civil assignment, Gai
Xun proved himself as a military talent and brave fighter in battles against the rebels
in Liang province. When Dong Zhuo controlled the imperial court, Gai Xun was one
of the very few officials who dared to criticize the warlord to his face. 44
23. Huangfu Song 皇甫嵩 (d. 195CE) was a nephew of the great general Huangfu Gui.
42
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Still a young man, Huangfu Song had already shown interest in both civil and
military pursuits. He was good at shooting and horse riding. Huangfu Song really
won his fame by commanding the campaign against the Yellow Turbans. Fu Xie,
mentioned above, was his aide-de-camp. The successful suppression of the rebels
made Huangfu Song the most renowned general and the indisputable military leader
of his time. He was later sent to Liang province against the local rebels. At that time,
Dong Zhuo was under his command. However, when Dong Zhuo controlled the
imperial court, Huangfu Song was unable to stop him and was deprived of his
command. 45
24. Dong Zhuo, the warlord who destroyed the Later Han, was a native of Lintao county
in Longxi commandery. When he was still young, he had already been a famed
fighter and earned friendship among the tribal leaders of the Qiang. He started his
career as military officer of Liang province. Later, he was recruited to the Yulin royal
guard in the name of the Liujun liangjiazi and then served as an aide-de-camp of
Zhang Huan in a campaign against the Qiang at Hanyang commandery. Dong Zhuo
rose quickly and became an important general in the northwestern region, in the last
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years of the Later Han. By commanding a multi-ethnic troop from the northwestern
borderlands, the ambitious Dong Zhuo made for himself a strong force which could
tip the balance of power of the empire. 46
Needless to say, the aforementioned names were only the notables of Liang province
during the two Han dynasties who left traces in historical records and were a very small
portion of the northwesterners who entered government services. Since little is known
regarding the people of northwestern provenance, 47 it is not possible to have a full picture
of the career patterns of the whole northwestern population based on the available
sources. Nevertheless, since the military elites were regarded by their contemporaries and
the Han historians as representatives of their countrymen, some general features
summarized from their career paths might give us clues to analyze the political status of
the northwestern aspirants to government office in the period under discussion.
Of the twenty four men whose biographies are listed above, fifteen lived in the
Former Han; one was active during the interval between the two Han dynasties; eight
lived in the Later Han.
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Several features can be summarized from the biographies of the fifteen Former Han
figures. Firstly, they all started their official careers and received promotion on the basis
of their military valor, skill, and merits. Some of them were the Liujun liangjiazi and
started their careers by serving in the prestigious royal guards of the Yulin and the Qimen,
which offered them opportunities to be close to the emperor and therefore advantages to
develop illustrious careers. Even those who were not in the royal guard still started as
military officers or ordinary cavalryman. At the peak of their careers, Gongsun He and Li
Cai were appointed Chancellor, and others like Shangguan Jie, Zhao Chongguo, Lian Bao,
and Xin Qingji reached the highest echelon of the government and played important roles
in imperial politics. Some of them were also ennobled for their military feats. Secondly,
nearly all the offices these men held were on military track, such as royal guards, various
positions of military officers, and different ranks of generals. Even when they were not in
active military service, their positions were still military related, such as Fu Jiezi’s and
Shangguan Jie’s duties relating to the management of breeding horses and keeping
chariots. It is clear that these men were on the military side of the government service,
which was different from the civil one. Thirdly, most of them took part in military
operations against the Xiongnu, the Qiang, and other Inner Asian peoples. These men
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constituted an important corps in the defense and expansion of the Former Han empire.
In contrast, the career pattern of the Later Han northwestern elites listed above shows
slight differences from that of their Former Han counterparts. Among the nine men, Liang
Tong was born in the Former Han times, took part in the civil war between the two Han
dynasties, and served in the Later Han court only after his surrender; therefore, his career
was exceptional and should not be simply counted in the Later Han group. The remaining
eight men were mainly active in the late period of the Later Han. Liang Qin, like his
Former Han predecessors, started his career as a military officer and took part in the
campaigns against the alien peoples. However, based on the sources shown above, it
seems that there was a change in career pattern of the northwestern elites after the middle
period of Later Han. Huangfu Gui, Zhang Huan, Duan Jiong, Fu Xie, Gai Xun, and
Huangfu Song, while they were remembered as military talents and famous generals, all
entered government services via civil positions and only shifted to military offices later.
Comparatively speaking, the Former Han group started their military career from the
bottom rungs of the military hierarchy, no matter whether they were in the royal guards or
cavalry or other troops, and had first-hand experiences in combat and as a rank-and-file
member of the military; while the Later Han elites started as civil officers and transferred
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to the military as middle or high level officers, which deprived them of the combat and
rank-and-file experiences. In other words, unlike the Former Han elites who grew up in
the military, the Later Han elites were transplanted into the military. It does not
necessarily mean that the Later Han elites were not good fighters in themselves but, for
some reasons which will be discussed in the next section, the Later Han system did not
provide room for them to be pure military men if they wanted to climb the ladder of
success. Furthermore, even though the Later Han elites achieved remarkable military
exploits, they seldom reached the highest echelons as their Former Han predecessors did
(Duan Jiong was able to reach the highest position but only because of his relations with
the eunuchs who had great influence in court politics). In addition, while it was common
for the Former Han elites to enter government by being the Liujun liangjiazi, the same
case was unlikely in the Later Han. None of the above six Later Han men were recorded
as Liujun liangjiazi in the historical sources. It might imply the diminishing role of the
Liujun liangjiazi in the Later Han.
The only man who was the Liujun liangjiazi on the Later Han list was the warlord
Dong Zhou. His career path was different from that of the “Three Brilliants of Liang
Province” and others as he grew up among the troops and held consistently to the military
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track. But in his early years he had a comparatively inferior career and was treated as an
uncouth military man. Therefore, he was a unique case on the list.
Differences between career patterns show that the political environment of the Later
Han differed from that of the Former Han, which would directly influence the political
and social status of the northwestern military elites and the mutual attitudes between
them and the imperial center as we shall see later.
Another point that merits our attention is that, geographically speaking, the Former
Han elites, especially those who were known as the Liujun liangjiazi, were from the old
commanderies, such as Longxi, Tianshi, Beidi, and Anding; however, during the Later
Han times, some of the elites like Zhang Huan, Duan Jiong, and Gai Xun were from the
new commanderies of Dunhuang and Wuwei. It tells the fact that the new commanderies
in the Hexi region founded by Emperor Wu and his successors had developed to a certain
degree and could produce their own elites in the Later Han times.
Before we explore the new career pattern of the elites and the related problems in the
next section, we should now focus on the non-elite settlers in the remainder of this
section.
Unlike the elites, the non-elite group in this study refers to those who moved to the
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northwest during the course of the two Han dynasties but without achieving high political
and social status. They constituted the local populace of Liang province and especially
the mainstay of pioneers in the new commanderies—Dunhuang, Jiuquan, Zhangye,
Wuwei, and Jincheng. Besides the soldiers, according to the Hanshu, those settlers who
moved to the Hexi region were mainly “the paupers of Guandong area, or those who had
committed transgressions in revenge, or the family members of those who had committed
betrayal and disobedient.” 48 其民或以關東下貧，或以報怨過當，或以誖逆亡道，家
屬徙焉. Simply put, the majority of them were the poor, the amnestied convicts, and the
exiles from different parts of the empire. In the absence of willing migrants, the
settlement of these settlers was an act of state. Considering their backgrounds, quite a
number of them were people who had nothing to lose and had no scruples about using
violence to achieve their aims or protect their own interests. They represented the
potential rebellious and restive elements of society. It seemed economical for the state to
relocate and cluster them together in the newly conquered northwestern frontier, where
their labor could be used to serve imperial projects, either defensive or expansionist.
Since the extant historical sources do not permit us to have the exact number and
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other details of the multitude of settlers, I can only draw an outline of the sanctioned
migrations toward the northwest during the two Han dynasties in the following.
State-sanctioned migration of people to frontiers as a policy of social engineering had
a long tradition during the Qin-Han period. 49 During the war of conquest in the third
century BCE, the Qin state would relocate its own population to newly conquered areas
and the captured subjects of rival states to the frontier regions or the old Qin domains so
that, on the one hand, the Qin could toughen its hold on the newly acquired lands and, on
the other hand, it could uproot the local power bases of its new subjects. Later on, when
the Qin swept all the rival states and established a vast empire, it continued the policy of
sanctioned migration and moved not only the erstwhile rival aristocrats and local
magnates but also convicts and poor people as well as those with low social status to the
northern and southern frontiers of the nascent empire. 50 Two specific cases were given in
the sources for the Qin moving people to the northwestern frontier: royal members of the
defeated Zhao state were moved by the Qin to Tianshui county in Longxi commandery;
ancestors of the famous “Flying General” Li Guang of the Former Han were moved to
49
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Chengji county in Longxi commandery. 51
The Former Han adopted the same policy. During the whole course of the Former
Han dynasty, enormous numbers of local magnates and wealthy families were relocated
to the metropolitan area under the direct surveillance of the state. 52 It was called the
policy of “strengthening the roots and weakening the branches” 53 強本弱末, which was
especially crucial for consolidating state power during the early years of the dynasty.
Meanwhile, migration towards the northern frontier was a response to the threat posed by
the Xiongnu. During the reign of Emperor Wen, Chao Cuo put forward his proposal of
state sponsored migration which encouraged and rewarded people moving to the northern
frontier for the purposes of strengthening the imperial defense, turning wild borderlands
into arable lands, and lessening the population pressure of the interior regions. The
essence of Chao’s plan was the militarization of the people who moved to the frontiers as
he anticipated that the migrants, once settled, would transform into tough defenders of the
frontiers and totally differ from the rotating garrison soldiers from the interior who were
unfamiliar with the frontiers and were afraid of the Xiongnu, not to mention the costs of
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sending the soldiers back and forth. 54 Also, as the historian Hsu Cho-yun puts, the
“policy of redistributing the population” was “to make more farmers independent and
self-sufficient” as taxpayers, which served the benefit of the state most. 55
State-sanctioned migration was in addition an emergency measure to settle the
refugees when natural disasters struck the empire. The needy of the affected area would
be moved to the frontier region in order to lessen the burden of relief in their native
places and to utilize their labor in developing the new territories. 56 In 119BCE, for
example, Emperor Wu moved 725,000 poor people who were affected by floods in
Guandong to the commanderies of Longxi, Beidi, Xihe, Shang, and Kuaiji 會稽. 57 In
other words, many settlers of the northwestern borderlands were immigrants from heavily
populated areas in Guandong.
During the reigns of Emperor Wu and his successors, the empire carried out
large-scale and yet step-by-step migrations of people to the newly acquired lands. For the
northwest that concerns us, as noted in the last chapter, the imperial court initially had no
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long-term plan of developing the Hexi region; therefore, although the state in 118BCE
deployed around 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers as pioneers on the farming colonies in the
immediate area of the west bank of the Yellow River, 58 its purpose was just to strengthen
the western defense. It was not until the Wusun declined to move back that the Han
empire took up the Hexi region in earnest. At first, only military personnel were sent to
the new territory; for instance, 600,000 soldiers were deployed as colonists to the Hexi
region and the neighboring commanderies of Shang, Shuofang, Xihe in 111BCE. 59
Although some of the garrison soldiers would return to their native places after
completing their duties, quite a few would stay and become residents there. Civilians also
gradually moved in and later reached a certain threshold which transformed the Hexi
region from a cluster of military colonies into a full-fledged administrative region. 60 For
example, according to the “Treatise on Geography” of Hanshu, a garrison station named
Yuze 漁澤 in Dunhuang commandery was upgraded as Xiaogu 效穀 (literally, efficient
in crop production) county in 105BCE as a result of its flourishing agriculture and,
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needless to say, a large farming population. 61 Although the dates of establishment of the
four Hexi commanderies are not exact, as the previous chapter noted, the fact that at least
three commanderies were established between 121BCE, the year of the acquisition of the
region, and 91BCE, the last possible year that Dunhuang commandery was set up, reveals
that local population must have reached certain amount and necessitated setting up new
commanderies. As the Hexi region was originally not a place commonly inhabited by the
Han people, the sudden and drastic increase of the Han population must be the result of
state-sanctioned migration. The Hanshu clearly states that in the autumn of 111BCE, the
Han state divided the commanderies of Wuwei and Jiuquan into two new commanderies
of Zhangye and Dunhuang and had people settle in. 62 When the Former Han established
Jincheng commandery on the former Qiang territory in 81BCE, it went without saying
that it was the Han settlers who constituted the mainstay of the registered population.
From a recently excavated source, we know that in 28BCE Dunhuang commandery sent
officers to commanderies of Donghai 東海 and Taishan 泰山, which were located in the
east, to lead the homeless roaming people there to the northwestern frontier. 63
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The Former Han not only moved refugees and deployed soldiers to the northwest, it
also exiled criminals to the northwest. A notorious example was that Emperor Wu exiled
a large number of offenders who were implicated in the infamous witchcraft hunting to
Dunhuang in 91BCE. 64 Various examples of discharged officials and their families being
exiled to the northwest can also be found in the historical records. 65
According to the estimation of a Chinese historical geographer, around 1.5 million
people had migrated to the northwest by the end of the Former Han dynasty. 66 Based on
the population census of Liang province which recorded in the “Treatise on Geography”
of Hanshu, migrants made up nearly all of the registered population of the commanderies
of Dunhuang, Jiuquan, Zhangye, Wuwei, and Jincheng, half of Beidi, and a sizable
portion of Longxi, Tianshu, and Anding. 67 Of course, besides the Han settlers from
various parts of the empire who constituted the mainstay of the registered population,
there were also countless autochthonous peoples and other alien peoples whom were
captured and settled by the empire, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Because of the limitations of the extant sources, it is hardly possible to go into details
about the lives of the northwestern settlers. However, thanks to the discovery of a Later
64
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Han stele in 1943, we now have a telling case of the history of migration of an elite
family in Liang province, which might shed some light on our understanding of the
migration and development of northwestern elites and even common settlers.
The stele dates to 180CE and was dedicated to Zhao Kuan 趙寬 (d. 152CE), who
was a local notable 68 of Haomen 浩亹 county in Jincheng commandery of Later Han
and a fifth-generation-grandson of the famous Former Han general Zhao Chongguo.
According to the inscription on the stele, which traces the family history of the Zhaos,
Zhao Zhongkuang 趙 仲 況 , the great-grandfather of Zhao Chongguo, was the
Superintendent of the Privy Treasury (Shaofu 少府) sometime in the reigns of Emperor
Wen and Jing; his son Sheng 聖 was an Advisory Counselor (Jianyi Dafu 諫議大夫).
Sheng had two sons: the elder of whom was a magistrate of a county and the younger was
a palace attendant and also the father of Chongguo. The Zhaos, however, suffered a
setback as Chongguo’s father committed a serious offense in the palace and the family
was exiled to Shanggui county in Longxi commandery. 69 That was the beginning of the
Zhaos as inhabitants of the northwest. Chongguo was enlisted in the local cavalry in his
68
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early age and later recruited to the royal guard because he was a Liujun liangjiazi. Since
Chongguo attained a highly prestigious position in his entire career, his family grew
strong and most of his offspring enjoyed successful official career. 70 Some of them might
move out from Liang province for postings in other sectors of the empire, nevertheless,
the main branch of the family remained in the northwest. According to his biography of
Hanshu, probably as a result of military campaign against the Qiang, Chongguo moved to
Lingju county in Jincheng commandery, which was set up on the former Qiang
domains. 71 It was an example of migration as a measure accompanied territorial
expansion and consolidation. However, the stele gives no indication of this migration. On
the other hand, the stele states that the protagonist Zhao Kuan moved from Shanggui to
Poqiang 破羌 county in Jincheng when he assumed the office of Deputy Major of the
Colonel Protector of the Qiang (Hu Qiang Xiaowei Jia Sima 護羌校尉假司馬) in the
Later Han times. One possible explanation for the two migrations would be that
Chongguo moved to Lingju with the troops but left some of his family members in
Shanggui; Kuan grew up in the family remaining in Shanggui and only moved to Poqiang
for his new posting. Later, Zhao Kuan engaged in a battle against the Qiang, in which the
70
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imperial army was defeated and Kuan’s four sons were all killed. In the ensuing
evacuation, Kuan fled from Liang province with the refugees to the erstwhile Former Han
metropolitan area. Several years later, he moved back to Poqiang, then again to Haomen
county, where the stele was excavated. 72
The history of the Zhao family paints a vivid picture of the experience of some
settlers in the northwestern borderlands. For various reasons, the settlers, mostly
unwillingly, moved from their native places to the northwest; some of them would settle
down but others might need to move again when the imperial power proceeded to further
northwest. On the other hand, natural disasters and war would become push factors
forcing settlers to move out of the northwest. The Qiang wars in the Later Han times
especially triggered waves of outward migration in the northwest, as we shall see in the
next chapter.
Like the Zhao family, some northwestern elites in the Later Han also benefited from
their ancestors who moved to the northwest during the Former Han times and
accumulated their wealth and influence in the region. The aforementioned Liang Tong
was a good example of those who greatly benefited from their family background and
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thus attained official positions in Liang province and even the Later Han imperial court.
According to the historical records, for some reasons, Liang Tong’s great grandfather
moved from Hedong commandery in the east to Beidi commandery in the northwest.
Later, as the Liang family had accumulated a great fortune, they were moved by the
Former Han government to the metropolitan area as a means to curb strong local
magnates. Not until the last years of the Former Han did the Liangs return to the
northwest and settle in Anding commandery. 73 With the great fortune and possibly
accompanying influence, the Liangs became local leaders. As a result, Liang Tong easily
assumed power in the region during the civil war and was highly esteemed by Emperor
Guangwu of the Later Han after his surrender. 74
The early Later Han rulers, on one hand, relied upon local magnates like Liang Tong
to help restore order in the northwest in the aftermath of the civil war; on the other hand,
they continued the policy of sanctioned migration as a measure to rehabilitate the region.
The southern sector of Liang province was especially devastated during the war and
many people were dislocated, as the Hou Hanshu says, “Although Longxi was pacified,
73
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people were starving and many of them were roaming.” 75 隴西雖平，而人飢，流者相
望. Besides providing relief to the roaming population, the Later Han state also moved
those who fled the war back to their home towns. For example, Emperor Guangwu once
ordered the Grand Administrator of Wuwei commandery to send 3,000 refugees in his
jurisdiction back to Jincheng commandery. 76 Moreover, the emperor issued an edict to
emancipate those who were forced to be slaves in Liang province as a means to increase
the taxable population of the region. 77 Meanwhile, in order to strengthen the defensive
efforts of the northwestern frontier zone, the Later Han resumed farming colonies in the
northwest, settling soldiers, commoners, amnestied convicts, surrendered Qiang people,
and their families there. Especially from the middle period of the dynasty on, when the
northwest was beset by the intermittent Qiang revolts, commoners were recruited to serve
in garrisons in the region. Furthermore, the state frequently commuted death sentence
into exile and sent convicts to the frontiers with their families. According to the records in
Hou Hanshu, examples can be seen in the following years (all in CE): 73, 74, 82, 84, 87,
96, 124, 126, 130, 144, 147, 150, 153, and 154. The practice lasted until the final years
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when the Later Han lost control of the northwest. 78 Needless to say, the use or threat of
violence played a key role in a region keeping criminals, whether in the way that the
convicts against each other or the authorities imposed order or discipline on them. 79 This
would no doubt contribute to the prevalence of martial spirit in the region.
Compared to the Former Han, sending convicts to the northwest became a routine
practice throughout the Later Han. Liang province was in general a land of exile,
Dunhuang commandery was in particular infamous for being a destination for amnestied
convicts. It might partly explain why Zhang Huan was so desperate to move out from
Dunhuang. Certainly, there were deeper reasons, which will be the subject of the next
section.

Peripheralization of the Northwestern Borderlands
Despite of his fame in the northwest, Zhang Huan seems uncomfortable being a
northwesterner. Was it Dunhuang commandery’s bad reputation of hosting amnestied
convicts that aroused his dislike? It was possible, but not completely. If Zhang Huan
merely detested the commandery, he could have requested to move to another part of
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Liang province but not necessarily the interior of the empire. Also, during the Qin and
Former Han dynasties, the northwest had long been a region for settling convicts,
cashiered officials, refugees, paupers, and so forth, but for many settlers the region
provided opportunities to start new life, the military elites were especially proud of being
the Liujun liangjiazi, which enabled them to set up social ladder. Elite families like the
Zhaos mentioned in the preceding section even took the initiative of moving to new
commanderies as a means to serve the imperial project. The contrast between Zhang
Huan and the Former Han elites in fact reflects that something about the importance of
the northwest vis-à-vis the empire and the status and self-perception of its elites changed
between the two Han dynasties. Furthermore, the Later Han prohibition of transferring
one’s registered residence from frontiers to the interior implied that there were always
frontier inhabitants who wanted to move inward and the state had to use legislative means
to prevent it. The prohibition itself was not only a preventive measure but also a sign of
restriction and discrimination against the frontiersmen.
In the whole course of Qin-Han history, as noted in the previous chapter, the
northwest was a periphery of the empire in the geographic sense. Nevertheless, the region
was not necessarily always peripheral to imperial politics. In the Former Han, especially
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during the reigns of emperors Wu and Xuan, the northwest was a particular target of
imperial concern and its military elites reached the apogee of their prestige. It was not a
periphery but a core in terms of politics and military. However, the northwest underwent
a gradual change of political status from the Former Han to the Later Han, in which the
confidence, glory, prestige, and privilege of the northwestern military elites were
undermined and the resources injected into the region by the imperial state were deprived.
The confidence of the northwestern military elites in the Former Han times was rooted in
the honor by the imperial state for their military service, which was a mark of their
success and value. The sense of honor was essential for the military elites, as “[h]onor
embraces the value one places on oneself, but even more importantly it also represents
the esteem in which society holds one.” 80 Remembering that when the famous Li family
of Longxi commandery was dishonored after Li Ling’s surrender to the Xiongnu, all the
military men of the commandery were ashamed of their relationship with the Li family. 81
It may give us a clue as to how the northwestern military elites regarded their honor.
While the Later Han northwestern military elites still upheld the tradition of pursuing
honor, however, the chance of receiving honor was remote to them now. For quite a
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number of them, the loss of honor not only meant that their chance of upward social
mobility was diminishing but also implied that their political and social status was
tarnished. As this section will show, the lackluster role of the northwest and the low
self-esteem of its military elites during the Later Han were caused by the change of
contemporary political and social perception towards the region and its people. As the
Later Han dynasty progressed, the northwest became not only a geographical periphery
but also a political one. In what follows, I shall trace the track of change and factors
contributed to the full-fledged “peripheralization” of Liang province in the Later Han
times, in which three interrelated aspects will be under examination, namely the declining
significance of Liang province as an imperial defense priority; the impact of the eastward
shift of political center; and the ascendancy of scholar-officials.

The declining significance of Liang province as an imperial defense priority
The relative lowering of political and social status of the Later Han northwestern military
elites was a consequence of the region’s relative decline in importance in the new
strategic situation facing the empire. Although both Han dynasties were born on
battlefield, their perceptions of strategic circumstances were very different. A brief
comparison between the zeitgeist of the two Han dynasties will lay a background for
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understanding the change of strategic concerns in the Later Han, which consequently
affected the significance of the northwest in the imperial security.
The Former Han, which was built on the debris of the short-lived Qin—the first
empire on the Chinese landmass, was in essence a nascent empire continuing its
predecessor’s experiment in empire-building. This backdrop gave opportunities for
various kinds of political philosophy and theory to be put into practice and for people
from all walks of life to play a role on the political stage. The general ethos of the epoch
was adventurous, aggressive, creative, and vigorous. The Later Han, on the other hand,
rooted its legitimacy in the self-proclaimed “restoration” of the Han dynasty and was an
empire that fashioned itself on the model of the “mature” Former Han. The political,
social, and cultural circumstances of the later Former Han and Wang Mang’s Xin
dynasties therefore cast a huge shadow over the Later Han and resulted in dogmatism in
political culture and restricted opportunities for certain social groups’ advancement in the
political arena. The general posture of the Later Han was conservative, defensive,
retrenching, and restrained. 82
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Different attitudes of political elites of the two Han dynasties towards the decadence
of their empires were also compelling. When the Former Han were declining in the last
decades of the first century BCE, the political elites were still active and ambitious to try
to overcome the decline by showing dogged determination and persistence in the attempts
of various reforms, and even hailing and supporting Wang Mang as a means of
reorienting the world. On the contrary, when the Later Han showed the signs of
decadence, its political elites were rather pessimistic about the future of the empire and
some of them even gave up any hope of saving the existing world. 83 Though some of the
outspoken Later Han literati, particularly the juniors, did sacrifice themselves in fierce
factional struggle in the vain hope that their actions could refresh the imperial court, 84
most political elites, especially those in power, chose to stay aside and seize chances to
accumulate their own resources while welcoming the final breakdown of the empire. 85
Such a contrast may partly explain why the Later Han was able to establish itself after the
Former Han but no solid empire could be rebuilt after the collapse of the Later Han.
The reflection of different zeitgeist on the imperial grand strategy was the different
83
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perceptions of strategic circumstances and hence different strategic settings. As a young
empire in its developing stage during the reign of Emperor, the Former Han adopted an
expansionist strategy. The acquisition and consolidation of the new northwestern
territories was a product during the most intense phase of empire-building. For two main
reasons, the Former Han paid serious attention to and put great effort in constructing and
consolidating its rule over the northwestern region.
Firstly, since the capital of the Former Han was located in Guanzhong, the
northwestern region which next to it therefore played a crucial role in defending the
western flank of the metropolitan region. However, when the Later Han set its capital in
Luoyang, the political center henceforth shifted from the western to the eastern sector of
the empire. It went without saying that the importance of the northwest as a western flank
of the empire diminished.
Secondly, the importance of Liang province in the imperial defense priority was
directly linked to the empire’s engagement in Inner Asia. In order to deepen the defense
of the western flank of the empire, to project the imperial power into the Western Regions,
and to keep the connection with the Western Regions smooth and secure, particularly in
the contest with the Xiongnu for the hegemony over the Inner Asian states, Liang
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province was crucial to the imperial strategic blueprint. Well before the conquest of the
Hexi Corridor, as noted in the preceding chapter, the Former Han had already tried to
make an alliance with the Yuezhi and established diplomatic relations with other Inner
Asian states. After acquiring the Hexi Corridor from the Xiongnu, the Former Han
obtained an easier access to the Western Regions and hence an opportunity to further
undermines the Xiongnu’s power base in the region. The two great powers thus engaged
in a fierce tug of war in the region. The Former Han rulers such as emperors Wu and
Xuan, and even the usurper Wang Mang, were willing to engage in battles with the
Xiongnu or other Inner Asian states for the sake of retaining Han influence and power in
the region. Liang province therefore acted as a crucial artery and depot of material supply
to the expeditions; its military elites and even commoners, undoubtedly, played active
roles in military operations; soldiers and settlers in Liang province were further deployed
in the colonial spots in the Western Regions as pioneers and colonists. When the imperial
government emphasized the value of the Western Regions, Liang province would
naturally deserve serious attention.
During the Later Han, as a direct result of the change of strategic value of the Western
Regions in the eyes of the Later Han policy makers, the strategic importance of Liang
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province changed. Compared with their Former Han predecessors’ enthusiasm for
engaging in the Western Regions, the Later Han rulers adopted a carefully-restrained
attitude from the very beginning and would not allow themselves to become deeply
involved in the region; any proponent of active interference in the region would usually
meet with a lukewarm response. The Later Han’s retrenchment in the Western Regions
consequently undermined the role of Liang province as a bridgehead or springboard for
advancing into Inner Asia and reduced the resources that the state would be willing to
invest in the northwest.
The “Tradition of the Western Regions” (Xiyu chuan 西域傳) of Hou Hanshu
provides us chronological account of diplomatic relations between the Later Han and the
Western Regions. 86 Based on this text, with complementary sources, a vivid picture of the
Later Han’s retrenchment policy towards the region can thus be painted.
Although the Former Han had never completely wiped out the Xiongnu’s influence in
the Western Regions, a fragile balance between the two powers was maintained over the
region till the end of the dynasty. 87 Those Inner Asian states located in between generally
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adopted an opportunistic approach to serve their own interests. During Wang Mang’s Xin
dynasty, bilateral relations between the Chinese regime and the Western Regions were
damaged by Wang’s foreign policy and official relations were finally cut off. 88 The
Xiongnu took advantage and imposed their control over the region. In 45CE, two decades
after the establishment of the Later Han, some states in the Western Regions,
overburdened by the Xiongnu economic exploitation, sent delegates to ask Emperor
Guangwu to reinstate the Protector General of the Western Regions as a means to offset
the Xiongnu influence in the region. However, the emperor set internal recovery as his
top priority and refrained from engaging in adventures abroad. 89 The emperor sent the
delegates back and took no further action, which meant that he was unwilling to return to
the Western Regions. Consequently, the area was left at the mercy of the Xiongnu and
was open to competition among some ambitious local states. As the area could no longer
serve as a buffer between the Xiongnu and the Han, the Hexi region was exposed to
frequent raids by the Xiongnu and their Inner Asian satellite states. During the reign of
Emperor Ming明 (r. 58-75CE), it was reported that the towns of the Hexi region had to
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88
HS, 99B: 4133.
89
HHS, 1B: 73 and 88: 2909. For Emperor Guangwu’s attitude towards the Western Regions, see
Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume III,” 131-134; Bielenstein also has an overview
of Guangwu’s foreign policies, especially towards the north, in his Emperor Kuang-wu, 25-57, and the
Northern Barbarians (Canberra: Australian National University, 1956).

166

shut their gates even in daytime to avert havoc. 90
It was not until 73CE when it launched an expedition against the Northern Xiongnu 91
that the Later Han reopened official relations with the Western Regions as an auxiliary
means for weakening the northern foe. 92 The Protector General was reinstated. It was but
a temporary success. Two years later, when Emperor Ming died, the anti-Han forces of
the Western Regions turned the table and killed the Protector General and his men; other
Han troops in the region were besieged. Although a rescuing force from Jiuquan
commandery defeated the enemy in the Western Regions, the newly-enthroned Emperor
Zhang 章 (r. 76-88CE) still decided to abandon the region to save resources. Only a
major named Ban Chao 班超 (32-102CE) voluntarily stayed in the region with his
handful followers; Ban would spend the following thirty years upholding the Han
influence over some of the states. 93 The pinnacle of the Later Han’s enterprise in the
Western Regions was under Emperor He 和 (r. 89-105CE), when the Han soundly
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defeated the Northern Xiongnu and Ban Chao was appointed Protector General. 94
Nevertheless, the Later Han never established stable control over the Western
Regions. Anti-Han forces rose up again shortly after the retirement of Ban Chao and the
death of Emperor He. The Later Han once again left the region. In 119CE, the Grand
Administrator of Dunhuang commandery put forward a proposal of recapturing the
Western Regions but was rejected by the imperial court. As the Northern Xiongnu and its
Inner Asian satellite states frequently invaded the Hexi region, some officials even
discussed the possibility of shutting the Yumen 玉門 and Yang 陽 passes at the
westernmost frontier to prevent invasion, 95 which implied the abandonment of the
Western Regions. In 123CE, another Grand Administrator of Dunhuang suggested a plan
of dealing with the situation in the Western Regions and was supported by the Imperial
Secretariat Chen Zhong 陳忠 (d. 125). Chen then submitted a memorial in which he
traces the history of Han’s involvement in the Western Regions and reminds the ruler that
the establishment of the Hexi commanderies by Emperor Wu was to disrupt the
connection between the Xiongnu and the Qiang and to further Han’s influence on the
Western Regions in order to cut off the “right arm” of the Xiongnu. The effort that
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ancestors spent on the Western Regions should be respected and not be given up easily. 96
Chen warns that if the Xiongnu controlled the Western Regions, it would be easy for
them to form alliance with the Qiang and then the Hexi Corridor would be subjected to
the united attack from both sides. The cost of defending the Hexi commanderies would be
very high if without the Western Regions as a cover. 97 In short, the Hexi Corridor and the
Western Regions should be treated as an integral whole in the defense agenda. The chain
effect of losing the Western Regions described by Chen Zhong finally persuaded the
emperor to take action. Ban Yong 班勇 (fl. 120sCE), Ban Chao’s son, was sent to the
Western Regions but with only five hundred convicts. Although he worked very hard,
Ban Yong was unable to fully restore Later Han’s influence over the region. 98 Neither his
tenure nor his achievement lasted long. From 130sCE on, the authority of Later Han over
the region diminished with time, the imperial state was neither willing nor able to make
any commitment to the region; it could only let its presence in the region fade out.
The Later Han was not enthusiastic about getting involved in the Western Regions. In
order to save resources for rehabilitating his new regime, Emperor Guangwu refused to
restore the Han presence in the region; the comeback made under Emperor Ming was
96
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merely a by-product of the expedition against the Xiongnu; 99 Emperor Zhang quickly
resorted to retrenchment policy when facing difficulty in the region. Ban Chao’s heroic
venture, though it earned him everlasting fame in Chinese history, was in fact largely a
self-motivated adventure and not a plan of the state. Needless to say, he did not have
strong support from the state and his successor easily lost control of the region. Although
Ban Yong was commissioned by the imperial court to the Western Regions, he had scant
resources at his disposal; what he really depended upon was the fame of his father. The
Later Han’s disinterest in the Western Regions is also reflected by the fact that every time
when crises emerged in the region, central officials generally inclined to avert troubles
and suggested closing the frontier passes and abandoning the region. 100 Some Grand
Administrotors of northwestern commanderies such as Jiuquan and Dunhuang would
champion the cause of retaking and protecting the Western Regions, which was crucial to
the security of their territories, the central government seldom sympathized with their
views. Courtiers like Chen Zhong, who supported the restorative campaign in the region,
were rare. Obviously, the general attitude of the imperial court was to avoid spending on
such a remote region. For the Later Han rulers, the costs of maintaining the Han presence
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in the Western Regions largely outweighed any benefit or revenue that could be derived
from controlling the region.
The Later Han’s reluctance to get involved in the Western Regions revealed that the
region no longer held the same strategic value to the Later Han as it did to the Former
Han. As Rafe de Crespigny points out that “the Western Regions presented the imperial
regime of Later Han with potential for some strategic advantage against the Xiongnu, and
it was naturally desirable that trade across central Asia should be maintained. The
territory, however, was not considered critically important, and the great days of ambition
had passed.” 101 I agree with de Crespigny and would take one step further to ask why the
Western Regions became less important to the Later Han and why the empire lost its
ambition in the region. A simple explanation would be that due to their internal problems
and the expeditions launched by the coalition forces of the Later Han and the Southern
Xiongnu in 73CE and 88CE, the Northern Xiongnu had been greatly weakened and was
no longer a threat to the Later Han; the Western Regions as well as the northwestern
frontier zone thus lost their strategic positions in the Han-Xiongnu contest. Meanwhile,
the Later Han had to shift its attention and resource to deal with the Southern Xiongnu
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along the northern frontier and the newly emerging Xianbei in the northeast. In other
words, the Later Han had to deal with threats from elsewhere. However, it only partially
answered my questions but did not explain why the Later Han staunchly continued
retrenchment policy when facing challenges in the Western Regions and, as will be
discussed in the next chapter, even chose to withdraw from Liang province when facing
serious threats from the Qiang. Obviously, the Later Han did not treat the threats from the
west as seriously as those from the east or did not adopt the same policy to deal with
threats from different regions. In fact, it all depended on what was defined as a threat,
how serious and urgent was it being identified, and what was accepted as an appropriate
way to deal with it. The logic lay behind was the Later Han policy makers’ perception of
threat, recognition of strategic circumstances, and setting of strategic priority, which were
all determined by the political and cultural contexts they encountered. These will be the
subjects of the following analysis.

The eastward shift of political center
Different attitudes toward the west not only show the different regional concerns between
the two Han dynasties but also reveal their respective visions of empire. As mentioned
before, the triumph of the Qin dynasty made Guanzhong the political center of the new
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empire. Such a prestigious position of Guanzhong was intact and even strengthened in the
Former Han dynasty as the geographical and strategic advantages of the region made the
Former Han founding emperor finally decide to build the imperial capital in the region; 102
the founders of the Former Han also shifted their regional concerns and interests from
east to west. 103 Accordingly, the Former Han inherited the Qin pattern of the West
overwhelming the East, which consequently deepened the divergence between
Guanzhong and Guandong. 104
As the foundation on which the Former Han exercise its rule over the empire,
Guanzhong became a magnet for aspirants to official careers, who tried any means to
access the area and to seek imperial favors or official advancement. Even well established
officials wanted to be included in the area as a mark of prestigious position. Here is a
vivid example: in 114BCE, the General of Towered Warship (Louchuan Jiangjun 樓船將
軍) Yang Pu 楊僕 (fl. 120s-100sBCE), who had achieved successful military exploits,
was ashamed of being a resident outside Guanzhong (Guanwai min 關外民) and thus
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persuaded Emperor Wu to move the boundary of the Hangu Pass, which was the dividing
line between the west and the east, slightly eastward, so that the area of Guanzhong
would expand and include Yang’s home town. 105 Emperor Wu did move the Pass
eastward. Certainly, the movement should not be a result of satisfying a general’s desire
but was Emperor Wu’s strategic consideration of redrawing the defense line of
Guanzhong. 106 Nevertheless, the anecdote tells us that the Han idea of being a resident of
Guanzhong promised prestige and higher social status. It is easy to understand as even
today, aspirants to prosperous official careers would like to move to the political center.
Serving as the western flank of Guanzhong, the northwest was also regarded as part
of the greater Guanzhong, as noted in the previous chapter, and had a long history of
under direct supervision and governance of the imperial state. While the Former Han
dynasty divided the eastern part of the empire into large numbers of fief-states with
various sizes, the whole Guanzhong region, including the metropolitan area and the
northwest as its backyard, was never granted as fiefs to princes and marquis. 107 This
policy was strictly followed in the whole course of the Former Han. The Later Han also
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adhered closely to the policy, although its capital was in the east. 108 During its last years
when facing widespread revolts, the Later Han appointed several senior officials as
Regional Commissioner (Zhou mu 州牧, literally Provincial Shepherd), the highest
executive and military official of a province and was given plenary authority in his
jurisdiction; however, Guanzhong, including Liang province, was not on the list and still,
at least nominally, under the direct central control.
Needless to say, when the political and military core of the empire was in Guanzhong,
the northwest not only enjoyed the geographical convenience to access the imperial
center but also played an important role in protecting the western flank of the
metropolitan area and serving for further northwestward expansion. The northwestern
military elites, particularly those who were the Liujun liangjiazi, were settled
advantageously in the greater Guanzhong region, which enabled them to easily engage in
the imperial politics and share the glory of being “people within the pass.”
While Guanzhong played the role of political and military center during the
Qin-Former Han period, Guandong/Shandong served as the key economic and cultural
region. With its fertile soil, dense population and other natural advantages, Guandong had
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enjoyed economic prosperity centuries before the founding of the Qin-Han empire, and
its economic development, particularly in terms of commerce, had already outpaced the
Guanzhong region. 109 Its economic importance was never underrated by the Qin-Han
imperial state. One of the reasons of the Qin and Former Han imperial states forcibly
moved substantial number of wealthy families from the east to Guanzhong was to break
up the natural concentrations of economic power in the east. As the Former Han dynasty
progressed, the economic growth of Guandong greatly benefited from the peace and
prosperity brought by the unified empire, it became the central region of finance,
commerce, and manufacturing of the empire. The Former Han set up offices of
manufacturing in eight commanderies: Henei 河內, Henan 河南, Yingchuan 潁川,
Nanyang 南陽, Taishan, Jinan 濟南, Guanghan 廣漢, and Shu. 110 The first six were all
in Guandong, and the remaining two in Yi province of the southwest. 111 There were also
three textile manufacturing offices in Qi 齊 commandery and others in Chenliu 陳留
commandery, all located in Guandong. 112 Agricultural production of Guandong was also
flourishing as the region was known as the breadbasket of the empire and provided
109
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substantial amount of agricultural products to Guanzhong (the agrarian surpluses of the
area were not enough to support the imperial court, government apparatus, and troops;
besides, the submission of grains was a form of taxation). 113 According to a memorial by
an official in mid-50sBCE, a large amount of grain was shipped annually from Guandong
to the metropolitan area and 60,000 labors were deployed for the task. 114 The
metropolitan area’s reliance upon the grain supply from Guandong was so great that
when an imperial advisor tried to persuade Emperor Yuan to move the capital to the east,
one of his points was the guaranteed abundant storage of grains. 115
As a key economic region in an agrarian society which practiced intensive farming,
Guandong needed large input of farming labor; at the same time, the flourishing
development of commerce sector provided opportunities for making fortunes, all of these
factors encouraged the concentration of population in the region. In fact, a great portion
of the overall population was living in Guandong and the population density of the area
was extremely high. Based on the data of population census recorded in the two Han
dynastic histories, which have been cited in the last chapter, Hans Bielenstien drew two
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maps to show the population distribution of the two Han dynasties as follows: 116

Map 8: Population of the Former Han in 2 CE

Map 9: Population of the Later Han in 140 CE

(Each dot represents 25,000 persons)

(Each dot represents 25,000 persons; the grey area
is where the population figure are missing)

Comparing the two maps, it is crystal clear that during the two Han dynasties a large
proportion of the registered population clustered together in Guandong or the mid-eastern
part of the empire. Even though the overall recorded population of the Later Han was less
than that of the Former Han, the overwhelming concentration of population in the east
still clearly shows on the map. In contrast, the population of Guanzhong area was much
lower and distributed sparser. Only when the Former Han located its capital in the region
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did a relatively large population be found in the metropolitan area; when the capital was
in the east during the Later Han, however, the population around the Former Han
metropolitan area experienced a drastic drop. It evidently shows that the dense population
in the Former Han metropolitan area was a product of political force which differed from
the natural concentration in Guandong.
Guandong not only provided the economic underpinning for the Qin-Han empire but
also played the role of cultural and intellectual center long before the imperial age.
During the sixth to third century BCE, the era of “hundred schools of thoughts” called by
modern historians and is remembered as the golden age in Chinese intellectual history,
most, if not all, of the philosophers, scholars, and their schools originated and flourished
in Guandong. The Qin state, although residing in the erstwhile Western Zhou domain,
was despised by the eastern states for being cultural backward and barbarous. 117 Even in
the Qin-Former Han period the establishment of political core of a unitary empire in
Guanzhong could not alter the leading role of Guandong in intellectual and academic
development. As the Former Han dynasty progressed, the peace and stability of the
empire further enhanced the intellectual prosperity of Guandong; at the same time, to
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meet the needs of civil governance, increasing number of eastern origins scholar-officials
held government offices and finally constituted the mainstay of imperial bureaucracy by
the last decades of the dynasty. The setting up of the Later Han capital in Luoyang
located in Guandong, was in part a result of the consideration of being close to the main
sources of scholar-officials and many local strong families; meanwhile, it also
strengthened the dominant cultural position of the east. 118 It was in such a situation that
Guandong achieved an unchallengeable position in fashioning the political culture of
Later Han, which will be mentioned under the next heading. For now, I would like to
focus on the Later Han founders’ decision of establishing capital in the east and its
influence on their vision of empire.
Although the founders of the two Han dynasties both arose in the east, they had very
different considerations on locating their capitals, which were related to their experience
of regime-building and the strategic circumstances facing them.
The founding emperor of the Former Han and his core followers were initially
roaming armed forces without strong local base; not until they entered Guanzhong area
and won the local support did they have solid footing, which ensured their final victory in
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the civil war after the fall of the Qin. 119 Based on the support of Guanzhong, the Former
Han actually repeated the Qin’s conquest of the east and maintained the West over the
East ruling pattern. Part of the political legitimacy of the Former Han was even based on
the notion of succeeding to the Qin. 120 Also, Guanzhong could provide the strategic and
geographic advantages which enabled the Former Han state to safeguard itself and project
its power to the east. 121 Needless to say, since the capital was located in Guanzhong, the
northwest would be recognized as a region with key strategic value.
In contrast, the Later Han followed an entirely different trajectory of regime-building.
Unlike their predecessors who were of plebian origins and generally less educated, the
founding members of the Later Han were generally from better-off backgrounds.
Emperor Guangwu, a distant imperial kinsman of the Former Han, was from a wealthy
landlord family. He was well educated and a student of the Imperial Academy during
Wang Mang’s reign. As a response to the chaotic situation, Emperor Guangwu and his
elder brother assembled their clan members and retainers and allied with other local
119
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strong families to form their first troops. In the process of establishing regime, Emperor
Gunagwu was greatly benefited from kinship networks and aided by various strong local
families like his. After Emperor Guangwu died, his son Emperor Ming ordered the
portraiture of twenty-eight generals who assisted his father in building the dynasty to be
shown at the Cloud Terrace (Yuntai 雲臺) of the palace. They were well known as the
“Twenty Eight Generals of the Cloud Terrace” (Yuntai ershiba jiang 雲臺二十八將) 122
in Chinese history and folklore, which resembles King Arthur’s knights of round table.
They were Deng Yu 鄧禹, 123 Ma Cheng 馬成, 124 Wu Han 吳漢, 125 Wang Liang 王
梁, 126 Jia Fu 賈復, 127 Chen Jun 陳俊, 128 Geng Yan 耿弇, 129 Du Mao 杜茂, 130 Kou
Xun 寇恂, 131 Fu Jun 傅俊, 132 Cen Peng 岑彭, 133 Jian Tan 堅鐔, 134 Feng Yi 馮異,135
Wang Ba 王霸, 136 Zhu You 朱佑, 137 Ren Guang 任光, 138 Zhai Zun 祭遵, 139 Li Zhong
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李忠, 140 Jing Dan 景丹, 141 Wan Xiu 萬脩, 142 Gai Yan 蓋延, 143 Pei Tong 邳彤, 144 Yao
Qi 銚期, 145 Liu Zhi 劉植, 146 Geng Chun 耿純, 147 Zang Gong 臧宮, 148 Ma Wu 馬
武, 149 and Liu Long 劉隆. 150 These 28 generals plus four other men, Wang Chang王
常, 151 Li Tong 李通, 152 Dou Rong, 153 and Zhuo Mao 卓茂 154 were regarded as the 32
meritorious officials of the founding of Later Han dynasty. 155
Of the thirty two men, most, if not all, of them were well educated. 156 To name only a
few, Zhuo Mao was a famous scholar of his time; Deng Yu, Zhu You, and Jing Dan all
studied at the Imperial Academy; Deng and Zhu were even classmates of Emperor
Guangwu. In economic terms, many of them were members of well-off or powerful
families like Emperor Guangwu, and had strong kinship networks and large landholdings
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with a certain number of retainers and tenants, which enabled them easily to gather their
military forces in the civil war. Many of them had official background when they joined
Emperor Guangwu; they were either from official families or (senior or junior) local
officials themselves. 157 Most importantly, except for one case, all the above meritorious
officials were deeply rooted in Guandong area and would prefer to stay close to their
power bases. The only exception was Dou Rong, as mentioned before, who was from an
official family in the Former Han metropolitan area which enjoyed great influence in the
Hexi Corridor due to taking successive postings in the region. With such a background,
Dou became the supreme leader of the Hexi Corridor during the civil war. What made
him became a meritorious official of the founding of the Later Han dynasty was his
surrender to Emperor Guangwu. The Later Han capital had already been set at Luoyang
before Dou’s surrender. Even when there were voices asking the imperial court to move
back to the Former Han capital Chang’an, Dou did not dare to express his opinion. With
his recent history of being a warlord, Dou was very cautious about committing himself to
anything after entering the Later Han court. In fact, he was honored by the emperor but
was not given any real power. In such an easterner-dominated court, strong local power
157
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bases, vested regional interests, and sense of attachment would lead the Later Han
founders incline to stay in the east.
Besides, there were strategic considerations that made the Later Han locate its seat of
authority in Guanzhong impossible. During the civil war and the initial years of the Later
Han, the whole Guangzhong region was divided into domains of contending powers, and
it took the Later Han some years to conquer and pacify the region. 158 Furthermore, during
the fighting between, the Former Han capital city Chang’an was devastated. Therefore,
locating the capital in Luoyang represented the Later Han founders’ interests and
response to the new strategic realities. The Later Han was based in the east and launched
its campaign of conquest to the west, which was in a reverse direction compared with the
Former Han’s and made the eastern-centric attitude inevitable.
In addition, Luoyang indeed had its own merits to win the position as the capital.
The importance of Luoyang had been recognized by the Former Han rulers. 159 For
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example, Emperor Wu once rejected his concubine’s request of enfeoffing her son at
Luoyang because of its crucial military and economic value. 160 When Wang Mang was in
power, he initiated a plan for building Luoyang as the second capital. Besides military
and economic considerations, Wang had his ideological reason to do that. As a usurper
who entertained his Confucian conviction to win popular support, Wang found Luoyang
was important in his project of establishing political legitimacy. According to the classics,
Luoyang was a city first founded by the Duke of Zhou, a cultural hero of antiquity and
also a model of emulation for Wang Mang. By building Luoyang a capital, Wang could
fabricate and strengthen his image as a “Duke of Zhou” of his time—a living sage. 161
Wang’s plan therefore deepened the relationship between Luoyang and Classicism, which
enjoyed a dominant position in the east. Although the Later Han was built on the failure
of Wang Mang, it actually inherited and continued the political culture fostered in the last
decades of Former Han and flourished under Wang Mang. 162 Wang’s building of
Luoyang had prefigured Luoyang’s role as capital in the Later Han times. 163
Many westerners, however, especially the residents of the erstwhile Former Han
as the core of the central state, which was the center of the known world. For an overview of such a cultural
centrality, see Des Forges, Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History, 1-4.
160
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metropolitan area were unwilling to accept the new situation. Since the day the Later Han
captured Guanzhong, they had strongly advocated the restoration of the seat of authority
in their area. One famous example was Du Du 杜篤 (d. 78CE), a scion of a renowned
family in the erstwhile Former Han metropolitan area and a celebrated writer of his day,
composed the “Rhapsody on the Capitals” (Lundu fu 論都賦), urging that the capital be
moved back to Chang’an. 164 Although no action was taken by the Later Han state, the
westerners’ nostalgia for the old capital persisted at least until the reign of the third Later
Han emperor.
In such an eastern-based regime with its easterner-dominated imperial court, the
strategic, economic, and cultural importance of Luoyang provided an arguably ideal seat
for the state. A deep-rooted nexus gradually unfolded between Luoyang and the whole
Guandong which made the movement of capital impossible. Luoyang became a magnet
which attracted all the aspirants to official career. The northwesterners who had once
enjoyed easy access to the central authority during the Former Han times thus lost their
geographical advantage. Moreover, the northwesterners found themselves facing a
foreign political environment in which they were forced to adapt for the sake of

164

HHS, 70A: 2595-2609.

187

advancement, which is the last point I want to examine in this chapter.

The ascendancy of scholar-officials
The declining strategic significance of Liang province as the western flank of the political
center and as the forward base for northwestward expansion did deprive the northwestern
elites’ geographical advantage of accessing to the imperial court. However, these were
secondary factors as the northwestern elites could still rely on their talent to overcome
geographical barriers and enter government service. In fact, what really lay behind the
estrangement between them and the political center and hampered their career was a new
political culture which emerged in the later years of the Former Han and matured in the
Later Han. This new political culture fostered a new political environment of the empire,
in which the northwestern elites faced a dilemma: whether to adapt themselves to the new
rules for advancement or to uphold their traditional way, though which might lead to an
inferior position. The new political culture, as a result of the ascendancy of
scholar-official, was a product of the prevalence of eastern based civil culture, which
deeply influenced the vision of empire and the official recruitment criteria in the Later
Han times. To examine this, we shall start with the civil-military relations of the time.
As the Sinologist Derk Bodde noted that Wen 文 (the civil side of life) and Wu 武
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(the martial side) constituted a notable dichotomy in pre-modern Chinese society; 165
putting this dichotomy in political context, the relative strength between civil and military
provides a perspective on understanding the empire-building process and political
development of early China.
Although the Western Zhou nobility was regarded as the embodiment of both civil
and military qualities, a distinction between civil and military positions within the
government had already begun to be drawn at the time. 166 In the centuries after the fall of
the Western Zhou, with the decadence of the old nobility, the various regional states hired
outsiders of ruling lineages for their talent to serve the administrations. Professional
specialization between civil and military sectors also became a desideratum for
governmental effectiveness and efficiency. Particularly in such a period of contending
states, military affairs were highly regarded by rulers as an essential means of protecting
their own state from invasion or invading others for expansion. Professional soldiers and
military experts, therefore, played important roles in the political arena. 167 Compared
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with the civil side, the military profession was highly specialized. Most military
knowledge and skills could not be solely learned from books but, most importantly, had
to be passed on at first hand, requiring persistent demonstration and practice and specific
drills (here I refer to those who really engaged in battle, and not armchair strategists who
were mainly literati). Military men’s experience on the battlefield and in the barracks was
in addition sharply different from what their civil colleagues obtained from academy and
government office buildings. Different training and experience thus fashioned different
mindsets, languages, and worldviews, 168 not surprisingly, the relations between civil and
military officials would not be harmonious and tensions have existed from very early
times. A sophisticated ruler would know how to maintain the balance between the two
sides and how to make them serve the interests of him or the state. The relative emphasis
on the two sides would also change in accordance with the need of the state.
In the process of building empire, the Qin state launched large-scale militarization
program which transformed itself into an effective war machine. Agricultural production
and military feat were both promoted as the top priority of the state. A new system of
ranks of merit or “meritorious military ranks” (Jungong Jue 軍功爵) was promulgated.
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Under this system, every man who served in the army and rendered meritorious service
would be granted a meritorious military rank which accompanied by material rewards,
economic benefits, and qualification for official positions. Not only did the rank holder
enjoy various privileges but one’s heir could also inherit certain ranks. The system of
meritorious military ranks was an effort of the state-sanctioned militarization policy,
through which martial spirit was promoted and military discipline was indoctrinated to
the people so that they were easily mobilized for military operations. As the rank holder
was respected and honored by the state, political and social status of military men was
held in high esteem which in turn enticed people to pursue such careers. The ranks of
merit system thus reshaped the Qin social structure. 169 As the system was inherited and
practiced by the Former Han, a Japanese scholar Nishijima Sadao 西嶋定生 even
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asserted that such a system was the underpinning for the Qin- Han society. 170
In addition to the ranks of merit system (with minor variations), the early Former Han
also inherited the martial spirit and respect for military feat. Emperor Gao (r.
206-187BCE), the first emperor of Former Han was very proud of himself for “holding a
three-foot sword to win the realm under Heaven” 171 提三尺劍取天下 and winning his
empire on horseback 居馬上而得之. 172 Most of the senior positions, whether civil or
military, of the early Former Han were occupied by military men who assisted the future
Han emperor in founding the dynasty. The position of Chancellor, the head of the
government, was monopolized by those military founding members. 173 Even during the
reign of Emperor Jing, the fourth generation emperor, Shentu Jia 申屠嘉 (d. 155BCE),
merely a captain of a crossbowmen team following Emperor Gao, was appointed
chancellor, for he was possibly the last man alive who had served the founder of the
dynasty. 174 Such a period was also the time that the Liujun liangjiazi emerged.
As the dynasty progressed, the tendency of militarization reached its high tide during
Emperor Wu’s time: Military affairs became a top priority of the state; the Liujun
170

Nishijima, Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei to kōzō; Tatemi, “Zen Kan ni okeru ‘Teishi’ no kōzō to
hensen, ” 82-110.
171
SJ, 8: 391. The three-foot sword was in Han measurement; one Han foot is equivalent to 23.1cm.
172
SJ, 97: 2699.
173
See SJ, 18 and 22.
174
HS, 42: 2100.

192

liangjiazi became a backbone of the imperial expansionist project; the officials who were
close to and entrusted by the emperor was military generals like Wei Qing and Huo
Qubing. 175 Emperor Wu himself was very interested in military affairs and paid serious
attention to who attained military achievements. There was a telling story that when
Emperor Wu learned that the young Zhao Chongguo was heavily injured in a battle, he
summoned Zhao to the court to show him the wounds. The emperor was overwhelmed by
that and therefore promoted Zhao as a reward for his courage and service. 176 During
those days, the military men’s ascent reflected the emphasis on military heritage that was
a tenet of the imperial definition of empire. The northwestern military elites, needless to
say, were the champions of the time.
However, after the reign of Emperor Xuan, the great-grandson of Emperor Wu, the
importance of military culture was gradually taken over by the civil one. The ranks of
merit, as a symbol, lost its military meaning and degenerated into a superficial system.
Military men in general and the northwestern military elites in particular entered a period
of gradual decline. Their loss of significance in politics went hand in hand with the
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empire’s increased use of scholar-officials.
As the advisor Lu Jia 陸賈 (fl. 220s-130sBCE) questioned Emperor Gao that
“(Although Your Majesty) won the empire on horseback, can it be governed on
horseback?” 177 居馬上得之，寧可以馬上治之乎？ and suggested employing both civil
and military personnel was the method for the regime to last longer (文武並用，長久之術
也), the emperor realized that he could not rule his empire solely by military might once
the chaotic period was over and the people were hoping for a return to normalcy. In order
to put his realm on the track of stability, the emperor needed the aid of men of letters.178
Since the founding members of the dynasty were generally less educated, the emperor
needed to recruit educated men from outside his caucus and these men, like Lu Jia and
the famous classics scholar and ritual expert Shusun Tong 叔孫通 (fl. 200s-180sBCE),
were mostly from Guandong, the breeding ground of men of letters. Those educated men
did make great contributions to the long-term development of the Han empire. For
example, it was Shusun Tong and his disciples who established and formulated the court
etiquette, ceremonial rites, and other relevant procedures which lay the foundation of
imperial rites of the Han empire. Shusun was even called by the Han intellectual as a
177
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saint of his day and the progenitor of Han classical studies. 179 Shusun Tong’s success
revealed the value of men of letters to the imperial rulers and also presaged the flowering
of scholar-officials in the following centuries.
Before expounding on how the official-scholars gradually formed the mainstay of the
imperial bureaucracy and its effect on the relations between the civil and military sectors,
it should be remarked that the dichotomy between civil and military presented in this
study is deliberately simplistic for the convenience of analyzing and showing the
changing relative strength between the two sectors and the tendency to preponderance of
the scholar-officials. In fact, each sector was not homogeneous within. The military side
had military men from different origins and with competing interests, and the
northwestern military elite was only a group among them (they did not always share the
same concerns); so did the civil side. 180 From its very beginning, the civil sector of the
Han bureaucracy contained not only men of letters and classics students like Lu Jia and
Shusun Tong but also a large team of clerical officers who were familiar with
administrative routines, procedures, and legal practices. In Chinese tradition, the former
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group was usually called Rusheng 儒生 (Confucian) and the latter Wenli 文吏 (Clerical
officer). 181 The clerical officer was a legacy of the Qin, which was famous for its
meticulous clerical system, 182 and played an extremely important role in the early years
of Former Han. The first chancellor of the Former Han dynasty, Xiao He 蕭何 (d.
193BCE), was himself a consummate clerical officer of a local government office during
the Qin times and finally played a leading role in shaping the legal and administrative
framework of the Han dynasty. 183 Benefiting from the historian Yan Buke’s meticulous
studies on the Rusheng and Wenli, we now have a clear picture of the development and
relations of the two groups during the Han times. 184 I shall not repeat the details here as it
is beyond the scope of this study; therefore, a brief summary will suffice.
In the early years of Former Han, although the rulers decried the harsh governance
and strict clerical practice of the Qin dynasty and promoted superficially more lenient or
laissez-faire policy, the clerical officers still constituted the backbone of the civil service
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system. As the dynasty progressed, however, increasing number of men of letters
emerged in government offices. During the reign of Emperor Wu, literary writing and
classical studies were recognized as criteria for entering civil service. The importance of
classical studies was growing rapidly and finally outpaced other criteria from the time of
Emperor Xuan on. Thereafter, more and more classical students entered the bureaucracy
and even reached senior official positions.
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Since the classics which the

scholar-officials and aspirants to office studied were closely related to Confucian
teachings, the success of official-scholars was hailed as a victory of Confucianism. 186 The
usurpation of Wang Mang was also a product of the prevailing Confucianism as
promoting Confucian conviction was an important means by which Wang used to gain
popular support within and without the government.
Facing the growing prosperity of scholar-officials, the relative importance of the
clerical officers declined. Since classical studies became desiderata for the success of
officialdom, most aspirants who sought to advance their careers within the bureaucracy
did so by studying the classics. Possession of culture was therefore seen and valued by
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the elite as a criterion of political and social superiority. On the other hand, the
administrative and legal knowledge that distinguished the clerical officers from others
was gradually disdained by scholar-officials as routine and trivial matters which should
be left to the minor functionaries. From the viewpoint of scholar-officials, they deserved
high positions since they studied the teachings passed on from the sages whereas clerical
officers should be content with junior positions as what they were doing was secular and
repetitive paperwork. Certainly, it did not necessarily mean that scholar-officials thought
the knowledge of clerical officers was useless as it was still crucial for daily operation of
the administration but just was not the prime knowledge that a scholar-official should
pursue. Some scholar-officials studied legal and administrative knowledge to enable
themselves handle government affairs more effectively and efficiently. Meanwhile, there
were clerical officers who received classical training in order to qualify themselves for
senior positions. As a result, a tendency of combination of the two groups emerged in the
last years of Former Han. Such a combination was encouraged in the Later Han since
Emperor Guangwu and his meritorious generals were classical students, as noted above,
and also interested in legal and administrative skills, which were essential for the
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rebuilding of empire. 187 Needless to say, classical knowledge was primary and clerical
knowledge was secondary.
The preponderance of scholar-officials not only squeezed the space of clerical officers
but also hindered the advancement of military officials. In theory, civil and military
officials had their own career trajectories. In reality, however, the predominance of
scholar-officials transformed the political culture of the empire into a civilized one which
honored civil officials with classical training and enhanced their comparative advantage
in bureaucratic recruitment. Although the historian Hsing I-tien 邢義田 points out in his
research that equipping oneself with both civil and military knowledge and skills was the
embodiment of ideal official in the Han times, 188 it was just an ideal type indeed. With
the growing prosperity of scholar-officials, in fact, military knowledge and skill were not
being treated on equal footing with their civil counterparts. In another article, Hsing cites
examples which show tellingly that a principle of recruitment based on appearance
gradually developed in the last years of Former Han and was practiced by the Later Han.
In order to reach a certain level of official position, according to the principle, candidate
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could not bear wounds made by weapons. 189 But who would have such wounds?
Generally speaking, it was mostly the military men. Hence, such a recruitment principle
implied a hindrance to military men’s advancement, and contradicted the ideal type.
Comparing with the story of Emperor Wu’s appreciation of Zhao Chongguo’s wounds
and Zhao’s ensuing promotion, mentioned before, the times had drastically changed.
While recruitment based on appearance discriminated against military men, civil
officials even invaded the privilege of their military counterparts. One salient example
was the transformation of the title and duty of the position of military general. By the
time of Emperor Wu, the various titles of General (Jiangjun 將軍) were granted to those
who took charge of military operations as commanders of an army. The person who was
entitled General was usually a military man. 190 The situation gradually changed after
Emperor Wu. During Emperor Xuan’s reign, civil officials started to take up the title of
General. For example, the famous classics scholar Xiao Wangzhi 蕭望之 (d. 47BCE)
was appointed General of the Van (Qian Jiangjun 前將軍) in 49BCE, 191 but no matter
whether before or after his assumption of the position Xiao had nothing to do with
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military affairs. Certainly, Xiao and other civil officials’ appointments of the position of
General were due to a variety of political reasons, but the predominance of civil officials
in bureaucracy was arguably an important factor.
During the Later Han, it was more common that many Generals were civil officials
and were not necessarily related to military affairs. 192 More than that, the men who really
took charge of military operations and commanding troops were not necessarily entitled
General but appointed as General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household (Zhonglang Jiang
中郎將, a modern equivalent would be Lieutenant General), which was subordinate to
General. Hence, civil officials would occupy the position of General and not take part in
military affairs, whereas military men who were intimately engaged with military
operations might only reach the second rank of the military hierarchy.
A recruitment system named Chaju 察 舉 ,
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literally “observation and

recommendation,” and usually called “Recommendation System” in modern Western
scholarship, adopted by the two Han dynasties contributed greatly to the expansion of
scholar-officials in the imperial bureaucracy. During the early years of Former Han, the
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founding members and their descendants had hereditary advantages of accessing official
positions, although other ways of entering government service existed. 194 As the dynasty
progressed, however, the need for acquiring talents from society became urgent and a
new method of recruitment was produced. In 178BCE and 165BCE, Emperor Wen issued
decrees ordering nobles and officials to recommend “worthy and upright persons and
persons who are outspoken and not afraid to criticize” 賢良方正能直言極諫者; in
134BCE, Emperor Wu promulgated a new law which ordered every commandery and
fief-states to recommend “filial and incorrupt” (Xiaolain 孝廉) persons. These marked
the incipient phase of the Recommendation System. 195 The system at first contained a
wide variety of recruitment subjects, besides the two mentioned above, there were
“understanding the classics” (Mingjing 明經), “understanding the law” (Mingfa 明法),
“capable of managing the river” (nengzhihe 能治河), “courageous and knowledgeable
about the art of war” (Yongmeng zhibingfa 勇猛知兵法), “incorruptible official” (Lianli
廉吏), “abundant talent” (Maocai 茂才), “extraordinary excellence” (Youyi 尤異). 196
However, the system gradually concentrated on the subject of “filial and incorrupt.”
Provinces and commanderies were required to recommend candidates of “filial and
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incorrupt” to the central government annually. In theory, “filial and incorrupt” were
virtues that everybody could develop; in reality, such a title was interpreted as derived
from Confucian ethics and gradually slipped into the hands of the men of letters who
asserted themselves as followers of Confucian teachings. Moreover, the rights of
recommendation were in the hands of senior officials who were always scholar-officials.
As a result, men of letters gradually controlled the system and gained greater presence in
the government officialdom. The scholar-officials, once they attained vested interests,
further strengthened such a system as the chief way of recruitment. Local powerful
families which were rooted mainly in Guandong and had resources to provide classical
education to their members took advantage to become the main source of
scholar-officials in the Later Han. 197 Furthermore, they established a rather exclusive
system based on their own ties and networks and helped their candidates entered the
government while excluding others from advancing in the bureaucracy. 198 As a result, a
handful of families got the lion’s share of bureaucratic positions. Japanese scholars such
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as Watanabe Yoshihiro and Higashi Shinji have presented detailed studies on the
composition of the Later Han bureaucracy, which show arguably the dominance of
Guandong based scholar-officials, 199 and I shall not repeat their findings here.
As a modern Han historian has stated sharply, “Confucianism was but a veneer that
made the local power alignment respectable and acceptable in the eyes of the court.” 200
Indeed, after the state opened the door of officialdom to the powerful families, the
“Confucianization” championed by the scholar-officials was largely self-directed and
became a tool for vested interests to enhance their status, wealth and power under the
auspices of imperial authority. 201 Hence, scholar-officials reached their predominance at
the expense of the advancement of other groups, including the military men.
Under such an eastern scholar-official dominated and growingly “Confucianized”
recommendation system, aspirants to official position in the frontier regions found
themselves in a disadvantaged situation. The elites of Liang province in particular
suffered from a “relative deprivation.” 202 They were famous for military ability and thus
199
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enjoyed privileges on official career paths during the first half of the Former Han dynasty;
however, as the recommendation system gradually put absolute emphasis on civil value
than the martial one, the northwestern military elites lost their traditional advantages in
the competition of advancement. As analyzed before, a large proportion of the registered
population of Liang province was composed of paupers and convicts from the east; they
were the scum of the society and their general level of education would not be high. In
response to the environment and practical needs of such a frontier society, the settlers and
their descendants would prefer military training to classical studies, especially when the
state relied heavily on their military contributions. The situation did not improve much
even after the empire had transformed its posture from aggressive to defensive. In the last
years of the Later Han, Liang province was still treated by scholar-officials as a land of
backwardness. In 184CE, when rebels rose up in Liang province, an official named Song
Xiao宋梟 (fl. 180sCE) told Gai Xun (no. 22 on the list of northwestern elites) his views
on the cause of and solution to the revolt and said, “Liang province lacked for education,
therefore, revolts always happened. Now, I intend to produce more copies of the Classics
of Filial Piety and let every household study it. It may lead the people to know
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righteousness.” 203 涼州寡於學術，故屢致反暴。今欲多寫《孝經》
，令家家習之，庶
或使人知義. The Classics of Filial Piety was a primer for children in the Later Han, 204
Song’s intention of teaching the people of Liang province the text showed clearly how
poor he thought the education level of the province was. Song’s words might be
hyperbolic but might still reveal how some scholar-officials despised Liang province.
After hearing Song’s opinion, Gai Xun, as a Liang province military elite himself, warned
Song that his words would only arouse the hatred of the entire province (結怨一州). 205
The people of Liang province were discontented with being treated as cultural backward,
or more precisely, detested the cultural arrogance of the scholar-officials.
Some Han rulers understood the disadvantaged positions of the frontier regions in
producing civil talents and tried to maintain a balanced recruitment. In 12BCE, when
Emperor Cheng asked all interior commanderies and fief-states to recommend “upright
and outspoken persons” to the court, he treated the frontiers separately by asking twenty
two commanderies on the northern frontier to recommend “persons who are courageous
and knowledgeable about the art of war.” 206 The emperor understood the interior and
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frontier commanderies produced different kinds of talents and made an attempt to provide
the militarized frontier commanderies an opportunity to recommend their own
candidates.
However, the predominance of scholar-officials and the increasing importance of
“filial and incorrupt” in the recommendation system were too strong to be altered. In
101CE, Emperor He of Later Han addressed clearly that the frontier provinces such as
You 幽 (in the northeast), Bing, and Liang had a low population and the official path of
their elites were narrow; the emperor thus assigned the frontier commanderies quotas of
recommendation in proportionate to their population. Accordingly, frontier commanderies
which had 100,000 or more people could recommend one “filial and incorrupt” annually;
those with populations below 100,000 could recommend one biennially; those with
populations below 50,000 could recommend one triennially. 207 Although the emperor
aimed to guarantee the rights of recommendation of the frontier commanderies, the
population of frontier regions was absolutely overwhelmed by that of Guandong and was
quantitatively too weak to compete with the interior commanderies.
Since military ability was no longer a guarantee to a bright career future as it once
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was, some Later Han northwestern elites realized that they had to adapt to the new rules
of the game in order to move upward in the bureaucracy of the “Confucian State.” 208 In
other words, they have to transform themselves into scholar-official or, at least, to seek
recognition from the scholar-officials. Such a tendency explains why the “Three
Brilliants of Liang province”: Huangfu Gui, Zhang Huan, and Duan Jiong all started their
official career with civil positions. Although they all transferred to the military
trajectories later in life, the experience of civil office might enable them to have a similar
career experience with their civil colleagues and communicate with the latter. When the
first Great Proscription (166CE) happened and many renowned scholar-officials and
literati were arrested, 209 Huangfu Gui was ashamed of himself for not being included
though he was an outstanding man of the western province (自以西州豪傑，恥不得豫).
Therefore, he submitted a memorial and claimed his relations with the proscribed parties.
His efforts of being implicated were in vain but he still worked to help the accused. 210
The reason for Huangfu Gui’s attitude might be complicated, but his eagerness to be
recognized by the scholar-officials was probably a crucial consideration. Duan Jiong,
albeit a tough warrior, studied classics when he was mature and was recommended as a
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“filial and incorrupt” to enter government service. 211 Among the three men, Zhang Huan
was the most “Confucianized” one. He studied classics with famous scholar-officials,
editing classical texts that his edition was later kept by the imperial library, teaching a
thousand students, and being an author of many literary works including an exegesis of a
Confucian canon. He even brought his students with him and lectured calmly to them in
the midst of a battle. 212 This might particularly remind his contemporaries that Emperor
Guangwu and his meritorious generals were well-known for their promotion of classical
studies and rituals during their time in the battlefield. 213 Probably because of his
“Confucian” background, Zhang Huan was desperate to move out from Liang province,
which lay beyond the realm of the “Confucian State.”
Nevertheless, although Liang province produced the “Three Brilliants,” the
northwestern elites were still too insignificant to tip the balance to favor themselves.
According to Hsing I-tien’s statistical research on the 324 Later Han “filial and incorrupt”
whose names were recorded in historical sources, only 2 among the 265 people whose
origins were known were from Liang province; the remainder all distributed in the
middle, eastern, southeastern part of the empire and Yi province in the southwest. Among
211
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them, the majority was in the commanderies of Guandong such as Runan 汝南, Nanyang,
Yingchuan, Henan, and Chenliu 陳留, all were traditional power-bases of powerful
families. 214 Although the sample size is small and the textual records were left by
scholar-officials, the numbers still give a clue to how tiny the role Liang province played
in the recommendation system.
Besides, even though the “Three Brilliants” tried very hard, their successes were
limited. Duan Jiong seemed to be the most successful one as he was twice appointed
Grand Commandant (Taiwei 太尉), which was equal to Chancellor. However, it was due
to the patronage of eunuchs, and Duan was despised by most scholar-officials for his
collaboration with eunuchs. Duan was forced to commit suicide and his family was exiled
to frontier when his patron lost in a factional struggle among the eunuchs. 215 During the
second Great Proscription (168CE), Zhang Huan was used by the eunuchs to suppress
their rivals—the leaders of scholar-officials and students of the Imperial Academy, who
had established a very strong patron-client relations. In the aftermath, Zhang Huan
bitterly regretted being deceived by the eunuchs. 216 This episode compellingly tells that
Zhang Huan lacked connections with the leading scholar-officials and was not accepted
214
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as one of them.
The absolute majority of the proscribed scholar-officials and students of the Imperial
academy, who were all the cultural elites of the time, were, not surprisingly, from the
eastern part of the empire. The Historian Jin Fagen 金發根 has analyzed the places of
origins of the proscribed or related people records in Later Han history and arranged the
order of the regions in accordance with their numbers:
(1) Guandong area, including the commanderies of Henan, Hongnong, (where Zhang
Huan requested to move to), Taiyuan 太原, Shangdang 上黨, and the region to the east
of Nanyang commandery and the north of Huai 淮 River.
(2) The regions along the middle and lower courses of the Yangzi River, including Nan
南 commandery and the area to the east of Wuling 武陵 commandery.
(3) The regions along the upper course of Yangzi River and the southwestern
commanderies.
(4) The metropolitan area of the Former Han and the northwestern commanderies. 217
It is clear that the most prominent cultural elites mainly concentrated in the

217
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commanderies at the mid-lower reach of the Yellow River, and the commanderies such as
Henan and Hongnong were just next to the imperial capital. The concentration of cultural
elites reveals an uneven distribution of power in favor of the core area. For the periphery,
of the 12 people recorded in the fourth category, 9 were from the former metropolitan
area; the remaining 3 were Zhang Huan, Huanfu Gui, and Gai Xun. Nevertheless, these
three men were only indirectly involved in the incident. On the other hand, as de
Crespigny has pointed out that among the men who were praised as martyrs and heroes in
the Great Proscription, only two had ever taken part in military campaign on the frontiers
and the military generals such as the “Three Brilliants” received no mention, which
reflected the “essential lack of sympathy and contact between” the scholar-officials and
the frontier military men. 218
Once again, the statistical data show us the minor significance of the northwestern
elites in relation to the cultural elites of the whole empire and their participation in the
high politics. No matter how hard the northwestern elites like the “Three Brilliants” tried,
the eastern scholar-officials dominated “Confucian State” was difficult to be challenged
except by brutal violence, which would be realized by Dong Zhuo, a military strong man
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and a Liujun liangjiazi, who did not adapt himself to the new rule of the game of power.

To conclude this chapter, the geographical characters and the composition of the
settlers determined the military nature of the region called Liang province. When the
empire was in an aggressive mode, the northwestern military elites reached their pinnacle;
however, when the empire retreated to a defensive mode, their significance diminished.
Limited by the geographical and cultural conditions of the frontier society the
northwestern elites could only be latecomers and losers when the eastern-based
scholar-officials re-shaped the political culture of the empire and dominated the imperial
politics. But the new political culture did not bring a broader cultural unity to the empire.
The new cultural elites of the empire drew a firm line between what they saw as the core
of the empire and its barbaric periphery. They dominated the Later Han state and held a
disproportionate share of central government offices by benefiting from their classical
education, provincial quotas of the recommendation system, and geographical proximity
to the imperial center. On the other hand, given their career frustrations and provincial
origins, some of the northwestern military elites adapted to the new political culture while
others felt the estrangement from the imperial center and finally resorted to violence—the
means which they were most familiar with—to pursue their interests. Besides, not only
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did the elites felt aggrieved but also the commoners became increasingly disaffected from
the Later Han state. All in all, the elites needed a discontented people to support their
actions against the empire. How the northwest was treated by the imperial center as a
barbaric periphery and how the northwesterners were further alienated from the Later
Han state will be discussed in the next chapter.
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4
Enemy within the Gates:
The Qiang Wars and the Abandonment of the Northwest

In the past, when the Qiang caitiffs launched their rebellions, they began in the
provinces of Liang and Bing, spread to Sili (the metropolitan area), wreaked havoc on
Zhao and Wei to the east, and plundered Shu and Han to the west; five provinces were
devastated and six commanderies were removed. In the surrounding areas, for over a
thousand li, 1 nothing was left in the countryside; pillage and havoc were ceaseless day
and night; people were being destroyed and burnt to ashes for days and months.
However, the gentlemen of interior commanderies who were not affected by the
disasters all proposed leaving the situation unfettered and waiting for the appropriate
time to deal with it. How could such an intention meet the expectations of the people? 2
往者羌虜背叛，始自涼、并，延及司隸，東禍趙、魏，西鈔蜀、漢，五州殘破，
六郡削迹，周迴千里，野無孑遺，寇鈔禍害，晝夜不止，百姓滅沒，日月焦盡。
而內郡之士不被殃者，咸云當且放縱，以待天時。用意若此，豈人心哉！

When the disheartened Wang Fu 王符 (ca. 90s-160sCE) wrote the above passage, which
belongs to an essay entitled “Jiubian” 救邊 (Rescuing the Frontiers), sometime during a
respite in the Qiang wars in the mid-second century CE, the terrible images of the
war-torn northwest and the discontent with the imperial center might still have haunted
1

Li is an ancient Chinese measure of length. One li in Han dynasty approximates to 0.415 km. But in
certain contexts of the Han records, such as this quotation, the term li is used for rhetorical purpose rather
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2
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汪繼培 and Peng Duo 彭鐸 (Beijing: Zhinghua shuju, 2010), 22: 257.
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him. Even nearly two thousand years thereafter, the reader can still feel his sorrow,
frustration, and anger from his words as he recalls the Qiang wars.
Wang Fu, a native of Linjing 臨涇 county in Anding commandery of Liang province,
was a noted yet eccentric scholar of his age. Although no details of his life are given in
the historical records, we know he was active during the first half of the second century
CE, which covered two intense periods of the prolonged Qiang wars (107-118CE and
140-145CE) and also the period during which the Later Han state began turning to
decadence in various respects. 3 He probably never entered government service but was
just an outspoken critic of contemporary politics and social issues. His commentaries
were preserved in the work entitled Qianfulun 潛夫論, literally The Comments of a
Recluse. 4 Having experienced first-hand the Qiang wars and the concomitant chaos,
3

For Wang Fu’s biography, see HHS, 49: 1630-1643. For an examination of Wang Fu’s dates of birth and
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the Han Dynasty,” in H. M. Wright trans., Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme
(New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), 187-225. For Chinese scholarship, besides Jin’s
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Han qingshi 王符《潛夫論》所反映之東漢情勢 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1995).
Although calling himself a recluse, Wang Fu did not lead an isolated way of life. In fact, he had
connections with some renowned intellectual figures of his time, including certain eastern-based
scholar-officials; he was highly admired by the northwestern military elite Huangfu Gui.
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Wang Fu left in his work the eyewitness accounts of the suffering of the northwestern
people and his criticism of the imperial strategy dealing with the disasters. Three essays
in the Qianfulun were on frontier problems, namely “Jiubian,” “Bianyi” 邊議 (Opinion
on the Frontiers), and “Shibian” 實邊 (Fortifying the Frontiers), all focus on the Qiang
wars. The value of his essays in understanding the history of the Qiang wars and other
related issues cannot be overemphasized. When Fan Ye compiled the Hou Hanshu nearly
three hundred years after Wang Fu, he adopted Wang’s report as one of the main sources
in the account of the Qiang wars. 5 In the twentieth century, the Sinologist Etienne Balazs
praised Wang Fu as being “the most important eyewitness of his times, about which we
would know very little if it were not for his account.” 6 Nevertheless, some scholars have
pointed out that Wang Fu was extremely hostile to the government and his essays on the
Qiang wars were highly partisan as well as emotional.7 It is true that, as a northwesterner,
Wang Fu’s criticism of the imperial court’s handling of the disaster unavoidably had a
strong bias, but for the purpose of this study his attitude provides appropriately the
viewpoints of some of his northwestern countrymen’s perceptions of the imperial center.
Before we move to the history of the Qiang wars, we shall first turn our attention to
5
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the Qiang people per se, whom I have mentioned many times in this study hitherto. Who
were the Qiang? It is a question that I shall deal with in the first section of this chapter.
Then, in the second section, I shall outline the military conflicts between the Qiang and
the Han regimes in order to provide a backdrop for our understanding of how devastating
the Qiang wars were. The final section will focus on two interwoven subjects: firstly, the
catastrophic impact of the wars on the Later Han in general and Liang province in
particular; secondly, the court debates over abandoning Liang province during the intense
periods of the Qiang wars and the ensuing forcible withdrawals. We shall see how the
Qiang wars exposed the underlying conflicts between the northwesterners and the
imperial center, aggravated the feeling of alienation of the former from the latter, and
deepened feelings of distrust and estrangement between the two sides.

Who were the Qiang?
The military confrontation between the Later Han and the Qiang was a “Hundred Years’
War” that continued intermittently throughout the mid-first century CE to the late-second
century CE and spanned nearly the whole life of the dynasty. It was a war of attrition in
that the Later Han became entangled in the military conflicts, exhausted enormous
amount of resources on fighting against the adversary and drained the imperial coffers to
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the point of bankruptcy, but without achieving clear and decisive military and political
victories. Undoubtedly, the Qiang wore down the Later Han and hence contributed to the
failure of the empire. In this section, I shall try to examine who the insurmountable Qiang
were.
According to the conventional viewpoint in Chinese history, the Qiang as an ethnic
group has an ancient origin and enjoys a very long history. Nowadays in the People’s
Republic of China, the Qiang are one of the 55 officially designated minority groups
(Shaoshu minzu 少數民族) or so-called “brotherly groups” (Xiongdi minzu 兄弟民族),
who join the dominating ethnic Han to constitute the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu
中華民族). 8 The modern Qiang people are officially and commonly regarded as the
descendants of the ancient Qiang since both of them reside in basically the same area
corresponding generally to the modern provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and
Sichuan, and lead a nomadic way of life. In many modern studies the Qiang are regarded
as an ethnic group whose history can be traced back to the Prehistoric period. Over this
long course of history, the Qiang have passed down their ethnic identity and culture
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generation after generation to the present. 9
Chinese archaeologists also try to manifest the above assumption of traditional
historiography in archaeology. Findings excavated in modern Gansu province and its
environs are characterized to being the remains of the Qiang and the sites of Neolithic
civilizations found in the areas such as Xindian, Siwa, and Kayue, mentioned in Chapter
Two, are regarded as the settlements of the ancient Qiang.10 However, since no written
evidence or other concrete traces left by the Qiang have been discovered, no clear linkage
can be established between those ancient civilizations and the ancient Qiang, as well as to
the modern Qiang. The assertion that the Qiang were the ancient inhabitants in the
northwest is in fact more susceptible to the presumption that the Qiang have always been
living in the same area. In other words, the people who inhabited the area in earlier times
were the ancestors of the Qiang in the Han dynasties, as well as in later centuries. 11
9

It is a dominant view in enormous Chinese works, for example, Ma Changshou 馬長壽, Di yu Qiang 氐
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10
For example, Yu Weichao 俞偉超, “Gudai Xi Rong he Qiang, Hu kaoguxue wenhua guishu wenti de
tantao” 古代“西戎”和“羌”、“胡”考古學文化歸屬問題的探討 in idem, Xian Qin liang Han kaoguxue
lunji 先秦兩漢考古學論集 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1985), 180-192; Zhao Huacheng 趙化成,
“Gansu dongbu Qin he Qiang Rong wenhua de kaoguxue tansuo” 甘肅東部秦和羌戎文化的考古學探索
in Yu Weichao ed., Kaogu leixingxue de lilun yu shijian 考古類型學的理論與實踐 (Beijing: Wenwu
chubanshe, 1989), 145-175.
11
In fact, it is a common practice of PRC scholarship on constructing the connections between various

220

Archaeological findings are interpreted as corroborating evidence for such an assertion.
Nevertheless, since no concrete evidence is available, the lineage of the Qiang from
Prehistoric to the Han periods should be suspected of being an invented or an imaginative
construction.
Such an invented lineage of the Qiang people is not necessarily a modern invention
but has a long tradition in Chinese historical records. The fact that there are no
independent accounts of the Qiang in the Shiji and the Hanshu reflects that the Qiang had
not yet been qualified as an important group in relation to the empire. However, when the
Qiang became a menace to the Later Han empire, historians felt it was needed to
understand and record such a dreadful enemy. As a result, the first independent and
detailed account of the Qiang appears in the Hou Hanshu. In the “Account of the Western
Qiang” (Xi Qiang zhuan 西羌傳) of Hou Hanshu, the complier Fan Ye traces the origins
of the Qiang to the San Miao 三苗, a tribe in the legendary period. According to Fan, the
San Miao originally lived in the south and was a branch of a clan surnamed Jiang 姜.
When the sage-emperor Shun 舜 expelled the Four Villains (Sixiong 四凶) to the
frontiers, the San Miao was exiled to the northwest, an area that was part of Jincheng

ancient and modern East Asian ethnic groups.
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commandery of the Han dynasties. 12 The story goes on to discuss the relationship
between the Qiang and the ancient Chinese regimes—Xia, Shang, and Zhou in
chronological order, and the Qiang were regarded as one group among the various
Western Rong, 13 an umbrella name of the western barbarians during the Zhou times. It
was not until the time of the legendary chieftain Wuyi Yuanjian 無弋爰劍 that the
Qiang people separated from the Rong family. According to the sources, Wuyi Yuanjian
was a fugitive slave of the ruler of Qin state. He hid in a cave and survived the fire set by
his pursuers. Then, he married a woman with a dismembered nose whom he met in the
wild. As the Qiang people believed Wuyi Yuanjian was protected by divine power from
the harm of fire, they honored and followed him as leader. The story also says how Wuyi
Yuanjian and his wife shaped the customs of the Qiang as he taught them to practice
animal husbandry and his wife who wore her hair hanging down to cover her nose-less
face, was emulated by the Qiang in their hair style. 14 The descendants of Wuyi Yuanjian
gradually divided and constituted the various groups of the Qiang people in the Han
times.
In the above account, Fan Ye provided his readers with a full story of explaining who
12
13
14

HHS, 87: 2869.
HHS, 87: 2870-2874.
HHS, 87: 2875.
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the Qiang were, where they came from, and why they emerged in the northwest as they
were known in the Han times. When tracing the origins of the Qiang, Fan constructed a
fictive relationship between the Qiang and the Han people by associating the Qiang with
legendary figures such as Emperor Shun and the San Miao in order to lead his readers to
believe that the Qiang were people with whom the Chinese ancestors had already
associated. 15 As the historian Nicola Di Cosmo analyzed, Sima Qian’s effort to
rationalize the Xiongnu in the Shiji gave an alien people a “Chinese” origin, to make
them into “a legitimate component of Chinese history from the very beginning,” and to
make them “part of the family” of the Chinese, 16 and Fan Ye did the same. It was a
project of demystifying the Qiang and familiarizing the Han people with them.
Fan Ye also casted the Qiang in an appropriate role to explain their adversarial
relationship with the Later Han. According to Fan, the Qiang were descendants of the evil
San Miao who had conflicts with the sage Emperor Shun; the Qiang then became a
member of the Western Rong family, the traditional enemy of the Zhou and Qin regimes.

15

In the “Account of the Xiongnu” of Shiji, Sima Qian constructed a fictive kinship relationship between
the Xiongnu and the ruling house of the Xia dynasty. For detailed study on the topic, see Di Cosmo,
Ancient China and Its Enemies, 294-311; Wang Mingke 王明珂, Huaxia bianyuan: lishi jiyi yu zuqun
rentong 華夏邊緣：歷史記憶與族群認同 (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 1997),
292-295; Wang Mingke, Yingxiong zuxian yu dixiong minzu: genji lishi de wenben yu qingjing 英雄祖先
與弟兄民族：根基歷史的文本與情境 (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2006),
Chapters 3 and 8.
16
Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 300.
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These stories revealed that the vicious nature of the Qiang was ingrained and one should
not be surprised by the bellicose relations that prevailed between the Qiang and the Han.
Besides, as an enemy of the Han people, the Qiang were depicted as debased and
barbarous as possible. They were the offspring of the ostracized San Miao and then a
member of the barbarous Western Rong; their legendary chieftain Wuyi Yuanjian was
originally a slave of the Qin state, which was regarded as the culturally backward
regional state of the Zhou dynasty. Hence, the ancestors of the Qiang were constructed as
being the worst of the worst. Furthermore, Wuyi Yuanjian hid in a cave like an animal to
escape from his pursers; he later married a nose-less woman he met in the wild. Although
Fan Ye did not explain why Wuyi Yuanjian’s wife had her nose cut off, it probably
implied she was a convict since amputation of the nose was one of the official
punishments in early China. It is clear that the couple was described as the scum of the
earth. Moreover, that the couple met and married in the wild meant they did not go
through proper marriage rites and “meeting in the wild” (implies that having sexual
intercourse in the wild) was in particular an uncouth practice criticized severely by the
Han Confucian scholars. Needless to say, the descendants of a fugitive slave and a
convict who married in the wild like animals were a degenerate people. One instance of

224

the Qiang’s barbarism was that they felt no shame in following Wuyi Yuanjian’s wife,
probably a convict, in letting their hair hang loose (pifa 披髮). From the standpoint of
Han culture, untied hair was a sign of abandoning refined culture and turning oneself into
a barbarian, which I will discuss more later. All these depictions clearly show how the
Qiang people were being despised and de-humanized in the standard history. 17
Although Fan Ye compiled the “Account of the Western Qiang” nearly 300 years after
the Later Han, it does not necessarily mean that the reconstruction of the Qiang story was
his own invention. He must have based his writing on the sources transmitted from the
Later Han times. 18 For instance, Ying Shao 應劭 (d. 200), a famous scholar-official in
the last decades of Later Han, mentioned the Qiang in his work entitled Fengsu tongyi 風
俗通義 (Comprehensive Discussion of Customs) as “originally from the Western Rong
origins, and were people of low and degraded status” 本西戎，卑賤者也. 19 It seems that,
at least in the last years of the Later Han, it was a prevailing view that the Qiang were
17

In a sharp contrast to the Qiang, the Xiongnu were given a noble origin of being from the ruling house of
the Xia dynasty in the Han historical records. It is probably because the Xiongnu were once a Eurasian
hegemon and, most importantly, had established formal diplomatic and marriage relations with the Han
dynasties, therefore, they earned much respect from the Han historians. For detailed discussion, see Di
Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 294-311; Wang, Huaxia bianyuan, 292-298; Wang, Yingxiong
zuxian yu dixiong minzu, Chapters 3, 7, and 8.
18
de Crespigny, Northern Frontier, 55.
19
This is an entry not found in the present edition of Fengsu tongyi but preserved in the 10th century
encyclopedic work Taiping yulan 太平御覽. See Ying Shao 應劭, Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu 風俗通義校注,
annotated by Wang Liqi 王利器 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 488. For detailed study on Ying Shao
and his works, see Michael Nylan, “Ying Shao’s ‘Feng Su Tung Yi’: An Exploration of Problems in Han
Dynasty Political, Philosophical and Social Unity” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1982).
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members of the Western Rong family, which indicated that the Qiang were a group of
barbarians in the west.
In recent years, the Taiwanese scholar Wang Mingke 王明珂 has published widely
in the field of Qiang studies and provided, from my point of view, a persuasive theory of
the identity of the Qiang in history. Basing his research on both textual sources and
archaeological data, Wang proposed that although the name “Qiang” was mentioned in
various Chinese documents, from oracle-bone inscriptions of the fourteenth century BCE
that were excavated in the early twentieth century to the texts of the Han times, the Qiang
were in fact not a “people” with continuity in time and space but rather just a general
label used by the ancient Chinese to call the non-Chinese people in the west. 20 According
to Wang, the name “Qiang” was an exonym (a label used by outsiders to refer to a given
group) used by the ancient Chinese with other ethnic labels such as Di, Yi, and Rong
rather than an autonym (which people use to identify themselves). 21 Therefore, it

20

Wang first proposed this view in his doctoral dissertation, see Wang Mingke, “The Ch’iang of Ancient
China through the Han Dynasty: Ecological Frontiers and Ethnic Boundaries” (Ph.D dissertation, Harvard
University, 1992). He later expounded this thesis in his Chinese works like Huaxia bianyuan; Yingxiong
zuxian yu dixiong minzu; Manzi, Hanren yu Qiangzu 蠻子、漢人與羌族 (Taipei: Sanmin shujun gufen
youxiangongsi, 2001); Qiang zai Han Zang zhjian : yige Huaxia bianyuan de lishi renleixue yanjiu 羌在漢
藏之間 : 一個華夏邊緣的歷史人類學研究 (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2003);
Youmuzhe de jueze: miandui Handiguo de bei Ya youmu buzu 游牧者的抉擇：面對漢帝國的北亞游牧部
族 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2008).
21
Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 99. Not until the 4th and 5th centuries
CE did the term “Qiang” become an autonym of the Qiang people. For the self identity of modern Qiang
people, see Wang, Manzi, Hanren yu Qiangzu, 21-58 and 91-122; Wang, Qiang zai Han Zang zhjian, 1-35
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represented a sense of otherness and a concept of “those in the west who are not us”
among the ancient Chinese. 22 In other words, “the Qiang were not only some people
living along China’s western frontiers generation after generation, but also a concept in
the minds of the ancient Chinese generation after generation,” and “the people were the
Qiang because the Han Chinese believed that they were.” 23 Wang further suggested that
the demographic and geographic implications of the term Qiang changed over time. From
the Shang to the Han dynasties, the term “Qiang” was generally applied to the people(s)
widely distributed across the west and northwest of China, and its ethnic boundary kept
shifting towards the west along with the Chinese westward expansion. 24 During the Han
dynasties, the Han people reached the boundary of ecological extent and the
autochthonous people lived there were thus named “Qiang” by the Han empire.
In fact, given the limited availability of historical sources, especially with no direct
evidence left by the ancient Qiang, it might not be possible to establish a clear connection
between the Qiang of the Han times and the ancient peoples who inhabited the same area
of activity. Therefore, hereafter, I will cut the Qiang people of the Han times off from the
periods before and after the Han times and adopt Wang Mingke’s view of treating the
and 251-296.
22
Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 1-3.
23
Ibid, 98.
24
Ibid, 129-132.
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term “Qiang” as an ancient ethonym and a catch-all category of identification for the
people living in the west of the Han regimes. The term “Qiang” as an exonym does not
necessarily mean that the people who were called “Qiang” cannot be treated as an ethnic
group. Here, I follow the definition given by Sian Jones that an ethnic group was “any
group of people who set themselves apart and/or are set apart by others with whom they
interact or coexist on the basis of their perceptions of cultural differentiation and/or
common descent.” 25 By this definition, the people who were called “Qiang” (as an
exonym) during the Han times constituted an ethnic group not only because they were
regarded as and set apart by the Han people but also because, as will be shown below,
they developed a different culture from the Han people. Also, conflicts with the Han
empires made the Qiang acutely aware of their common boundaries, forcing them to
define their differences from the Han and leading them to build defenses or launch
offensives against the common adversary.
As the Qiang were distinct from the Han people, we may ask what kind of marker(s)
of distinction the Han people adopted. Since antiquity, the Chinese people have been in
contact with peoples dissimilar from themselves; some of them could be distinguished

25

Sian Jones, The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the Past and Present (London:
Routledge, 1997), xiii.
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from physical appearance like the notion of “deep eyes and high noses,” which became a
salient feature and stereotype of defining foreigners in later periods. 26 However, there
was no record that the Qiang had different physical features from the Han.
Hairstyle was surely a significant marker of ethnicity. In contrast to the hairstyle of
the Han people, the Qiang let their hair untied, which was regarded by the Han people as
a signifier of cultural barbarism. 27 In the early Later Han, a famous scholar Ban Biao 班
彪 (3-54CE) once warned Emperor Guangwu that there were large numbers of
surrendered Qiang intermingling with the Han people in Liang province, and it would
cause tremendous problems if the empire did not take any preventive measures. He called
the Qiang a people who “let the hair unbound and folding the robes to the left” 被髮左衽
(pifa zuoren), pointing out that the customs between the Han and the Qiang were different
(xisu jiyi習俗既異), and their languages were mutually unintelligible (yanyu butong 言
語不通). 28 It was true that the Qiang left their hair unbound, as we have seen above, but
we have no evidence of the Qiang’s clothing. In fact, whether the Qiang really folded
their robes to the left was not the crux of the matter. What Ban Biao said pifa zuoren was
26

See Marc Samuel Abramson, “Deep Eyes and High Noses: Physiognomy and the depiction of barbarians
in Tang China,” in Nicola Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt eds., Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and
Human Geographies in Chinese History (London: Routledge, 2003), 119-159.
27
Also, as Abramson has pointed out in his article, in certain context, “hairstyles and head coverings also
had significance in that they were viewed both in Inner Asia and China as makers of political allegiance.”
See Abramson, “Deep Eyes and High Noses,” 125.
28
HHS, 87: 2878.
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of symbolic meaning to draw a line between civilized people and barbarians. Since
Confucius first used the phrase pifa zuoren to describe the non-Zhou people, 29 the phrase
had become a metaphor of bestiality used by ancient Chinese scholars to describe alien
people who led a barbarous and uncivilized way of life. 30 By using this catchphrase, Ban
Biao wanted to emphasize the fundamental cultural differences between the Qiang and
the Han, and he used the different customs and languages as supporting evidence.
Although we do not know the language of the Qiang people during the Han times, we
have historical records of their social customs.
According to the sources available, the most significant markers that distinguished the
Qiang from the Han were their way of life and social organization. 31 The “Account of
Western Qiang” says,
[The Qiang] have no fixed abode, but follow the availability of water and grass. Their
lands produce little of the five grains, and they make their living by raising and herding
animals… when the father dies, [the son] marries the step-mother; when the elder
29

See Chapter 14 of the Analects (Lunyu 論語). In Confucius’s day, the Zhou people knotted their hair,
wore caps, and folded their robes to the right; letting hair unbound and folding robes to the left was a
non-Zhou custom, which meant the violation of the Zhou rites. From the Zhou times onward, the proper
combination of “robes and caps” 衣冠 (yiguan) was symbolized as one of the essences of Chinese culture.
30
In the “Account of the Xiongnu” of Hanshu, which was mainly compiled by Ban Biao’s son Ban Gu, the
phrase pifa zuoren was also used to describe the barbarians. See HS, 94B: 3834. Another example in a
memorial jointly written by two Han officials can be found in HS, 73: 3126. Goldin, “Steppe Nomads as a
Philosophical Problem in Classical China,” 220-246, has a brief discussion on the usage of the term pifa
zuoren by the Han scholars.
31
For a summary of the living style and social organization of the Qiang in the Han times, see Guan
Donggui 管東貴, “Handai de Qiangzu (I)” 漢代的羌族(上), Shihuo yuekan 食貨月刊 1.1 (1971): 15-20
and “Handai de Qiangzu (II)” 漢代的羌族(下), Shihuo yuekan 1.2 (1971): 87-97. Guan also doubts the
relationship between the Qiang of the Han times and their assumed ancestors in the same area of activity.
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brother dies, [the younger brother] marries the widow. Hence, there are no widowers
and widows in their country, and their breeds are prosperous. There are no monarchs or
officials; no one tribe is superior to others or trying to unify the others. When [a group
is] strong, they will separate from their original tribe and have their own leader; when
[they are] weak, they will attach to a stronger one. They raid and plunder each other
and worship strengths as heroic… They are good at fighting in mountain valleys but
weak on plains. [Their military strength] cannot be enduring, but [they are] determined
to charge headlong plunge. [They] regard dying in battle as auspicious, and dying from
illness as inauspicious. [They] can withstand extremely cold weather just like
animals. 32
所居無常，依隨水草。地少五穀，以產牧為業……父沒則妻後母，兄亡則納厘綆，
故國無鰥寡，種類繁熾。不立君臣，無相長一，強則分種為酋豪，弱則為人附落，
更相抄暴，以力為雄……其兵長在山谷，短於平地，不能持久，而果於觸突，以
戰死為吉利，病終為不祥。堪耐寒苦，同之禽獸。
Ying Shao provided a similar entry in the Fengsu tongyi, which Fan Ye probably
copied into his work,
[The Qiang] have neither monarchs and officials nor superiors and subordinates. The
strongest one is the leader. [They] cannot be unified, and divided into various breeds
and groups. The strong bully the weak, and they raid each other. For a male to die in
battle is regarded as auspicious and to die from illness considered inauspicious. 33
無君臣上下，健者為豪，不能相一，種別部分，強者陵弱，轉相抄盜，男子戰死
以為吉，病終者謂之凶。
Both passages must have depicted the most notable features of the Qiang that struck
the Han writers and distinguished them from the Han people. According to Fan’s account,
the first striking contrast between the Qiang and the Han was that the former led a
nomadic way of life, raising and herding animals for livelihood while the latter was
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composed mainly of a sedentary agrarian population. Benefiting from modern
geographical and archaeological studies, we now know that the Qiang and the ancient
people who inhabited the same area led a nomadic way of life as a strategy of survival
and in adaptation to the natural environment. 34 A series of changes in climate occurred in
the area of activity of the Qiang people and their presumed ancestors from the late
Neolithic to the Bronze Ages, roughly around 3000-500BCE, which led the area to
become separate from the middle and lower Yellow River Valleys (the core of China
proper) in terms of human ecology. This transformed the inhabitants from sedentary
farmers into nomadic pastoralists. 35 Herding cattle, horses, sheep, and goats constituted
the Qiang’s production portfolio. The Qiang were, in particular, known as shepherds. The
Later Han scholar Xu Shen 許慎 (d. 120sCE) explained the meaning of the character
“Qiang” 羌in his etymological classic Shuowen jiezi 說文解字 (Explanation of Simple
and Compound Graphs) that the character Qiang was formed by “sheep” and “man,” and
that the Qiang were shepherds in the west. 36 Ying Shao also said that the Qiang “work
34

For the natural setting and human ecology of the area of activity of the Qiang people and their presumed
ancestors, see Wang “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 5-13; Wang, Youmuzhe de
jueze, 158-162.
35
Wang “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 14-57.
36
Ibid, 110. The character Qiang first appeared in oracle-bone inscriptions of the Late Shang period (ca.
14th-12th centuries BCE) and the pictograph is composed of two parts: sheep and man. Wang Mingke
suggests that Qiang was a label used by the Shang people to refer to non-Shang or hostile population living
west of them. Also, the Qiang captured in the wars were used by the Shang people as human sacrifices in
ancestral worship ceremonies which implied that the Shang people did not treat the Qiang as human beings

232

mainly as shepherds, therefore the character Qiang is formed by sheep and man, and they
are thus called.” 主牧羊，故羌字從羊人，因以為號. 37 It is clear that the image of the
Qiang as shepherds was engraved in the memory of the Han people.
The fact that the Qiang had no fixed abode nor cities or towns and had to keep
moving with their cattle in search of pasture all marked their utmost fundamental
differences from their Han neighbors. For the Han people, a sedentary way of life was an
indisputable signifier between civilized and non-civilized peoples. It formed the basis for
the Han people to define the cultural and ethnic “others.”
Another distinctive contrast between the Qiang and the Han was their social customs
and organizations. The Qiang practiced levirate marriage, where a brother of a deceased
man was obliged to marry his brother’s widow; a son of a deceased man was obliged to
marry his step-mother. 38 These practices, as a strategy of survival in a tough natural
environment, were surely for the benefit of the Qiang to continue their family lines.
However, in the eyes of the Han people, especially in the Later Han period when the
classical training scholar-officials exerted great influence on the intellectual world, the
Qiang’s marriage practices were behaviors of bestiality and sacrilege that should be
but just animals. See Wang, “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty,” 101-103.
37
Ying, Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu, 488.
38
On the role of female in Qiang society, see Wang, Youmuzhe de jueze, 180-188.
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denounced since they severely violated the moral standard and social order of the Han
society. 39 The Han literati believed that their moral principles and social customs were
universal and the differences of the Qiang could only prove that they were uncouth
barbarians.
Furthermore, from the Han point of view, the Qiang’s lack of centralized political
system and divisions of social hierarchy were clear signs of backwardness and barbarism.
Since the pre-imperial age, the Chinese had already believed that their political system,
administrative institutions, and social hierarchies were superior to those of their
neighbors and this belief was strengthened by the establishment and continuation of the
centralized empire in the Han times. Therefore, the absence of monarchs, officials, social
hierarchies and the loose political and social organizations of the Qiang clearly defined
their inferiority. 40 On the other hand, the lack of centralized authority and the existence of
various competing groups made the Qiang a difficult enemy for the Han empires to find a
consistent strategy to deal with.
Both Fan Ye and Ying Shao also mentioned the Qiang’s worship of physical strength
39

In contrast to the pre-imperial period, Chinese marriage and sexual relations and behaviors underwent a
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40
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and military prowess in order to depict the Qiang as valiant warriors as other barbarians
and, most importantly, to emphasize the brutal and belligerent face of the Qiang, a trait
which distinguished them from the civilized Han. As was pointed out earlier, Fan Ye used
metaphors of bestiality to describe the Qiang so that one would not be surprised when he
mocked the Qiang’s capability of enduring extremely cold weather as animals did. Since
the Qiang were animals or animal-like people, it went without saying that they had a
different nature from the Han people, and it could explain why they were not the
members of the Han realm and why they were always in conflict with the Han. 41
It is clear that Fan Ye’s account has listed out the ways of living and social
organizations of the Qiang that made them different from the core Han population;
nevertheless, I would suggest that such cultural differences were prevalent in a general
sense and especially in the early period of the Later Han but were gradually integrated
with the factor of political allegiance from the mid-Later Han period onward. Simply put,
I would say political allegiance played an increasing role in defining the Qiang and the
Han in the Later Han context. During the chaotic period, the impact of war might change
people’s ways of living, obscuring a clear distinction between the ethnic groups of Qiang
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and Han. As will be shown in the coming sections, over the course of the protracted
conflicts, the ethnic boundaries between the Han and the Qiang in the northwestern
region gradually became blurred. Both Han and Qiang united to fight against the empire,
and ethnic Han people were called Qiang by their imperial adversary. The warlord Dong
Zhuo, for example, was called a Qiang by his contemporaries since he was close to the
Qiang chieftains and, most importantly, commanded a military force constituted by a
large number of Qiang officers and soldiers. 42 Also, many local strongmen in Liang
province in the last decades of Later Han married Qiang women and commanded Qiang
forces. On the political spectrum of the time, there were no great differences between the
ethnic Qiang and ethnic Han in the northwest as they were all enemies of the imperial
state and were “those who are not part of us and live in the west” in the eyes of
Guandong based scholar-officials. In other words, “Qiang” was a label used to refer to a
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hostile population living west of the Later Han imperial center. At this point, “Han” and
“Qiang” are mellable terms that define the people who either swore allegiance to the
imperial state or did not. 43

Han-QIANG Enduring rivalries
As mentioned before, the military confrontation between the Later Han and the Qiang
was a “Hundred Years’ War” and its consequences for the Later Han cannot be
overemphasized. However, it is still an understudied subject. 44 From the perspective of
the history of warfare, there are many battles and campaigns as well as strategy and
tactics adopted by the two sides that deserve in-depth study, but not much has been done
on these topics yet. The operational facet of the Qiang wars in particular deserves further
research as conflict with the Qiang developed a new pattern of warfare and posed an
unprecedented strategic situation that was drastically different from those that the Later
Han army accustomed to. The Later Han military found it hard to adapt and adjust
themselves to the battles with the Qiang, which can partly explain why the Later Han
made their effort of overcoming the Qiang such a difficult task and could only won a
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Pyrrhic victory. Nevertheless, space prevents me from exploring this fascinating subject
any further in the present study, and I shall save it for my future research.
What concerns us in this chapter is the impact of the Qiang wars on the Later Han
empire in general and on the northwest in particular, and how the prolonged conflicts
aggravated the discontent and enmity of the northwesterners towards the imperial center.
This section will first introduce the bellicose relations between the Former Han and the
Qiang as a backdrop for understanding the enduring rivalries between the Later Han and
the Qiang; then sketch the course of the protracted Qiang wars during the Later Han
dynasty.
1. The adversarial relations between the Former Han and the Qiang
Generally speaking, the Qiang were never a main concern in the Former Han imperial
strategy. The fact that there are no independent accounts for the Qiang in the Shiji and the
Hanshu tells of the relative insignificance of the Qiang to the Former Han. In the eyes of
the Former Han policy makers, the Qiang as a group only played a subsidiary role in the
Former Han’s strategic setting against the Xiongnu. 45 As mentioned in Chapter Two,
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when the Former Han put the Qiang on the strategic agenda it was mostly for the purpose
of cutting off their contact with the Xiongnu, the prime target of the empire. Nevertheless,
the Qiang still engaged in military conflicts with the Former Han.
The first recorded formal contact between the Qiang and the Former Han happened in
the reign of Emperor Jing when a Qiang tribe surrendered to the Han. Those Qiang were
settled in five counties: Didao 狄道, Angu 安故, Lintao 臨洮, Didao 氐道, and
Qiangdao 羌道. 46 Among them, there were three “dao”—special districts for settling
alien populations. Also, from the biography of the famous “Flying General” Li Guang,
we know that he once repented of his undue killing of around 800 surrendered Qiang
rebels when he was the governor of Longxi commandery during the same period. 47
When Emperor Wu initiated the imperial expansionist project, there was an influx of
Han troops and settlers into the Qiang’s area of activity. Conflicts ensued as the Qiang
felt threatened and were even expelled by Han encroachment. 48 On the other hand, the
Xiongnu sometimes played the Qiang card to threaten the Former Han’s backdoor—the
southern part of the northwestern borderlands. This resulted in a collaborative assault
upon the Han in 112BCE. Various Qiang groups resolved their hatred, formed a
46
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confederation, gathered 100,000 men, and launched an eastward attack on the Han to
echo a concomitant southward attack from the Xiongnu. Emperor Wu sent the cavalry of
the northwestern region and the infantry of the interior commanderies in total of 100,000
to suppress the Qiang. 49 Afterwards the emperor set up the official position of Colonel
Protector of the Qiang, mentioned in Chapter Three, to take charge of the Qiang affairs. 50
In 81BCE, the imperial court of Emperor Zhao divided two counties each from the
commanderies of Tianshui, Longxi, and Zhangye to form a new commandery called
Jincheng as means to strengthen control over and defend against the Qiang. The foremost
general Zhao Chongguo, who would spend his last years dealing with the Qiang,
probably moved to the new commandery at this time as we have discussed in the
previous chapter.
The Qiang’s offensive in 112BCE was launched not only at the Xiongnu’s instigation
but also as resistance to Han encroachment. In contrast to the conventional explanation
given in standard histories that military conflicts between the Chinese regimes and the
surrounding peoples were initiated by the avaricious barbarians for the purpose of
plundering Chinese resources, the Qiang were in fact victims of Han territorial expansion
49
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and colonization. 51 Accompanying the inroad of the Han power into the northwest was a
large number of Han garrison soldiers and settlers who competed with the Qiang for the
limited pasture and arable lands. In the scramble for resources, the Han colonists, backed
by imperial military, nearly always gained the upper hand and displaced the
autochthonous peoples from the preferred settlement sites. The state-sponsored
conversion of pastures into settled agriculturally-productive tax-remitting land or
government-owned grazing land forced the Qiang people into the rather unproductive
uplands in the west. One focal point of struggle between the Han and the Qiang was the
Great and Little Yu Valleys (Daxiao Yugu 大小榆谷), which are principally alluvial
plains and loess-covered low hills and therefore a major agricultural area in the upper
Yellow River Valley. 52 The area originally provided a desirable site to various Qiang
groups for their mixed economy. However, with the steady advance of Han settlers, the
Qiang were forced out of the area and retreated to isolated enclaves. The deprived Qiang
were certain to fight tooth and nail in attempts to recover their lost land. 53
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In the meantime, increasing numbers of surrendered or captured Qiang were resettled
by the Han state into the northwestern counties. In the new environment, these alien
new-comers were usually discriminated against, abused and exploited by the Han local
officials and inhabitants, with magnates in particular, which in turn exacerbated tensions
and unease between the Han and the Qiang. During the reign of Emperor Yuan, for
instance, an official named Hou Ying 侯應 (fl. 40s-30s BCE) once reported that the
Qiang who lived along the frontiers were suffering from Han exploitation as the greedy
Han officials and people seized their wives, sons, and animals. 54 Seeds of hatred were
thus sowed.
After the 112BCE assault, the Qiang launched another large-scale offensive in 61BCE.
Once again the Xiongnu played a role in abetting the Qiang against the Han, but the
crucial factor that triggered this offensive was the Han-Qiang conflict over grazing lands.
Several years before the offensive, when a Han emissary Yiqu Anguo 義渠安國 (His
surname Yiqu probably reveals that his family was of Yiqu Rong origin, one of the
western barbarians in the northwest during the Warring States period) visited the Qiang
area, a Qiang tribe requested permission to move eastward from the barren mountainous
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area they were living to herd their animals in the no-man’s area in the valley of the Huang
River. When the emissary reported to the court, the Qiang specialist General Zhao
Chongguo rejected the request. However, the Qiang thought they had already notified the
Han official and thus led their animals crossed the Huang River. As local authorities were
unable to handle the situation, conflicts arose. In 63BCE, several Qiang groups formed an
alliance and swore to fight together. The court again sent Yiqu Anguo to settle the issue.
Upon his arrival, Yiqu summoned 40 chieftains, had them beheaded, ordered his troops to
raid the Qiang, and killed over a thousand of them. The massacre provoked uproar among
the Qiang, and widespread revolts ensued. 55 When the situation was out of control, the
76-year-old General Zhao Chongguo volunteered to command the campaign against the
Qiang. Unlike his colleagues who supported a heavy-handed policy of attacking the
Qiang, Zhao installed colonies in the region instead, as he believed it was the most
effective way to throttle the Qiang. 56 Although Zhao managed to suppress the Qiang, his
victory was but a short-term palliative measure as the Han never reached an optimal way
to solve the deep-rooted conflict with the Qiang. 57
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The two offensives launched by the Qiang, the appointment of Colonel Protector of
the Qiang, and the establishment of Jincheng commandery all demonstrate the increasing
importance of the Qiang in the imperial strategic concerns. Although only sporadic
revolts of the Qiang occurred in the last forty years of the Former Han, 58 the imperial
state never relaxed its grip on the Qiang, 59 especially when it came to preventing the
Qiang from collaborating with the Xiongnu and protecting the communication lines
between the imperial center and the Western Regions from being interrupted by the
Qiang. 60
Besides textual records that referred above, documents on wooden boards and
bamboo strips excavated in the northwest also speak of the tensions between the Han and
the Qiang during the Former Han times. An official document found in the Juyan site
states that if any staff of government offices were killed by the Qiang, family members of
the deceased would be granted 30,000 cash for burial. 61 Another strip was a letter written
colonies was effective or not. For the supporting views, see Guan, “Handai chuli Qiangzu wenti de banfa de
jiantao,” 130-131; for the opposing views, see Yang, “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang
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by somebody to express his gratitude to his patron who had helped the poor writer
resettle in the midst of the Qiang area (Qiangzhong 羌中). 62 This kind of resettlement
exemplifies the Han policy of moving poor people into Qiang-populated areas, on one
hand, provided a new life for the needy yet, on the other, irritated the Qiang people. In
Xuanquan 懸泉, a recently excavated site of a Han postal relay office near Dunhuang,
remnants of late Former Han documents concerning the Qiang were discovered,
including records of the offices of Colonel Protector of the Qiang and other relevant
postings. 63 Furthermore, there were reports of the Han army suppressing Qiang revolts. 64
The Former Han and the Qiang maintained a fragile peace until the end of the dynasty
when Wang Mang became the regent of the last Former Han emperor. As mentioned in
Chapter Two, Wang Mang forced some of the Qiang groups to surrender their lands to
establish Xihai commandery, a move which eventually backfired as the Qiang attacked
the new commandery in order to recover their lost territories. Wang Mang’s failure once
again showed that scramble for land was a deep-rooted source of conflict between the
two sides.
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2. The Qiang Wars during the Later Han
From the standpoint of the Later Han empire, the Qiang who engaged in the so-called
“Qiang wars” were composed of both foreign invaders and rebels. The Qiang forces were
constituted not only by the Qiang groups outside the imperial realm who had conflicts
with the Han over land resources but also by those who lived in the empire and were
subject to imperial rule. Growing conflicts between the Han and the Qiang within and
without the empire triggered the protracted military confrontations.
For the Qiang people living outside the imperial realm, the Han colonization in the
northwest meant encroachment upon their lands. Although the Later Han was not as
aggressive as the Former Han in territorial expansion, competition for grazing and arable
lands between the Later Han and the Qiang were still intense. In fact, the Later Han never
stopped setting up colonies in the Qiang’s areas of activity. For example, around 100CE,
one local official proposed the imperial court to reinstate Xihai commandery, which was
abolished under the Qiang attack. The imperial court empowered this official to set up 34
colonies in the area as preparatory measures. Increasing numbers of colonies threatened
the Qiang’s living space and thus intensified hostility towards the Later Han. As historical
records show, when the Han colonists invaded the land of the Qiang, various Qiang
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groups would form alliances and united forces against the Han armies.
Within the imperial realm, the availability of large numbers of Qiang was a main
cause that made the Qiang problem last so long and spread so vast. As mentioned above,
the Former Han resettled surrendered and/or captured Qiang in the northwestern
commanderies, and a large Qiang population had stayed within or along the northwestern
frontier by the end of the dynasty. The civil war ensued the downfall of Wang Mang
enabled some of the Qiang originally outside the imperial realm to move in and to occupy
counties in Jincheng commandery. During the civil war, Wei Ao and Dou Rong recruited
armies from the Qiang and other non-Han peoples. 65 Although Dou Rong surrendered to
the Later Han and Wei Ao was defeated, not all the Qiang groups who originally attached
to the two men shifted their allegiance to the Later Han. Some of the Qiang were still
openly hostile towards the Later Han and carried out raids on the Han territories.
In dealing with the Qiang, the Later Han followed its predecessor’s practices by
sending military forces to crush them, reinstating Colonel Protector of the Qiang to
oversee the restive Qiang in the region, and resettling captured and surrendered Qiang in
the imperial territory. 66 Here are some examples: In 35CE, General Ma Yuan 馬援
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settled more than 8,000 Qiang in the commanderies of Tianshui, Longxi, and Fufeng 扶
風. 67 The first two commanderies were in Liang province but Fufeng was in the erstwhile
Former Han metropolitan area and it was the first time that the Qiang being settled in a
non-frontier commandery. Ma’s decision would incur criticism from later generations for
sowing the seeds of Qiang rebellion in inland areas. 68 In 58CE, the Later Han troops
defeated a Qiang tribe and settled 7,000 of them in the Former Han metropolitan area. 69
Henceforth, the Qiang spread to Guanzhong. In 77CE, a certain number of Qiang in the
Former Han metropolitan area were moved to Hedong, an interior commandery next to
the Later Han metropolitan region. In 101CE, the Grand Administrator of Jincheng
commandery defeated the Qiang and resettled the 6,000-odd surrendered to the
commanderies of Hanyang, Anding, and Longxi. 70 Besides, the commanderies of Beidi,
Shang, and Xihe all had Qiang population, though no details were given in the sources.
In terms of resettlement, different Qiang groups received different treatment. The
Later Han state settled some of the Qiang along the frontiers and allowed them to retain
tribal organization in order to utilize their military strength as frontier garrisons. However,
Kyozoku naishisaku ni tsuite” 後漢の羌族内徙策について, Shiteki 史滴 9 (1988): 49-74.
67
HHS, 24: 835; 87: 2878-2879.
68
HHS, 87: 2901. Different from the traditional view, de Crespigny suggests that Ma Yuan’s resettlement
strategy was successful in weakening the Qiang’s power, see his Northern Frontier, 73-74.
69
HHS, 87: 2880.
70
HHS, 87: 2884.

248

spreading along the frontiers gave these groups opportunities to collaborate with their
counterparts who lived outside the empire; retaining tribal organization enabled them to
preserve solidarity and autonomy, which would become their weapons in anti-Han
operations. On the other hand, the Later Han state disbanded the tribal organization of
some Qiang people, resettled them in counties to live with Han people, where they took
up duty of paying taxes and corvée labor as common subjects of the empire; some were
even recruited by the imperial state as special troops; some others were bullied by the
local officials and magnates and were reduced to being their retainers and slaves. No
matter whether they were soldiers or slaves in the Han territories, the Qiang generally
suffered from exploitation which exacerbated their hostility towards the Han.
Since the wars between the Later Han and the Qiang lasted very long, it will not be
necessary to weary the reader with the details. It will suffice to provide a sketch of the
military conflicts; I will leave the details for a future study. 71
After General Ma Yuan suppressed the Qiang in 35CE, fights between the Qiang and
the Han broke out consecutively in 56, 57, and 58CE in the commanderies of Wudu and
Longxi. 72 Although the Han forces managed to defeat the Qiang, the power of the Qiang
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in the northwest was still very strong. When the newly-appointed acting Colonel
Protector of the Qiang, Guo Xiang 郭襄 (fl. 50s CE), arrived Longxi commandery, he
was frightened by the fact that the Qiang were prevalent in Liang province and
immediately retreated to the capital. Guo was then dismissed and the office of Colonel
Protector of the Qiang was also suspended, 73 which reflected the inactive attitude of the
imperial court. In 76CE, a new round of military conflict with the Qiang broke out; the
Later Han reinstated the Colonel Protector of the Qiang and spent great efforts in
suppressing the Qiang. 74 The situation was out of control again in 86CE and the Colonel
Protector was even killed in a battle in the following year. Shortly after, 800 Qiang tribal
chieftains agreed to make peace with the new Colonel Protector but were all ambushed
and killed. This aroused widespread anger among the Qiang and trigged another wave of
Qiang offensives. It lasted until 89CE when a new Colonel Protector managed to pacify
the Qiang. 75 However, military confrontation resumed in 92CE and the Later Han had to
spend the following six years in making the Qiang surrender.
In addition to the incidents mentioned above, there were skirmishes that broke out
intermittently. According to the historical accounts, these conflicts were mainly caused by
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the Han mismanagement of the Qiang groups along the frontier. The Colonel Protector of
the Qiang and other regional and local authorities held prime responsibility for relations
with the Qiang. When there were Han officials who were capable of maintaining a good
relationship with the Qiang, the region could enjoy peace and stability without recourse
to the armed forces. 76 Otherwise, when the Han officials mishandled the situation, such
as killing the surrendered tribal chieftains, widespread discontent and hatred spurred the
Qiang to fight against the Han. Although the ability of the officials was important in
managing the Han-Qiang relations, it was neither a stable institutional factor nor a
long-term method to resolve such deep-rooted antagonism. Depending on capable
officials was a stopgap measure that could only maintain a fragile balance between the
two sides at best but could not guarantee long-lasting peace.
In the second century CE, three wars broke out between the Qiang and the Later Han
and brought devastating effects to the empire. The first began in 107CE and ended in
118CE. The second lasted from 140 to 145CE. The third was from 159 to 169CE.
In 107CE, a Han emissary to the Western Regions forcibly conscripted several
thousand Qiang cavalrymen in the commanderies of Jincheng, Longxi, and Hanyang as
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his escort. When they arrived at Jiuquan commandery, the unwilling Qiang cavalrymen
all fled as they were afraid of being deployed in the Western Regions with no return. 77
During the process of catching the Qiang fugitives, the Han troops raided many Qiang
settlements and caused widespread discontent and fear. Nearly all the Qiang in Liang
province immediately rose up against the Han authority. They attacked towns and killed
Han officials. According to the sources, since those Qiang had already been settled in the
empire for long time, they lived as common subjects and had no armor and weapons;
therefore, they used bamboo and wooden sticks as spear and halberd, and wooden boards
as shield. Some of them even wielded bronze mirrors to mislead the Han soldiers into
thinking that they were holding bronze weapons. 78 Even though they were poorly
equipped, the Qiang repeatedly defeated the Han forces.
Facing such a large-scale Qiang revolt, the Later Han imperial court deployed 50,000
troops under the command of General of Chariots and Cavalry (Juji jiangjun 車騎將軍)
Deng Zhi 鄧騭 (d. 121CE), who was the brother of the regent Empress Dowager Deng
and also a descendent of Deng Yu (a founding member of the Later Han and the number
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one of the “Twenty-Eight Generals of the Cloud Terrace”), with the assistance of Ren
Shang 任尚 (d. 118CE). Appointing such a prestigious person as Deng Zhi as the
commander-in-chief demonstrated that the Later Han imperial court began the campaign
with high hopes. However, the results were disappointing. Deng’s army was defeated in
108CE. Dianlian 滇零 (d. 112CE), a Qiang chieftain, seized the chance to establish a
regime in Beidi commandery and proclaim himself Son of Heaven, putting himself on
equal footing with the Han emperor. Dianlian then called upon Qiang groups everywhere,
invaded the regions of Zhao and Wei (modern northern Henan province and southern
Hebei province) in the east and Yi province (modern Sichuan province) in the south.
Guanzhong was at the Qiang’s mercy and its communication with the east was
interrupted. Corresponding to modern Chinese geography, the provinces of Gansu,
Qinghai, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, southern Hebei, and the northern portion of Sichuan
were all subject to the Qiang’s military assault. The price of grain in counties in the
Huangzhong 湟中 area, where the conflict was most intense, skyrocketed. Innumerable
civilians were killed in chaos. Facing such a difficult situation, the immediate response of
the imperial court was to call back Deng Zhi in order to protect him from continuous
defeat, which would undermine the authority of the Deng family, and left Ren Shang to
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take over the command. 79
Between 109 to 110CE, the Han armies suffered a series of defeats. The imperial
court then ordered Ren Shang to retreat from the western frontier to Chang’an to
strengthen the defense of Guanzhong. Meanwhile, at request of local officials, the
government seats of Jincheng commandery and Colonel Protector of the Qiang were all
removed from their original sites. The retreat of troops and government seats all
prefigured the imperial court’s intention of withdrawing from the war-torn region, which
will be discussed in the next section about the debates over abandoning Liang province.
In 111CE, Ren Shang was dismissed for achieving nothing in the campaign.
Meanwhile, the Qiang became stronger. They crossed the Yellow River and attacked the
interior commanderies, including Hedong, Shangdang, Henei, and even threatened Zhao,
Wei, and the imperial capital. The imperial court was frightened and immediately
mobilized all the capital defense troops to hold the chokepoint access to the capital. Over
600 fortresses were thus built in north China to defens against the Qiang. 80 In the
meantime, the imperial court forcibly evacuated the residents of Longxi, Anding, and
Shang commanderies eastward to the Former Han metropolitan area. For those who were
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reluctant to move, the Han armies reaped all their crops in the fields and demolished their
houses. 81 These measures only fueled apprehension in the people of Liang province and
finally provoked those homeless into acts of violence against Han authorities. Those
northwestern residents finally joined Dianlian’s regime, which subsequently transformed
it into an anti-Han forces with a mixed composition of peoples.
Starting from 112CE, the war was a stalemate. In order to make a breakthrough, in
114CE, the Later Han set up 33 fortresses in the interior commandery Henei to strengthen
the defense line, replaced the commanders with a new cohort, and summoned the
Xiongnu cavalry for help. 82 It was not until 118CE that the Later Han forces finally
destroyed the Dianlian regime, though it was ruled by Dianlian’s son by then, and order
was temporarily reestablished in the affected region. The magnitude of the devastation in
this ten-year war was unprecedented, which we will return to in the next section.
The peace achieved by the Later Han was short-lived. In the following year, some
Qiang planned to revolt, although they were quickly suppressed. In 120CE, military
conflicts between the Later Han and the Qiang broke out again and lasted till 122CE with
heavy casualties on both sides. It was not until 126CE when a Qiang rebellion in Longxi
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was suppressed did Liang province really enjoy a short-term peace again. 83
During early 130s CE, the Later Han state resumed setting up colonies in the
Huangzhong region, which fueled apprehension of the Qiang living there. In 134CE,
some Qiang groups raided Han commanderies and began a new round of intermittent
military conflicts.
The cumulative effect of the 130s CE conflicts was the second Qiang war (140-145
CE). When the war broke out, the Qiang forces attacked Jincheng and the Former Han
metropolitan region. Ma Xian 馬賢 (d. 141CE), a hero in the previous war, was
appointed as General Who Conquers the West (Zhengxi jiangjun 征西將軍) with
100,000 troops to suppress the Qiang. Meanwhile, 300 fortresses were set up as defensive
measures. In 141CE, however, the 5-6,000 cavalry contingent led by Ma Xian himself
met a crushing defeat at Mount Yegu 射姑山, and Ma and his two sons were killed and
the contingent was decimated by the Qiang. 84 Ma Xian was the highest ranking official
ever killed by the Qiang and his demise indeed marked a military disaster for and
imposed psychological dislocation on the Later Han. Meanwhile, the death of Ma Xian
encouraged all the Qiang within and beyond the imperial realm to unite against the
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empire. As historical accounts describe, “the Eastern and Western Qiang therefore
achieve a great union” 東西羌遂大合. 85 The Qiang divided into three armies: one
advanced eastward to Chang’an and burnt the mausoleums of the Former Han emperors;
another marched northward to Beidi commandery and defeated the Han defensive forces;
the third moved northwestward to attack the Hexi Corridor. Consequently, the whole
Liang province and Guanzhong region were ravaged by the Qiang. The Later Han state
then resorted to evacuating the government seats of Anding and Beidi eastward. 86
In 142CE, the imperial court appointed Zhao Chong 趙沖 (d. 144) as Colonel
Protector of the Qiang. Apart from using military forces, Zhao exploited the disunity of
Qiang society and the discord among the Qiang chieftains. As a result, some Qiang
groups surrendered. Although Zhao spent great effort in alleviating the situation, in
144CE, one of his attachés joined the Qiang forces. When chasing this fugitive, Zhao
Chong and his men were wiped out in an ambush by the Qiang. It was not until next year,
when the Han officials managed to bribe some of the Qiang chieftains, thereby
dismembering the Qiang union, that the war ended.87
The third war broke out in 159CE and lasted for ten years. In 159CE, Duan Jiong, one
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of the “Three Brilliants of Liang Province,” was appointed Colonel Protector of the
Qiang. The ruthless Duan was well-known for his iron-hand policy in dealing with the
Qiang. Once he assumed the new position, Duan defeated several Qiang groups who
raided Longxi commandery. It was only the beginning of the war. In the following years,
Duan and the Qiang fought back and forth in the northwest. When Duan was in a
campaign in 161CE, the Qiang and other non-Han people under his command mutinied
because of their discontent with overdue services. Duan’s troops collapsed, and he was
jailed by the imperial court.
Duan’s successor was unable to suppress the Qiang and the situation grew worse. The
imperial court then appointed Huangfu Gui, one the “Three Brilliants of Liang province,”
to command the imperial forces in the west. Huangfu managed to alleviate the situation
for several months. Zhang Huan, another one of the “Three Brilliants,” also participated
in this war. Both Huangfu and Zhang were different from Duan Jiong as they did not rely
solely on armed forces but also adopted sympathetic stances in dealing with the Qiang. 88
However, it was not easy to solve the deep-rooted antagonism between the two sides.
Even though Huangfu and Zhang temporarily restored order in certain areas, there was no
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room for complacency. In 162CE, various Qiang groups united again and launched
another wave of offensives. All commanderies in the west were ravaged and the Later
Han “nearly lost Liang province” 涼州幾亡. 89 Facing such an uncontrollable situation,
the imperial court released Duan Joing and appointed him Colonel Protector again.
After returning to the battlefield, Duan Jiong launched a large-scale counteroffensive
campaign. From 164 to 165CE, according to accounts, there was not a single day that
Duan was not fighting (wuri buzhan 無日不戰). 90 As a result of his effort, the Qiang
were exhausted. Duan was ennobled for his victory. In 167CE, the Qiang in the west rose
up again but were wiped out by Duan. The history says, “the Western Qiang were thus
pacified” 西羌於此弭定. 91
Nevertheless, the Eastern Qiang were still active in Guanzhong. As Duan Jiong
achieved success in the western front, the emperor summoned him to the capital and
asked his opinion on how to handle the eastern front. Duan said that the Qiang could only
be dealt with by “putting pikes between their ribs and blades on their necks” 長矛挾
脅，白刃加頸. 92 The emperor found Duan’s view persuasive and appointed him to take
charge of the eastern front. Once he arrived, Duan won a battle and killed many Qiang.
89
90
91
92

HHS, 65: 2147.
HHS, 65: 2147.
HHS, 65: 2148.
HHS, 65: 2148.

259

The imperial court then granted him the title of General who Crushes the Qiang. In order
to keep his promise to the emperor and end the war quickly, Duan continued his offensive
strategy and even carried out widespread genocide, wiping out the Qiang groups he
encountered. As a result, the Qiang who faced Duan either died or surrendered. In the end
of the biography of Duan Jiong in Hou Hanshu, the compiler Fan Ye praised Duan’s
victory as making “the valley quiet and the mountain vacant” (gujing shankong 谷靜山
空), 93 which clearly reflected the result of mass killings. However, it was definitely a
Pyrrhic victory as the protracted warfare had already drawn the Later Han to the verge of
bankruptcy and, most importantly, deeply undermined the imperial authority in the
northwest.

Seeds of Destruction
The magnitude of devastation caused by the Qiang wars was unprecedented in the Later
Han history, and in the history of early imperial China. The protracted warfare not only
resulted in tremendous loss of life and property but also unleashed a maelstrom of unrest
in the northwest, which finally turned the northwesterners hostile towards the imperial
center. After winning the Qiang wars, ironically, the imperial center had lost control of
93
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the northwest and it was the northwestern warlord Dong Zhuo who gave the final blow to
the Later Han imperial authority and triggered the dismemberment of the empire.

1. Economic losses and heavy casualties
The sporadic conflicts with the Qiang during the first fifty years of Later Han had already
necessitated large garrison forces in the northwest and required heavy maintenance costs.
From 100s CE onward, the prolonged Qiang wars even left the Later Han on the brink of
bankruptcy and took a heavy toll on both belligerent sides.
According to the accounts of Hou Hanshu, military spending, including feeding the
troops and other logistical expenses, in the first Qiang war (107-118CE) “cost over 24
billion cash and emptied the state’s coffers.” 94 用二百四十餘億，府帑空竭. In 111CE,
when the war “spread to the interior commanderies, innumerable people on the frontier
died; the provinces of Bing and Liang were consequently exhausted.” 95 延及內郡，邊民
死者不可勝數，并、涼二州，遂至虛耗. Although the historical records did no give the
exact number of casualties, it would not be baseless to say that the death toll of the Later
Han soldiers was high, not to mention that of civilians. For example, when Ren Shang
met a devastating defeat in a battle in 108CE, over 8,000 of his soldiers died. Also, from
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the “Stele for Zhao Kuan,” which I have analyzed in the previous chapter, we know that
around 108 and 109CE Zhao Kuan was the Deputy Major of the Colonel Protector of the
Qiang and was engaged in a battle, in which the Later Han army was decimated; Zhao
Kuan himself barely survived but lost his four sons who were troops. 96 Furthermore,
when the Qiang forces invaded the interior commanderies, which had enjoyed a long
period of peace and prosperity, it caused panic in those areas. A great number of
fortresses were built in the interior and residents were forced to evacuate. A Later Han
stele dating to 117CE called Si Sangong shan bei 祀三公山碑, which was inscribed for
commemorating an offering to a local deity carried out by local officials, used the phrase
“suffered from the Qiang’s raid” 遭離羌寇 to describe the context behind erecting the
stele. 97 It is noteworthy because the stele was located originally in Changshan Guo 常山
國 (in modern Hebei province), an enfeoffed kingdom in the interior of the empire, and
thus shows the Qiang war’s impact on the area beyond the Northwest.
The threat of war, pillage, and the subsequent hyperinflation in grain prices all caused
large-scale dislocation of population in the northwest. 98 Once again, Zhao Kuan provided
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a real case of dislocation as he followed the refugees who moved to Guanzhong after the
catastrophic defeat, which we have seen in the last chapter. Moreover, a comparison
between census data that was carried out by the Later Han in 140CE and by the Former
Han in 2CE, both listed in Chapter Two, shows clearly that the northwestern
commanderies experienced a drastic drop in population in the first one hundred years of
Later Han. For example, the percentage of registered household in Longxi and Jincheng
commanderies was only 10% of the Former Han’s and Beidi commandery was even only
5%. The apparent population decrease in northwest could have resulted from various
reasons, but the first Qiang war (107-118CE) was undoubtedly a significant one. Many
people were killed in the war and even more fled and disappeared from the government
household registers to shirk their onerous duties and avoid military service as much as
possible. As a result, while the Later Han state had to throw enormous resources into the
Qiang wars, the taxable northwestern households were shrinking quickly; in order to
compensate for the loss, local governments squeezed the remaining residents, which in
turn forced them to evade the burden even more. A vicious circle was thus formed.
Although the second Qiang war (140-145CE) was shorter than the first one, it still

77-80; Luo, Handai de liumin wenti, 77-80.

263

cumulatively cost over 8 billion Later Han currency. 99 The death toll of soldiers was no
less than during the previous war. For instance, General Ma Xian, his two sons, and
several thousand cavalrymen were wiped out in the battle of Mount Yegu; most of the
100,000 men originally under Ma’s command finally died in battle in the subsequent
years. The history summarizes that “the bones of the soldiers who did not attain a proper
death were widely seen in the countryside.” 100 士卒不得其死者，白骨相望於野.
The third Qiang war (159-169) lasted ten years and incurred enormous costs. Despite
the lack of details about all the expenses and casualties of this war, there is a record of
Duan Jiong’s military achievements which could give us a glimpse of the scale of the war.
According to his biography, Duan Jiong fought 180 battles, killed 38,600-odd Qiang, and
captured 427,500 livestock from them. In total, Duan spent 4.4 billion cash. 101
Surprisingly, only 400-odd of his soldiers were killed in battle, though we do not have
corroborating evidence of the authenticity of that number. These were only the statistical
data related to Duan Jiong, without counting the expenses and casualties under other
commanders in the ten years.
Although the Qiang wars were finally ended by Duan Jiong’s mass killing, the wars
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had already exhausted the imperial coffer and left a trail of desolation across the
northwest. Worse still, the northwestern region was also suffering from natural disasters
during the protracted military confrontation. Civilians died in the greatest numbers when
war coincided with natural disasters. Natural disasters further dislocated the people who
survived and produced a large number of refugees, which caused social disorder not only
in Liang province but also other regions where the refugees spread. Some scholars
suggest that the influx of the northwestern refugees to the interior of the empire brought
discontent and conflict to other regions and finally underlay the widespread popular
uprising such as the Yellow Turbans Rebellion in the last years of Later Han. 102
Based on the historical records, we can make a brief list of serious natural disasters
happened in Liang province during the Later Han period as follows:
93CE

Earthquake in Longxi commandery. 103

97CE

Earthquake in Longxi commandery. 104

109CE

Great famine in the whole province, cannibalism was reported. 105

138CE

Earthquake in Jincheng and Longxi commanderies. 106
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144CE

Earthquake in six commanderies of Liang province. In the past
eight months, there were in total 180 earthquakes in the area. 107

161CE

Earthquake in the whole province. 108

180CE

Earthquake and flooding in Jiuquan commandery. 109

183CE

Flooding in Jincheng commandery. 110

Though this is not a complete one, it can still give us a glimpse of the situation in Liang
province during the period in question. 111 It seems that from the late first century to the
mid-second century the northwestern region had entered a period of frequent earthquake,
especially in Longxi and Jincheng commanderies. Hence, it might not be coincidental
that the two commanderies were subject to most frequent attacks from the Qiang.
Historical records reveal that the entry of the 138CE earthquake was immediately
followed by a report of the Qiang attacking the fortresses of Jincheng; after the 144CE
earthquake was another Qiang assault, which killed the Colonel Protector of the Qiang.112
The Qiang were probably affected by the earthquake and resorted to raiding as a way of
relief; they could have also seized the opportunity to attack the empire when the Han
107
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local officials were preoccupied with relief work.
The combined effects of prolonged warfare and natural disasters indeed devastated
the war-torn areas and deeply disrupted people’s lives, but the northwestern writer Wang
Fu complained repeatedly in his essays that if the regional and local officials were more
concerned with the welfare of northwestern people and if the imperial army were more
efficient, the Qiang wars could have ended earlier and the devastating effects of the wars
could have been alleviated. 113 In other words, from Wang Fu’s point of view, poor
management and mishandling of the situation were the cause of the long lasting suffering
of the northwestern people.
Wang Fu’s criticism was supported by the evidence given in the historical sources. As
mentioned before, the Qiang people were exploited by regional and local officials, which
caused riots. Even in times of peace, official corruption and embezzlement prevailed in
Liang province, and both the Han and non-Han peoples suffered. The malfeasance of
officials in Liang province became especially serious in the middle of the dynasty. During
the late 150s CE, according to the wooden strips excavated in a family vault of imperial
kinsmen at Gangu 甘谷 prefecture in modern Gansu province (which belonged to
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Hanyang commandery in the Later Han times), there were cases where local officials of
Liang province even dared to infringe upon privileges of members of the imperial clan
who lived in their jurisdiction by encroaching on their lands and forcing them to render
levies, from which they were supposed to be exempt because of their royal
kinsmenship. 114 If even the privileges of imperial kinsmen (though distant) were violated,
it would not be difficult to imagine that the commoners of Liang province were all at the
mercy of local officials. 115
Therefore, one reason why both Huangfu Gui and Zhang Huan had good reputations
in Liang province and even earned respect from Qiang adversaries was their
righteousness and denunciation of official corruption. After General Ma Xian’s
catastrophic defeat in 141CE, Huangfu Gui submitted a petition to the imperial court in
which he sharply pointed out that the Qiang revolts were mainly caused by the
mismanagement of frontier commanders, that it was their exploitation that forced the
Qiang’s military resistance, and that it was their inefficiency and incapability of dealing
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with the situation and their attempts to cover up defeats that delayed the opportunities of
pacifying the Qiang in the early stages. 116 Later, when Huangfu Gui was appointed to
command imperial troops in the northwest, he exercised his plenary authority to cashier
corrupt regional and local officials as a necessary measure to pacify the Qiang; 117 in the
same manner, when Zhang Huan was in charge of the Qiang affairs in the northwest, he
promoted incorrupt behavior, which earned him the trust of Qiang tribal leaders. 118 The
admirable behavior of both Huangfu and Zhang, on the other hand, reflected the
prevailing corruption among officials in the northwest. However, what Zhang and
Huangfu did was not an institutional mechanism for dealing with the Qiang questions.
Therefore, when both of them were removed by their political opponents for their
anti-corruption campaigns and other reasons, the relations between the Qiang and the
Han regional and local officials deteriorated again.
Apart from malfeasance and corruption, the fact that quite a few officials advocated
withdrawal from Liang province during the Qiang wars aggravated the chaotic situation
even further. Moreover, the imperial army sent to the battlefront was criticized as
inefficient and incompetent, which finally fostered the rise of the non-imperial controlled
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northwestern military forces. Withdrawal and the military balance between the imperial
troops and the northwestern forces will be discussed in the following two subsections.

2. Abandoning the Northwest and forcible Withdrawals
Facing incessant armed conflicts with the Qiang, especially after military setbacks, the
idea of abandoning the northwest arose among some officials. The most revealing
expressions of the idea were three debates over abandoning the region. The proponents
insisted that it was the best way to solve the Qiang problem once and for all. Such an idea
found wide support among central officials as well as their regional and local colleagues
in Liang province. For the northwesterners, on the contrary, such an idea meant
abandoning them and was unacceptable. Although the proposals of abandonment were
never formally put into practice, the imperial court adopted an alternative way of
evacuating the regional and local government seats and forcibly removing the residents,
which provoked large-scale discontent among the northwesterners. The idea of giving up
Liang province not only showed the estrangement between the imperial center and the
northwest but also deepened the distrust between the two sides.
The idea of giving up the northwestern territories first emerged in the early years of
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the Later Han. About 35CE, when General Ma Yuan defeated the Qiang who had
occupied a significant number of counties in Jincheng commandery since the last years
of Wang Mang’s regime, some courtiers suggested giving up the land west of Poqiang
county in Jincheng as the territory was distant and dominated by adversaries. 119
Although no details of the courtiers were given in the history, it might be reasonable to
say that that was the voice of easterners. As already explained in the preceding chapter,
from its establishment onwards, the Later Han imperial court was dominated by officials
based on the eastern part of the empire. Hence, the suggestion of abandoning some
western counties might represent the eastern-based officials’ concerns and interests of
not wasting resources on the far western borderlands.
In response to this, General Ma Yuan, a man from Guanzhong and an expert on
northwestern affairs, with his firsthand knowledge of the area, pointed out that the walled
towns located west of Poqiang county were all in good condition and provided favorable
circumstances for defense, and it would be a mistake to leave the land to the Qiang, who
would in turn take this advantage to strengthen themselves and cause further harm to the
Later Han. Emperor Guangwu accepted Ma Yuan’s strategic evaluations and decided to
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retain the territories. 120 The emperor’s decision was probably based on the consideration
that giving up the land recently taken from the defeated adversary Wei Ao would
undermine the authority and stability of the newly-founded empire.
Although the imperial court retained the territories of western Jincheng commandery,
the emergence of the suggestion of cession when facing only small-scale conflicts with
the Qiang (which was rather easily suppressed by Ma Yuan) indeed presaged the idea of
giving up the whole province when large-scale and protracted warfare broke out.
In 107CE when General Deng Zhi was sent to Liang province to command the Qiang
campaign, a jailed ex-official named Pang Can 龐參 (fl. 100s-130sCE) had his son
submit a petition to the imperial court, urging that the imperial court halt the troops in
Guanzhong region and temporarily put Liang province aside in order to give people relief
from the burdens of extra taxes and labor service as a means to save energy and resources
for future action against the Qiang rebels. 121 In the meantime, a senior official named Fan
Zhun 樊準 (d. 118CE) recommended Pang Can as a suitable person to be entrusted the
northwestern affairs. Empress Dowager Deng accepted Fan’s suggestion, then released
Pang and appointed him to command the garrisons in Guanzhong region.122
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Pang Can’s main concerns were the social well-being of the people, especially the
people of the eastern sector as he was strongly against the practice of “sending grain
across ten-thousand li” (wanli yunliang 萬里運糧) to Liang province, which deeply
disturbed the normal lives of farming households. Pang did not propose giving up Liang
province permanently but only as a short-term palliative measure of dealing with the
problem until the empire regained enough resources and energy. The policy makers’
appreciation of Pang’s proposal reflected that they basically shared his view and preferred
to take no immediate action with respect to Liang province. Pang Can was a native of
Henan commandery, which was located in the vicinity of the Later Han capital Luoyang,
and entered government service by being recommended as a “filial and incorrupt.” Hence,
his view might represent some other Guandong-based scholar-officials like him.
In the Spring of 110CE, the Qiang grew stronger, while the imperial army suffered a
series of defeats. Natural disasters further deteriorated the situation in the northwest. Pang
Can submitted another proposal to Deng Zhi, who was now the Grand General and the
most powerful official, suggesting that the empire concentrate its defensive efforts on
consolidating the region of Chang’an and its vicinity (that is, the metropolitan region of
the Former Han dynasty) and move the residents of frontier commanderies to the
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region. 123 Pang Can stressed that it was the best way to protect the empire and not to
harm the living standards of most people. Deng Zhi was worried about the enormous
expense of warfare in Liang province and was inclined to give up the province so that the
empire could focus on the northern frontier against the Xiongnu; hence, Pang’s plan was
convincing to him. Deng then clearly manifested his intention to abandon Liang province
in a court meeting with all senior officials, and the attendees unanimously agreed with
him. 124
However, when the Grand Commandant (Taiwei 太尉, ranked as Chancellor) Li Xiu
李脩 (fl. 110s CE) told his staff about the decision shortly after the court meeting, Yu Xu,
one of his staff who has been mentioned in the previous chapter, was strongly against it.
Yu pointed out that, firstly, the preceding emperors had put in great effort to conquer the
northwestern region, and it was inappropriate to give up the territory for the sake of
saving money; secondly, if Liang province were abandoned, Chang’an and its vicinity
would become the frontier and all the Former Han imperial mausoleums located nearby
Chang’an would be exposed to enemies, which would be totally unacceptable for the
Later Han, a dynasty that claimed itself as the successor of the Former Han; thirdly,
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Liang province was famous for producing good fighters that were sturdier and braver
than their counterparts in other provinces; they were a strong force that deterred the
Qiang from leaving them behind and going directly to Chang’an and its vicinity. Yu
further explained that if the northwesterners were still loyal to the Han, they would be
willing to fight for the empire, but if the state abandoned the northwest and moved them
from their homeland, they would definitely turn against the state, and nobody could resist
such a formidable force. 125
Li Xiu was terrified by the picture drawn by Yu Xu and asked for a solution. Yu
emphasized that the imperial court should pay serious attention to the attitudes and
allegiance of the northwesterners. In order to harness such a strong force, Yu suggested
that the senior officials of the central government should each recruit several
northwesterners to serve in their office. Also, the male family members of incumbent
regional and local administrators of Liang province should be granted honorary official
titles. By doing this, the imperial court could reward the efforts of the northwesterners
and the regional and local officials on one hand, and hold hostages to rein the two groups
of people on the other. 126 It was Yu’s plan of killing two birds with one stone. Li Xiu
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immediately called for a court meeting and explained Yu’s proposal to everybody. They
finally turned the table and put Yu’s plan into action. Liang province was thus kept in the
imperial realm. However, Yu Xu earned no merit as he was hated by Deng Zhi and his
brothers for his opposing views; later on, Yu was demoted to the rank of a local
official. 127
Although Yu Xu frustrated Deng Zhi’s plan, neither of them was really concerned
about the interests of the northwesterners. Deng Zhi insisted on giving up Liang province
for saving the empire from the turmoil in the northwest. That he secured a unanimous
support for his plan in the first place was probably mainly due to his powerful status, but
it might also reflect the view of the majority of senior central officials, the bulk of whom
were Guandong scholar-officials. Yu Xu was capable of turning the table because his
arguments touched the core concerns of the policy makers by emphasizing the
importance of keeping Liang province to the legitimacy and security of the Later Han
dynasty. His argument that abandoning the northwest would provoke the unruly
northwestern forces against the imperial center especially invoked the nightmare of the
senior central officials. Yu Xu’s suggestion of using northwesterners in central
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government was in fact for the benefit of the imperial center but not wholeheartedly for
the well-being of the northwesterners.
The third debate took place in 185CE. In the previous year, the Yellow Turbans
uprising broke out and swept quickly across the eastern part of the empire. 128 While the
imperial court had to put all its resources and energy into suppressing the Yellow Turbans,
Liang province was at war again. Although the Qiang wars nominally ended in 169CE
with Duan Jiong’s mass killing, the region was never restored to peace. In the general
population of Liang province, the issue was far from resolved. With the deteriorating
political, social, and economic conditions that resulted from the protracted Qiang wars in
the northwest, discontent among the Han settlers, the Qiang, and other non-Han peoples
in the region towards the Later Han grew stronger and stronger. Finally, they launched a
large-scale offensive in 184CE. The people of Fuhan 枹罕 and Heguan 河關 counties
revolted against the local governments and had the “voluntary Hu followers from the
Huangzhong area” (Huangzhong yicong Hu 湟中義從胡, which is a group of alien
origins counted by Zheng Tai in Dong Zhuo’s troops; see Zheng’s speech cited in Chapter
One) Beigong Boyu 北宮伯玉 and a man called Li Wenhou 李文侯 (probably an
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ethnic Han according to his name) as their leaders. 129 They then joined the Qiang forces
in Beidi commandery to attack Jincheng commandery. In Jincheng, two local strongmen,
Bian Zhang 邊章 (d. 185CE) and Han Sui 韓遂 (d. 215CE), echoing the rebels,
organized their own forces, killed the Grand Administrator, and controlled the
commandery. The united force then turned to other commanderies in Liang province and
even made an inroad on Chang’an and its vicinity in the following year. Facing the
formidable forces of Bian and Han and their allies, the imperial court appointed Huangfu
Song (nephew of Huangfu Gui) and Dong Zhuo to be responsible for restoring order in
the northwest. Shortly afterwards, Huangfu Song was dismissed for having achieved
nothing, and a senior official Zhang Wen 張 溫 (d. 191CE) was appointed as
commander-in-chief of the western front, with over 100,000 troops under his
command. 130 However, no matter how large his forces, Zhang Wen was still unable to
defeat his adversaries.
The Later Han was suffering from a multi-frontal war, with the Yellow Turbans in
particular critically threatening the imperial center and the eastern sector of the empire,
the Excellency over the Masses (Situ 司徒; ranked as Chancellor) Cui Lie 崔烈 (d.
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192CE), a man from a prestigious Guandong scholar-official family, held a court meeting
with all senior central officials and advocated giving up Liang province so that the empire
could focus solely on the eastern front. Fu Xie (no. 22 on the list of northwestern elite in
Chapter Three) immediately shouted out, “only beheading the Excellency over the
Masses would all under Heaven be pacified” 131 斬司徒，天下乃安. Fu Xie was thus
censured for his lacking respect to senior officials and was summoned by Emperor Ling
to giving an explanation for his actions. Fu told the emperor that Cui Lie was wrong for
suggesting the abandonment of Liang province. Fu explained that Liang province was of
utmost strategic importance in defending the western flank of the empire, and it would be
a catastrophe to leave such a vast land and its strong soldiers to the “barbarians who fold
their robes to the left” (zuoren zhi lu 左衽之虜). 132 Fu Xie’s emphasis on the strategic
buffering function of Liang province earned the emperor’s agreement. Once again, Liang
province was kept in the imperial realm. One point meriting our attention is that Fu Xie
used the phrase zuoren zhi lu to describes all the adversaries in Liang province, no matter
who they were and whether they really folded their robes to the left. It provides
corroborating evidence that the term zuoren had became a metonymy for barbarism, and
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the ethnicity between Han and barbarian in the northwest was in large extent determined
by political allegiance.
By summarizing the three debates over abandoning Liang province, I will suggest
that what lay at the heart of the debates were two different visions of empire among the
Later Han officials.
It was mainly the Guandong scholar-officials who put forward the plan of giving up
Liang province. Their central argument was that by cutting off the chaotic northwest, the
empire could protect itself from getting involved with any further trouble and thus save
its energy and resources. It was an eastern-centered point of view and a lesser-empire
vision that by preserving the resources and energy of the eastern sector, the Later Han
could be a self-contained and self-sufficient empire. The significance of the idea of
giving up the northwest can never be overemphasized. Since the establishment of the Qin
empire in 221BCE, abandonment of imperial territory happened only once in the history
of early imperial China. It was in 46BCE that Emperor Yuan of the Former Han
(interestingly enough, his reign was also the period that the classical-training
scholar-officials started flourishing in the imperial court) accepted an official named Jia
Juanzhi‘s 賈捐之 suggestion of abandoning the far southern commandery Zhuya 珠崖
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(modern-day Hainan 海南 island), which was annexed by Emperor Wu in 110BCE,
because of the intermittent rebellions of the aboriginal people. 133 However, Zhuya was
only a commandery in the administrative hierarchy and, most importantly, was much
smaller and farther from the imperial center than Liang province. To abandon a whole
province was something unprecedented. In fact, behind such a view lay the political
message that “they were not part of us.” It was only when the eastern scholar-officials did
not regard Liang province as an inseparable part of the empire that they could decide to
give up the whole territory. The triumphalism that accompanied the conquest of the
northwest prevailing in the reign of Emperor Wu of Former Han dynasty had long
dissipated during the Later Han. Among the Later Han political elites, there were lesser
expectations and hopes of the northwest frontier region.
According to Wang Fu’s essays, the view of giving up Liang province was not only
advocated by central officials but also widely shared by regional and local officials in
Liang province. Since the Later Han bureaucracy practiced the rule of avoidance, namely
“Rule of the three mutual [exclusions]” (Sanhu fa 三互法), by which “no regional
authority was nominated to govern his region of origin: no prefect, nor his adjuncts
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governed his home county, no grand administrator nor his aides governed his
commandery of origin, no regional inspector exercised control in the region where his
prefecture was situated,” 134 generally speaking, the regional and local officials who
governed Liang province were non-native people. As mentioned in the preceding chapter,
the mainstay of the Later Han bureaucracy consisted of eastern-based scholar-officials, a
great proportion of officials dispatched to Liang province would doubtlessly be men of
eastern background. 135 Some of them might even have various relations to the officials at
the imperial center. Therefore, according to Wang Fu, these officials would not have the
patience and determination to protect the territory. When riots broke out, they just wanted
to escape from the chaotic northwest as soon as possible. That was why they echoed the
voice of abandoning Liang province at the imperial center. That might also partly explain
the prevailing corruption and malfeasance of the officials in Liang province. In addition,
when Yu Xu suggested granting honorary titles to the male family members of those
incumbent regional and local officials in Liang province, he was aiming to encourage
those officials to fulfill their duties. To criticize the eastern-centered mindset of the
134
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officials, Wang Fu mocked those officials that if their male family members were under
the menace of the Qiang as those people on the frontier were, then those officials would
unanimously support the campaigns against the Qiang. 136
On the other hand, the opposite side included officials with northwestern backgrounds
like Fu Xie and like Yu Xu, who, while of eastern background, had a different view than
his colleagues. They emphasized Liang province as an inheritance from the Former Han
and its strategic position, especially its role in protecting the western flank of the empire.
This view of greater-empire was used to uphold the integrity of the imperial territory.
Wang Fu also criticized the officials who supported giving up Liang province as unwise
since no country could sustain itself without frontiers. 137 Both Yu Xu and Fu Xie
succeeded in preserving Liang province due to their strong arguments of imperial grand
strategy, which touched the core concern and fear of the imperial court. They emphasized
the strategic importance of Liang province and in particular the potential hostility of the
northwestern military forces, which would be a nightmare to the empire if they turned
against the imperial center.
Despite the fact that Yu Xu had succeeded in persuading the decision makers to keep
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Liang province in the imperial realm, the Later Han state in fact adopted an alternative
way of withdrawal from the northwest, thereby giving up Liang province, though
temporarily.
In 110CE, after a series of defeats to the imperial army, the imperial court relocated
the government seat of Jincheng commandery to Xiangwu 襄武 county in Longxi
commandery and the office of Colonel Protector of the Qiang from Jincheng
commandery to Zhangye commandery in order to avert from the Qiang attack. In the
following year, “as the Qiang grew stronger, the regional and local officials, who were
mainly from interior commanderies, had no commitment to defense and fight, and all sent
memorials to [the imperial court to] strive to be first to move their commanderies and
counties away from the menace of the adversary.” 138 羌既轉盛，而二千石、令、長多
內郡人，並無戰守意，皆爭上徙郡縣以避寇難. The imperial court agreed with them and
moved the government seats of Longxi commandery from Didao to Xiangwu county of
the same commandery, Anding commandery to Meiyang 美陽 county of Fufeng, Beidi
commandery to Chiyang 池陽 county of Pingyi 馮翊, and Shang commandery to Ya
衙 county of Pingyi. 139 Both Fufeng and Pingyi were commanderies in Guanzhong
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region and next to Chang’an. These government seats of commanderies were moved
eastward or southward in order to escape from the Qiang. In addition to moving the
government seats, the state ordered the people belonging to the respective commanderies
to follow suit. The ordering of people to move confirmed what I have stated in Chapter
Two that the imperial state defined the imperial sovereignty over its subjects more than
over the territories, and the regional and local administrative units were based on
governing registered population rather than clearly delineated territories.
However, most of the residents of Liang province were attached to their homeland
and were unwilling to move. As a result, the officials carried out forcible movement by
“cutting crops in their fields, demolishing their houses, leveling their defensive facilities,
and destroying their storage.” 140 刈其禾稼，發徹室屋，夷營壁，破積聚. These actions
provoked great discontent among the affected residents. In the meantime, drought and
locusts plagued Liang province, which worsened the situation of the people. The
historical records depict a tragic picture under which many people who were forced to
move either died on the way or become refugees. The elderly and the weak were
abandoned and many of those who survived were forced to be servants or slaves of local
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magnates. 141 The direct consequence was a popular uprising led by the residents of
Hanyang commandery Du Qi 杜琦 (d. 111CE), Du Jigong 杜季貢 (d. 117CE), and
Wang Xin 王信 (d. 112CE). Du’s force then allied with the Qiang chieftain Dianlian.
In 129CE, when the order in Liang province was temporarily restored, Yu Xu urged
the emperor to move back the commanderies-in-exile. In his memorial, Yu criticized the
myopic officials who ignored the strategic value of Liang province and for readily
abandoning the strategic defensive positions. 142 The emperor accepted Yu’s proposal and
ordered the reestablishment of commanderies of Anding, Beidi, Shang, Longxi, and
Jincheng.
In 141CE, however, the situation turned for the worse. After General Ma Xian’s death
in battle, the Qiang’s plundering in Guanzhong and burning of Former Han imperial
mausoleums, the Later Han found no way to suppress the Qiang and therefore resorted to
the evacuation of commanderies again. Anding commandery was relocated to Fufeng and
Beidi to Pingyi, both were next to Chang’an. 143 The defensive frontline was contracted
and retreated to Chang’an and its vicinity. 144
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Although the Later Han state never openly abandoned Liang province, the evacuation
of government seats and the concomitant forcible movement of residents exacerbated
tensions between the people of Liang province and the imperial center. The relocation of
government seats and of residents corroborated the northwesterners’ perception that the
officials as well as the imperial court had no determination or ability to defend and
protect the land and people of the northwest; the forcible movement especially bred
hatred among the northwesterners towards the imperial state. The Qiang wars as well as
the ensuing withdrawals discredited the imperial authority among the northwesterners. As
the imperial state was no longer reliable, the people of Liang province could expect little
from the state and had to arm themselves for self-protection. The growing discontent with
the imperial state engendered unrest among the northwestern military forces and turned
them against the empire. This finally realized the prophecy of Yu Xu when he warned the
imperial court about the worst consequences of abandonment.

3. Spontaneous Militarization flourished in Liang province
As briefly mentioned in the preceding chapters, the Qin state instituted a top-down
sanctioned militarization program, with universal military service as the most crucial
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component supplemented by the system of ranks of merit, which provided the Qin with a
formidable military force to establish the first empire in Chinese history. The practice of
sanctioned militarization was inherited by the Former Han dynasty. However, the role of
sanctioned militarization diminished with time during the Former Han and was finally
renounced by the Later Han: universal military service was abolished by the founding
emperor Guangwu; the value of ranks of merit gradually diminished and transformed
from a mechanism for rewarding service to the state, particularly in combat, to a
perfunctory practice of giving titles without real respect and privileges. 145 The extent of
adoption of sanctioned militarization shows a notable difference between the two Han
dynasties, which confirms the comparison between the zeitgeist of them in the previous
chapter. Since there have been many discussions on the military systems of the two Han
dynasties, universal military service in particular, I shall not repeat them here. 146 The foci
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of this subsection are the impact of the abolition of universal military service on the
flourishing of bottom-up spontaneous militarization in Liang province and how the
imperial court lost control of the northwest.
For the Later Han’s abolition of universal military service, Lei Haizong 雷海宗 was
arguably the best-known as well as its first modern critic. In his 1940 essay, Lei blamed
Emperor Guangwu’s decision as unwise as it not only incapacitated the military power of
the Later Han but also destroyed the martial spirit of succeeding generations of Chinese
people, which transformed Chinese culture into what he called an “amilitary” or a
“demilitarized” culture (wubing de wenhua 無兵的文化); Chinese people were therefore
suffering from foreign invasions. 147 Despite the fact that nationalist sentiments during the
War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) deeply influenced Lei’s perception of
military factors in Chinese culture and thereby made some of his claims exaggerated, he
did really point out the abolition had deeply undermined the overall military might of the
Later Han dynasty. In his recent study on the topic, Mark Edward Lewis regards Emperor
Guangwu’s decision as a product of rational calculation with the nature of “abandoning
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reliance on conscripts to form the elite forces and halting regular training while reserving
the power to conscript in emergencies.” 148 Lewis argues that the reasons for the abolition
were due to three considerations: economy—the Later Han state could save money from
holding the annual inspection ceremony and maintaining a large standing commandery
troops; loyalty—the imperial court could reduce the chances of munity, since during the
last years of Wang Mang the annual assembly of commandery troops had provided
opportunities for the power contenders to launch rebellions, and even the future Emperor
Guangwu once made a failed attempt; and efficacy—a streamlined and professional army
would replace the bulky farmer-conscripted army without disturbing most people’s daily
lives. 149 In short, the intention of Emperor Guangwu was to secure his regime by means
of demilitarizing most of the population and minimizing military expenditure.
With most of society theoretically unarmed and untrained in warfare, the standing
imperial army would be the only military power in the empire and the emperor would be
the sole possessor of military forces. During most of the Later Han, standing forces
consisting of recruits were mainly stationed in the imperial capital and several permanent
camps at key points in the empire. To deal with threats from different directions, the Later
148
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Han set up, for example, Liyang camp 黎陽營, Duliao camp 度遼營, and Yuyang camp
漁陽營 in the north; Yong camp 雍營 and Chang’an camp 長安營 in the west; and
Xianglin camp 象林營 and Fuli camp 扶黎營 in the south. However, these were
mainly for the interior of the empire, and people along the frontiers were still required to
provide certain military services for the frontier defense. Also, in order to have adequate
men to defend the frontiers, an increasing number of convicts reprieved from death
sentences were deployed to serve garrisons, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, and
various non-Han people such as the Xiongnu and the Qiang were recruited and organized
in frontier troops.
However, for such a vast empire as the Later Han, a handful of military camps only
located at strategic points would not be sufficient to meet multi-frontal, protracted
external or internal military conflicts. Hence, during times of emergency, the Later Han
needed to call up reserve troops that were composed mainly of the untrained
commoners. 150 Needless to say, they would only provide reinforcement in terms of
quantity but not in quality. Since the common people were undertrained and
undisciplined, a minor or partial defeat would throw the whole army into panic and chaos,
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which would then create a snowball effect and result in the collapse of the army, which
was what happened in the Qiang wars. Furthermore, since the commandery troops were
disabled, when the Qiang succeeded in penetrating the frontier defenses and invaded the
interior commanderies, there were no significant or capable troops to oppose the
adversary; the Qiang were therefore able to roam those regions at will. As we have seen
before, the only method the state could adopt was to set up a large number of fortresses in
the interior as a means of passive defense. Based on these facts, we may be able to
understand why Wang Fu complained in his work that the imperial army’s incapacity to
fight was one of the important reasons why the Qiang wars lasting so long. 151
Ying Shao, whose Fengsu tongyi I have cited in the discussion on the Qiang, made a
harsh and yet revealing retrospective comment in his work entitled Han Guan 漢官
(The Han Institutions) on the failure of the Later Han military system. Ying manifests his
thought on military affairs in the beginning of the passage by quoting words from the
classic Zuo Zhuan 左傳 (The Zuo Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals):
Heaven produces the five materials, and the people utilize all of them. Since none [of
the five elements] could be discarded, who could give up using weapons [or
violence]? 152
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天生五材，民並用之，廢一不可，誰能去兵？
Ying then argued that the abolition of universal military service of the Later Han led
to the following results:
Since the commanderies and fief-states have abolished infantry and cavalry, the state
lacks safety precautions, which really incites the rebels. When turmoil happens in one
direction, [it needs forces from] other three directions come to rescue it… all the
requisitions make the common people in uproar. Without sufficient training in archery
and horsemanship or enough learning of disciplines and doctrines, the people are
suddenly forced to face strong adversaries… Therefore the imperial troops perform
poorly and are defeated in every battle… As a result, [the state] recruits soldiers from
the three frontiers with distinct customs who are not our kind… by tracing the failure
of the imperial troops, the saying “to fight without prior training is equal to throwing
them away” is not vacuous! 153
自郡國罷材官騎士之後，官無警備，實啟寇心。一方有難，三面救之……一切取
辦，黔首囂然。不及講其射御，用其戒誓，一旦驅之以即強敵……是以每戰常負，
王旅不振……爾乃遠徵三邊殊俗之兵，非我族類……不教而戰，是謂棄之，跡其
禍敗，豈虛也哉！
Ying Shao blamed the abolition of commandery troops, which was a direct result of
the abandonment of universal military service, causing the imperial forces to become
insufficient and incapable of protecting the empire. Mobilizing the common people who
had no military training only aggravated the situation further. Ying quoted a saying from
Confucius, “To send the common people to war without prior training is equal to
throwing them away.” 154 以不教民戰，是謂棄之. It is Ying Shao’s diagnosis of the
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failure of the Later Han imperial troops. In fact, Zheng Tai also quoted the same saying in
his analysis of the weaknesses of the eastern alliance to Dong Zhuo, which I have cited in
the beginning of Chapter One.
Moreover, Ying Shao pointed out a very important feature of the Later Han military
system—employing non-Han troops. The imperial tradition of recruiting non-Han
soldiers during the two Han dynasties can be traced back to at least the reign of Emperor
Wen of the Former Han. 155 Chao Cuo, the statesman who proposed the project of
resettling people along the northern frontier and of setting up farming colonies,
championed the benefits of using surrendered non-Han peoples as frontier garrisons to
resist Xiongnu invasions. 156 During the reign of Emperor Wu, the employment of
non-Han soldiers went hand in hand with the large-scale external warfare and territorial
expansion. Such a tradition was inherited by the Later Han and became an economical
way of settling the increasing number of surrendered non-Han people such as the Qiang
and the Xiongnu. 157 With the abolition of universal military service and the poor
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performance of the imperial army, the Later Han empire came to rely increasingly on
barbarian recruits to fill the ranks of its army along the frontiers. 158 For example, the
troops under the command of Colonel Protector of the Qiang were, to a large extent,
composed of the Qiang and other non-Han peoples. 159 Duan Jiong’s mass killing of the
Qiang rebels was in fact carried out by his Qiang soldiers.
Needless to say, non-Han troops served a good purpose to the imperial military
machine with several advantages, particularly in external warfare. Recruiting non-Han
soldiers minimized the laborious process of recruiting and training individual civilians
since, comparatively speaking, the barbarian soldiers were tough fighters, and were
familiar with the frontier terrain and climate. Another advantage was that the barbarian
tribesmen could be brought into the army in groups, with their own tribal organization
and existing structure of command and coordination—an efficient army could easily be
formed. More than that, it was an ideal policy developed by the imperial rulers in that by
using barbarian against barbarian, the empire could rein the alien people without
exhausting its own resources.
Nevertheless, the fatal drawback of employing foreign troops was the question of
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political allegiance. There was no guarantee of their loyalty to the emperor or his empire.
The non-Han troops would easily turn against the Han empire when they were not
satisfied with their treatment. For those non-Han peoples who were allowed to retain their
tribal organization, such as the Qiang groups who were settled by the Later Han along its
northwestern frontier, the preserved tribal solidarity, network, and command structure
critically hindered their loyalty to the imperial center but provided motives of collective
action and mechanism for mobilization against the empire. As we have seen, the trigger
for the First Qiang War in 107CE was the mutiny of Qiang cavalrymen who were afraid
of the possibility of a long-term stationing in the Western Regions.
Even though they were nominally under imperial command, the political allegiance of
the non-Han troops depended upon patron-client relations with the imperial commander.
It was a highly personal relationship rather than a well-regulated institution. As
mentioned above, a great number of the troops under Duan Jiong’s command were the
Qiang. During the last years of the second century CE when Duan Jiong was called back
to the capital, as a means to discharge him from his army, and was later put to death as
implicated in a eunuch factional struggle, many of his former officers and their followers
became rebels. A central official named Liu Tao 劉陶 (d. 185CE) sharply pointed out
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that since those former subordinates of Duan Jiong were skilled at fighting and were
knowledgeable about the geography of the northwest, they were very hard to defeat. 160
The Qiang and other non-Han peoples also constituted the backbone of the military
forces of the warlord Dong Zhuo, as Zheng Tai counted in his speech cited in Chapter
One. Dong Zhuo grew up in Liang province and had established very close relationships
with some of the Qiang tribal leaders since his early age. 161 It was for these reasons that
Dong was appointed to deal with the Qiang problem in the last years of the Later Han.
Dong shrewdly exploited his networks with the Han and non-Han peoples in Liang
province and the imperial court’s reliance on him to establish his own forces in the
northwest. The overwhelming high number of non-Han members of his army earned
Dong’s troops the name of “Qiang-Hu” army from the eastern based scholar-officials, 162
and Dong himself was called a “Qiang-Hu” by his contemporaries. 163 Dong’s troops, as
he claimed, only followed his direction and would not under the command of other
imperial generals. Therefore, it became a force which Dong could rely on to challenge the
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imperial authority. 164
Various factors such as protracted warfare, natural disasters, official corruption and
exploitation contributed to the difficult situation that provoked not only non-Han troops
but also Han residents in Liang province into turning against the Later Han state. As
analyzed in the preceding chapters, Liang province was a highly militarized region and
was well-known for producing formidable military talents and tough fighters. Since the
imperial army from the east was incapable of restoring order in the northwest during the
Qiang wars, the northwesterners had to rely upon themselves for self-protection. Those
who were discontented even joined the rebels. When the imperial court decided to give
up Liang province and carried out forcible evacuations, it aggravated the fear and
discontent of the northwesterners. For the people of Liang province, the imperial court’s
proposal of giving up the province was no different from a proposal of abandoning
them. 165 The northwesterners’ distrust toward the imperial center thus reached the peak.
In order to protect their regional interests, various local forces arose and united,
regardless of whether or not they were Han or non-Han people. One Japanese scholar
called the united front of anti-Later Han forces in Liang province as a multi-racial and
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multi-ethnic “United regime of Liang province.” 166
In fact, during the long course of living together in the region, the Han and non-Han
inhabitants gradually developed close relationships and adapted and accommodated each
other, though intermittent conflicts happened. In the last years of the Later Han, it was
difficult to differentiate between the Han and the Qiang. 167 Dong Zhuo was called a
Qiang by his contemporaries; many of his subordinates were of mixed Han-Qiang family
background; Ma Teng 馬騰 (d. 212CE), one of the most important military strongmen in
Liang province and an ally of the aforementioned Han Sui, had a Han father who was an
ex-local military officer and a Qiang mother; 168 both Ma Teng and his son Ma Chao 馬
超 (176-222CE) were said to have earned wide support among the Qiang and the Hu.
Those rebel leaders or military strongmen such as Bian Zhang, Han Sui, Ma Teng, and
Wang Guo all commanded multi-ethnic forces like Dong Zhuo’s. 169
The threat of facing a common enemy—the Later Han state—gradually helped all the
northwestern military men forge a regional identity as people of Liang province
(Liangzhou ren 涼州人). As the historical records show, this identity was especially
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emphasized by the military leaders in the last years of the Later Han. Rebel leaders such
as Ma Teng and Han Sui as well as subordinates of Dong Zhuo such as Li Jue 李傕 (d.
198CE) and Guo Si 郭汜 (fl. 190s CE), all declared themselves as people of Liang
province. Even in 192CE when there were factional struggles over the succession of
Dong Zhuo among his subordinates after the warlord’s death, Li Jue and Guo Si, both
from Liang province, temporarily put aside their conflicts and promoted the regional
identity of people of Liang province to resist the attack launched by anti-Dong eastern
scholar-officials. They were also regarded by their adversaries as people of Liang
province. 170 The identity of people of Liang province was superimposed on internal
differences among the northwestern military men in response to conflict with the eastern
adversaries.
With the flowering of the regional identity of the people of Liang province, the
imperial rule over the province ended before the empire’s collapse. In 187 CE, while the
Later Han state was still struggling to restore order in the northwest, a mutiny broke out
among the people of six commanderies of Liang province who were conscripted in the
army under the command of the Inspector of Liang province (Liang zhou cishi 涼州刺史)
170

HHS, 66: 2176. Chen Yong has provided a detailed study of the emphasis of Liangzhou identity among
northwestern military men after the death of Dong Zhuo, see his “Dong Zhuo jinjing shulun” 董卓進京述
論, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 中國史研究 1995.4: 112-121.
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Geng Bi 耿鄙 (d. 187CE). The mutiny was said to have been caused by Inspector
Geng’s corruption and exploitation. The mutineers killed Geng and his associates, and
then attacked other towns that were still under imperial control. Ma Teng, originally an
aide-de-camp of Inspector Geng, quickly grasped the opportunity and became the leader
of the mutineers. With the outbreak of mutiny, the imperial power was wiped out in Liang
province. In 189CE, Ma Teng and Han Sui allied and became the dominant power in
Liang province. On the other hand, although the imperial court ordered Dong Zhuo to
suppress the rebels in Liang province, he established himself as a semi-independent
power without obeying the imperial order and manipulated the situation between the
northwestern rebels and the imperial court. Dong maintained connections with Ma and
Han, and the two strongmen also wanted to benefit themselves by collaborating with
Dong. Even though Liang province was still nominally a regional administrative unit of
the empire, the imperial center found itself no longer able to control the region, which
was already in the hands of warlords.

To recap, the chaotic situation in Liang province caused by natural disasters and
protracted warfare furthered the estrangement between the imperial court and the
northwesterners; the poor performance of the imperial army in the Qiang wars revealed a
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decreased ability of the imperial center to protect its territory and subjects from horrors of
warfare; the intention of giving up Liang province and the ensuing forcible evacuation
further discredited the imperial center to the northwesterners. The disappointing
performance of the empire in political and military terms left the people of Liang
province no choice but to rely on themselves for self-protection. While the soldiers from
other sectors of the empire generally performed badly, the military forces in the northwest
retained a comparatively high strength as evidenced by Yu Xu, Fu Xie, and Zheng Tai,
who were mentioned in different contexts.
The people of Liang province became less willing to support an imperial center that
was unable to provide them with security and prosperity. They joined the rebels or
formed self-armed forces, pushing them away from the imperial authority. During the
Qiang wars and afterwards, the respect and support for the imperial center among the
northwesterners diminished quickly, and the imperial court finally realized that it was no
longer able to rule the northwest.
The lack of respect and support was a major cause of the fall of the empire. Certain
elites of Liang province had foreseen or tried to trigger the downfall of the empire. In
187CE when Inspector Geng Bi was killed and the rebels were attacking the towns in
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Liang province; Fu Xie, the northwestern statesman who successfully kept Liang
province in the imperial realm in the 185CE debate, was the Grand Administrator of
Hanyang commandery in Liang province. Besieged by the rebels, Fu Xie’s son proffered
advice to his father that all under Heaven had betrayed the imperial court and it was no
longer worth defending for the dynasty. 171 Fu agreed with his son but insisted that he had
to die for his duty. The rebels also sent a messenger to Fu Xie and persuaded him that the
Later Han dynasty had lost its mandate. 172 After entrusting a confidant to take his son out
of the siege, Fu Xie chose to die in battle. Fu’s story reveals that people in Liang province,
no matter which side they were on, had a feeling that the Later Han dynasty was going to
end. About the same time, an ex-official and Hanyang native Yan Zhong 閻忠 (d.
189CE) told General Huangfu Song, the hero who suppressed the Yellow Turbans and the
nephew of the famous Huangfu Gui, that the Later Han was falling and nobody was able
to save it. As the most prestigious military leader of his time, Yan said, that Huangfu
Song should lead his army to march to the imperial capital, wipe out the corrupt imperial
court, and take the Mandate of Heaven himself. 173 Huangfu Song was terrified after
hearing this and insisted that he would follow the principle of loyalty to the dynasty.
171
172
173

HHS, 58: 1878.
Ibid.
HHS, 71: 2303.
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Although both Fu Xie and Huangfu Song recognized the deterioration of the empire, they
refused to betray the Later Han. It was probably because they were “centralized” and
“civilianized” by the imperial court and the dominant Guandong scholar-official culture.
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Huangfu Song’s uncle Huangfu Gui had made a
great effort to be recognized by the eastern scholar-officials. Such a family background
and education might have influenced Huangfu Song to be a staunch supporter of the
dynasty. 174 However, other northwestern elites like Fu Xie’s son and Yan Zhong did not
hold the principle of loyalty to the empire. They manifested clearly that the Later Han
was near its end. It was Dong Zhuo, an uncouth Liujun liangjiazi who dared to desecrate
the imperial authority, and led the northwestern troops to storm the imperial capital,
deposed the emperor, killed the Empress Dowager and hammered the last nail into the
empire’s coffin. 175

174

Chen Yong discusses the scholar-officials of the late Later Han period were bound by the principle of
loyalty and dared not to directly challenge the throne, see his “Liangzhou sanming lun,” 72-74.
175
For a detailed analysis of Dong Zhuo’s political actions after controlling Louyang, see Chen, “Dong
Zhuo jinjing shulun”, 109-112.
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5
Epilogue:
The Beginning of the End

In his magnum opus Dushi fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要 (Essentials of Geography for
Reading History), Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹 (1631-92CE) made a comment about the role
played by the northwestern region in the toppling of the Later Han dynasty,
As I have observed that since the ancient times, he who wreaked havoc throughout the
empire always originated from Shaanxi. 1 While the Eastern Han dynasty was enjoying
peace and prosperity, the Qiang and Hu launched revolt in the western frontier.
Therefore, brilliant generals and vigorous soldiers all gathered in the region between
the Yellow River and Long Mountain. As the situation unfolded to the worst end, [the
northwestern rebels] were as avaricious as big swine and as venomous as serpents;
[They] desecrated the imperial palace, thereby throwing the empire into turmoil. 2
吾觀自古以來，為天下禍者，往往起於陝西。東漢當承平之際，而羌、胡搆亂於
西垂，故良將勁卒盡在河、隴之間。迨其末也，封豕長蛇，憑陵宮闕，遂成板蕩
之禍。
Gu sharply pointed out the militarized nature of the northwestern region during the
Later Han period and traced the causal relationship between the concentration of military

1

For Gu, Shaanxi was not confined to modern Shaanxi province but referred to the whole northwestern
area.
2
Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹, Dushi fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要. He Cijun 賀次君 and Shi Hejin 施和金
annotated. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005) v.5, 52: 2451.
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forces in the northwest and the downfall of the dynasty. These are associated with the
main thread running through the present study that the highly militarized northwestern
region was the harbinger of the disintegration of the Later Han empire.
In this project, I adopted a regional perspective by focusing on the role of the
northwestern frontier region vis-à-vis the imperial center to explain the collapse of the
Later Han empire. I emphasized the role that regional conflicts played in the decline and
fall of the dynasty, and paid particular attention to the incompatibility between the
militarized culture of the northwest and the civil values promoted by the imperial center,
which was dominated by the eastern-based scholar-officials. Through this analysis, I have
provided a case study of the relationship between the imperial center and the regions with
different cultures and identities, and the variations of the conception of such a
relationship in the period of early imperial China.
As a frontier region of the Qin-Han empire, the northwest was a new territory to the
Chinese realm. Until the Later Han times, some portions of the northwestern region had
only been part of imperial soil for one hundred years. Its coalescence into the Chinese
empire was a product of long-term expansion and conquest, which arguably defined the
region’s military nature. Furthermore, in the harsh natural environment of the region,
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only tough people could survive, and unsurprisingly, the region fostered vigorous
warriors. Mixed culture and multi-ethnicity featured prominently in this highly
militarized frontier society, which contrasted sharply with the imperial center that
promoted unified cultural values and stood in the way of a greater degree of transregional
integration.
When the Former Han empire was enthusiastic about marching to Inner Asia, the
northwest played a crucial role in serving as a bridgehead, and the northwesterners, with
the Linjun Liangjiazi in particular, contributed enormous efforts to the imperial enterprise.
At that time, the northwestern region was deemed a military and political core of the
empire, though it was in the periphery in a geographic sense. In short, it was the process
of shaping the empire in the northwest that permitted the rise of military elites from the
comparatively culturally backward Liang province. However, the Later Han rulers had a
different vision of empire from their Former Han predecessors. When the Later Han
adopted a retrenchment policy, the strategic value of the northwestern region changed
accordingly. The region lost the importance it once enjoyed in the expansionist era of the
Former Han. It was reduced to a land that was disdained for its cultural backwardness and
was considered a region that could be readily given up in the eyes of the eastern-based
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scholar-officials. At that time, the northwest was not only a geographic periphery but also
a political periphery. In other words, the northwestern region and its inhabitants went
through a process of political peripheralization during the Later Han.
When its strategic value was high, the imperial center was willing to spend enormous
resources on the northwest; when its strategic value decreased, the imperial center would
not give any patient and resources to the region. What determined the calculation of
strategic costs and benefits was greatly influenced by the political culture that prevailed
among the imperial policy makers.
Facing the prevailing political culture of the Later Han, which emphasized civil
values and honored knowledge of classical studies, the northwesterners found themselves
receiving lower political and social status than their eastern counterparts. For the
northwestern military elites, the new political culture, which upheld the prominence of
civil values, hindered their career advancement; for the common northwesterners, the
eastern-based scholar-officials’ ideas and actions of giving up the northwest showed that
they were being abandoned by the imperial center. While the imperial center cared little
about the welfare of the northwesterners, prolonged warfare and natural disasters
exacerbated the hardship of the northwesterners. It was the disaffected northwesterners
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who finally played the role of harbingers in the process of disintegration of the empire.
Although the Later Han imperial center had already suffered from and was weakened by
various problems, such as political infighting at the imperial court, popular rebellions,
invasions launched by foreign peoples such as the Xianbei and Wuhuan along the
northern frontier, and the massacre of the eunuchs at the capital unleashed by the
official-scholars in 189CE especially brought the imperial center to a chaotic situation,
the empire was still staggering. It was the warlord Dong Zhuo and his northwestern
troops who entered the capital, as the outsiders, deposed and installed emperors according
to their will, murdered the Empress Dowager, and thus desecrated the imperial authority.
These actions gave the regional governors legitimate opportunities to establish their own
semi-autonomous regional regimes in name of opposing Dong Zhuo and the rebels from
Liang province, and thus dismembered the empire. Therefore, Dong Zhuo’s march to the
capital in 190CE marked the beginning of the end of the Later Han dynasty and also the
breakdown of the early imperial system in Chinese history; a period of great disunion
ensued.
As I have stated in Chapter One, this study is the first step of my study on the
transformation of Chinese society and development of Chinese history during the period
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before and after the fall of the Later Han, and the present study only provides the
background of the collapse of the empire, for the process and result of collapse will wait
for further studies. 3
Lastly, I would like to point out two trends took place during the Later Han, though I
cannot discuss in depth about them in the present study. They are “Regionalism” and
“Confucianization.”
As I have elaborated in this study, under the façade of a unified empire, there were a
multitude of regional variations and conflicts in the vast expanse of the Qin-Han empire.
Regional cultures and customs persistently existed in Chinese history and hindered the
empire from achieving cultural unification. For example, the Qin state established Nan
南 commandery on a newly conquered land in 278BCE, however, in 227BCE, which
was over 50 years after the conquest, the Grand Administrator of Nan commandery still
lamented and criticized in an announcement that regional culture harmed the interests of
the imperial state. 4 As mentioned in Chapter One, the Later Han dynasty was a time when
the powerful families exerted great influence on both the imperial center and various

3

As what Yoffee said, “what happens after collapse is as important as the process of collapse itself,” and
classified the studies of collapse into three aspects: background of collapse, process of collapse, and result
of collapse. See idem, “Orienting Collapse,” 7.
4
Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 睡虎地秦墓竹簡整理小組, Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian 睡虎地秦
墓竹簡 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1977), 15.
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regions. The growth of powerful family and regionalism went hand in hand during the
Later Han. By the end of the dynasty, regionalism had already become a strong force that
undermined the empire, and narrow parochial interests had predominated over the
imperial interests. 5 What came with this trend was the devolution of military power to the
regional governors, which provided them means and resources against Dong Zhuo in
190CE. The present study is only one of the stories of regionalism in the Later Han times,
though it is the most important one.
The “Confcuianized” political culture that dominated the Later Han imperial center
played a crucial role in the scholar-officials’ perceptions of the northwest and its people.
This political culture gradually formed in the last years of the Former Han and reached its
pinnacle in the Later Han, and it was but the political revelation of a multi-faceted great
tide of “Confucianization” occurred at the time. 6 How “Confucianization” as a political,
social, and intellectual movement influenced the civil and military values of the empire
and the interactive relationship between the “Confucian state” and frontier societies
deserve further study. Furthermore, after the fall of the Later Han dynasty, there was a
tendency for some eastern-based Confucianized scholar-official families to actively
5

Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty,” 176-195; de
Crespigny, “Provincial Gentry and the End of Later Han,” 533-558.
6
Paul Goldin has provided a case of “Confucianization” of the Han law, see his “Han Law and the
Regulation of Interpersonal Relations: ‘The Confucianization of the Law’ Revisited,” 1-32.
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militarize themselves as a response to the incessant warfare. This phenomenon compels
us to consider the relationship between “Confucianization” and “Militarization.”
However, to pursue these problems in detail would take us beyond the concerns of this
work.
As I have said, this study is just a beginning of the end.

312

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Classical Chinese Texts
Ban Gu 班固, comp. Han shu 漢書. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996.
Chen Shou 陳壽, comp. Sanguo zhi 三國志. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997.
Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu 春秋左傳注. Annotated by Yang Bojun 楊伯峻. Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju, 1981.
Lunyu yizhu 論語譯注. Annotated by Yang Bojun 楊伯峻. Hong Kong: Chunghwa Book, 1994.
Fan Ye 范曄, comp. Hou Hanshu 後漢書. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003.
Fang Xuanling 房玄齡, et al. comp. Jin shu 晉書. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974.
Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹. Dushi fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要. Annotated by He Cijun 賀次君 and Shi
Hejin 施和金. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005.
Si You 史游. Jijiu Pian 急就篇, in Siku Quanshu 四庫全書 vol. 223. Shanghai: Shanghai guji
chubanshe, 1987.
Sima Qian 司馬遷, comp. Shi ji 史記. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002.
Sun Xingyan 孫星衍, comp. Hanguan liuzhong 漢官六種. Annotated by Zhou Tianyou 周天游.
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990.
Wang Fu 王符. Qianfulun jian jiaozheng 潛夫論箋校正. Annotated by Wang Jipei 汪繼培 and
Peng Duo 彭鐸. Beijing: Zhinghua shuju, 2010.
Ying Shao 應劭. Fengsu tongyi jiaozhu 風俗通義校注. Annotated by Wang Liqi 王利器.
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981.
Zhao Yi 趙翼. Nianershi zhaji xiaozheng 廿二史箚記校證. Annotated by Wang Shumin 王樹
民. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001.

313

2. Modern Works
Abramson, Marc Samuel. “Deep Eyes and High Noses: Physiognomy and the depiction of
barbarians in Tang China.” In Nicola Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt eds., Political Frontiers,
Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History. pp. 119-159. London:
Routledge, 2003.
Adelman, Jeremy and Stephen Aron. “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and
the Peoples in between in North American History.” The American Historical Review 104.3
(Jun, 1999): 814-841.
Allard, Francis. “Frontiers and Boundaries: The Han Empire from Its Southern Periphery.” In
Miriam T. Stark ed., Archaeology of Asia, pp. 233-254. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
Andrade, Tonio. How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the
Seventeenth Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
Asselin, Mark Laurent. A Significant Season: Cai Yong (ca. 133-192) and His Contemporaries.
New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2010.
Atwill, David G. The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest
China, 1856-1873. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
Balazs, Etienne. “Political Philosophy and Social Crisis at the End of the Han Dynasty.” In
Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme. H. M. Wright trans., pp.
187-225. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1964.
Barfield, Thomas J. The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757.
Cambridge, MA. & Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1996.
Baud, Michiel and Willem van Schendel. “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.”
Journal of World History, 8.2 (Fall 1997): 211-242.

314

Benjamin, Craig. “The Origin of the Yuezhi.” In Craig Benjamin and Samuel N. C. Lieu eds.,
Walls and Frontiers in Inner Asian History. pp. 101.130. Sydney: Ancient History
Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, 2002.
Bielenstein, Hans. “The Census of China during the Period 2-742 A.D.” Bulletin of the Museum
of Far Eastern Antiquities 19 (1947): 125-163.
────. “An Interpretation of the Portents in the Ts’ien-Han –Shu.” Bulletin of the Museum of
Far Eastern Antiquities 22 (1950): 127-143.
────. Emperor Kuang-wu, 25-57, and the Northern Barbarians. Canberra: Australian
National University, 1956.
────. “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: with Prolegomena on the Historiography of the
Hou Han shu.” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 26 (1954): 1-209.
────. “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume II, the Civil War.” Bulletin of the
Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 31 (1959): 1-287.
────. “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume III, the People.” Bulletin of the Museum
of Far Eastern Antiquities 39 (1967): 1-198.
────. “Lo-yang in Later Han Times.” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 48
(1976): 1-147.
────. “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty: volume IV, the Government.” Bulletin of the
Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 51 (1979): 1-300.
────. “Later Han Inscriptions and Dynastic Biographies: a Historiographical Comparison.”
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Sinology: Section on History and
Archaeology, pp. 571-586. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1981.
────. “Han Portents and Prognostications.” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern

315

Antiquities 56 (1984): 97-112.
────. “Wang Mang, the restoration of the Han dynasty, and Later Han.” In Denis Twitchett
and Michael Loewe eds., The Cambridge History of China vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires,
221 B.C.–A.D. 220., pp. 223-290. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
────. “The Institutions of Later Han.” In The Cambridge History of China vol. 1: The Ch’in
and Han Empires, 221 B.C. – A.D. 220, pp. 491-519.
────. The Bureaucracy of Han Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Bodde, Derk. “The State and Empire of Ch’in.” In Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe eds., The
Cambridge History of China vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220., pp.
20-102. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
────. “What and Why in Chinese Civilization.” In Willard J. Peterson, Andrew H. Plaks,
and Ying-shih Yü eds., The Power of Culture: Studies in Chinese Cultural History, pp. 344-358.
Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994.
Bol, Peter. “Middle-Period Discourse on the Zhong Guo: The Central Country.” On Digital
Access to Scholarship at Harvard http://www.ceps.com.tw/ec/ecJnlIntro.aspx?Jnliid=3243
(2009): 1-31.
Brashier, K. E. “Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Stelae.” In Text and Ritual in Early China.
Martin Kern ed., pp. 249-284. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2005.
Brown, Miranda. The Politics of Mourning in Early China. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2007.
Bunker, Emma C. Nomadic Art of the Eastern Eurasian Steppes: The Eugene V. Thaw and Other
New York Collections. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2002.
Cai Liang. “In the Matrix of Power: A Study of the Social and Political Status of Confucians (Ru

316

儒) in the Western Han Dynasty (206 BCE-8 CE).” Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University,
2007.
Chan Hok-lam. Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty
(1115-1234). Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984.
Chang Chun-shu 張 春 樹 . Handai bianjiangshi lunji 漢 代 邊 疆 史 論 集 . Taipei: Shihuo
chubanshe, 1977.
────. The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume One: Nation, State, & Imperialism in Early
China, ca. 1600 B.C.-A.D. 8. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007.
────. The Rise of the Chinese Empire, Volume Two: Frontier, Immigration, & Empire in Han
China, 130 B.C.-157 A.D. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007.
Chang, Michael G. A Court on Horseback: Imperial Touring & the Construction of Qing Rule,
1680-1785. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007.
Chen Chi-yun. Hsun Yueh (AD 148-209): The Life and Reflections of an Early Medieval
Confucian. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
────. “Han Dynasty China: Economy, Society, and State Power, a Review Article.” T’oung
Pao 70 (1984): 127-148.
Chen Yong 陳勇. “Dong Zhuo jinjing shulun” 董卓進京述論. Zhongguoshi yanjiu 中國史研究
1995.4: 109-121.
────. “Liangzhou sanming lun” 「涼州三明」論. Zhongguoshi yanjiu 中國史研究 1998.2:
37-48.
Cheng, Anne. “What Did It Mean to Be a Ru in Han Times?” Asia Major 14.2 (2001): 101-118.
Ch'ü T'ung-tsu. Han Social Structure. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1972.
Connery, Christopher Leigh. The Empire of the Text: Writing and Authority in Early Imperial

317

China. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998.
Crossley, Pamela Kyle. A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Dai Yingcong. The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing. Seattle and
London: University of Washington Press, 2009.
de Crespigny, Rafe. “Political Protest in Imperial China: The Great Proscription of Later Han,
167-184,” Papers in Far Eastern History 11 (1975): 1-36.
────. “Politics and Philosophy under the Government of Emperor Huan 159-168 A.D.”
T’oung Pao 66 (1980): 41-83.
────. Northern Frontier: The Policies and Strategy of the Later Han Empire. Canberra:
Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1984.
────. “Provincial Gentry and the End of Later Han.” In Schmidt-Glintzer, hrsg. von Helwig
ed., Das andere China - Festschrift für Wolfgang Bauer zum 65. Geburtstag. pp. 533-558.
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995.
────. “Some Notes on the Western Regions in Later Han.” Journal of Asian History 40:1
(2006): 1-30.
────. “The Military Culture of Later Han.” In Di Cosmo ed., Military Culture in Imperial
China. pp. 90-111.
Des Forges, Roger V. Cultural Centrality and Political Change in Chinese History: Northeast
Henan in the Fall of the Ming. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Di Cosmo, Nicola. “The Northern Frontier in Pre-Imperial China.” In Michael Loewe and
Edward L. Shaughnessy eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of
Civilization to 221 B.C., pp. 885-965. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

318

────. Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
────. “Han Frontiers: Toward an Integrated View.” Journal of the American Oriental Society
129.2 (2009): 199-214.
──── ed. Military Culture in Imperial China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2009.
──── and Don J. Wyatt eds. Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human
Geographies in Chinese History. London: Routledge, 2010.
Dreyer, Edward L. “Zhao Chongguo: A Professional Soldier of China’s Former Han Dynasty.”
The Journal of Military History 72.3 (2008), 665-725.
Du Zhengsheng 杜正勝. Zhoudai chengbang 周代城邦. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi,
1979.
────. Bianhu qimin: chuantong zhengzhi shehui jiegou zhi xingcheng 編戶齊民：傳統政治
社會結構之形成. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1990.
Dubs, Homer H. trans and annotated. The History of the Former Han Dynasty, Volume II.
Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1955.
────. The History of the Former Han Dynasty, Volume III. Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1955.
Dunnell, Ruth W. The Great State of White and High: Buddhism and State Formation in
Eleventh-Century Xia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996.
Duyvendak, J. J. L. “An Illustrated Battle-Account in the History of the Former Han Dynasty.”
T’oung Pao xxxiv (1939), 249-64.
Ebrey, Patricia Buckley. The Aristocratic Families of Early Imperial China: A Case Study of the
Po-ling Ts’ui Family. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

319

────. “Later Han Stone Inscriptions.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40:2 (1980):
325-353.
────. “Toward a Better Understanding of the Later Han Upper Class.” In Albert E. Dien ed.,
State and Society in Early Medieval China, pp. 49-72. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 1990.
Elliott, Mark C. The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
Ferrill, Arther. The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation. London: Thames and
Hudson, 1986.
Fu Lecheng 傅樂成. “Xi Han de jige zhengzhi jituan.” 西漢的幾個政治集團. In idem, Han
Tang shilunji 漢唐史論集, pp. 1-37. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1977.
────. “Handai de Shandong yu Shanxi,” 漢代的山東與山西. In idem, Han Tang shilunji,
pp. 65-80.
Fujita Katsuhisa 藤田勝久. Shiki Sengoku shiryō no kenkyū 史記戰囯史料の硏究. Tōkyō:
Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1997.
────. Chūgoku kodai kokka to gunken shakai 中国古代国家と郡県社会. Tōkyō: Kyūko
Shoin, 2005.
Fukui Shigemasa 福井重雅. Kandai kanri tōyō seido no kenkyū 漢代官吏登用制度の硏究.
Tōkyō : Sōbunsha, 1988.
Gao Rong 高榮. “Handai Hu Qiang Xiaowei shulun” 漢代護羌校尉述論. Zhongguo bianjiang
shidi yanjiu 中國邊疆史地研究 1995.3: 10-16.
Gao Wen 高文. Hanbei jishi 漢碑集釋. Kaifeng: Henan daxue chubanshe, 1985.
Ge Jianxiong 葛劍雄. Zhongguo yimin shi 中國移民史 volume. 1. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin

320

chubanshe, 1997.
────. Zhongguo renkoushi 中國人口史, volume 1. Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe,
2002.
Geng Shaojiang 耿少將. Qiangzu tongshi 羌族通史 Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe,
2010.
Goldin, Paul R. [Goldin, Paul Rikita]. The Culture of Sex in Ancient China. Honolulu: University
of Hawai’i Press, 2002.
────. Confucianism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.
────. “Steppe Nomads as a Philosophical Problem in Classical China.” In Paula L. W.
Sabloff ed., Mapping Mongolia: Situating Mongolia in the World from Geologic Time to the
Present, pp. 220-246. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and
Anthropology, 2011.
────. “Han Law and the Regulation of Interpersonal Relations: ‘The Confucianization of the
Law’ Revisited.” Asia Major XXV. Part I (2012): 1-32.
Goldstone, Jack A. “The Problem of the ‘Early Modern’ World.” Journal of the Economic and
Social History of the Orient 41.3 (1988): 249-284.
Graff, David A. Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300-900. London: Routledge, 2002.
Giersch, Charles Patterson. Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan
Frontier. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Goi Naohiro 五井直弘. “Chūgoku kodai teikoku no ichi seikaku” 中国古代帝国の一性格. In
idem, Kandai no gōzoku shakai to kokka 漢代の豪族社会と国家, pp. 51-70. Tōkyō: Meicho
Kankōkai, 2001.
────. “Ryōkan kōtaiki no hanran” 両漢交替期の叛乱. In idem, Kandai no gōzoku shakai

321

to kokka, pp. 141-160.
────. “Gokan ōchō to gōzoku” 後漢王朝と豪族. In idem, Kandai no gōzoku shakai to
kokka, pp. 228-281.
Guan Donggui 管東貴, “Handai de Qiangzu (I)” 漢代的羌族（上）. Shihuo yuekan 食貨月刊
1.1 (1971): 15-20.
────. “Handai de Qiangzu (II)” 漢代的羌族（下）. Shihuo yuekan 1.2 (1971): 87-97.
────. “Handai chuli Qiangzu wenti de banfa de jiantao” 漢代處理羌族問題的辦法的檢討.
Shihuo yuekan 2.3 (1973): 129-154.
Gurr, Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
Guy, R. Kent. Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration
in China, 1644-1796. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010.
Hamaguchi Shigekuni 濱口重國. “Kōbutei no gunbi shukushō to sono eikyō” 光武帝の軍備縮
小と其の影響. In idem, Shin Kan Zui Tō shi no kenkyū 秦漢隋唐史の研究. pp. 291-325.
Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku shubankai, 1966.
Han Maoli 韓茂莉. “Lun Zhongguo beifang xumuye chansheng yu huanjing de hudong guanxi”
論中國北方畜牧業產生與環境的互動關係. In Hou Renzhi 侯仁之 and Deng hui 鄧輝
eds., Zhongguo beifang ganhan banganhan diqu lishi shiqi huanjing bianqian yanjiu wenji 中
國北方乾旱半乾旱地區歷史時期環境變遷研究文集, pp. 294-303. Beijing: Shangwu
yinshuguan, 2006.
Hartwell, Robert. “Demographic, Political, and Social Transformation of China, 750-1550.”
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42 (1982): 365-442.
Hao Shusheng 郝樹聲 and Zhang Defang 張德芳. Xuanquan Hanjian yanjiu 懸泉漢簡研究.
Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua chubanshe, 2009.

322

Hendrischke, Barbara. The Scripture on Great Peace: the Taiping Jing and the Beginnings of
Daoism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
Herman, John. Amid the Clouds and Mist: China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007.
────. “The Kingdoms of Nanzhong: China’s Southwest Border Region Prior to the Eighth
Century.” T’oung Pao 95 (2009): 241-286.
Hibino Takeo 日比野丈夫. “kasei shigun no seiritsu ni tsuite” 河西四郡の成立について. In
idem, Chūgoku rekishi chiri kenkyū 中国歴史地理研究 . Kyōto: Dōhōsha Shuppanbu, 1988.
Higashi Shinji 東晋次. “Gokan jidai no senkyo to chihō shakai” 後漢時代の選挙と地方社会.
Tōyōshi kenkyū 東洋史研究 46.2 (1987): 33-60.
────. Gokan jidai no seiji to shakai 後漢時代の政治と社会. Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1995.
────. Ō Mō: juka no risō ni tsukareta otoko 王莽：儒家の理想に憑かれた男. Tokyo:
Hakuteisha, 2003.
Hill, John E. Through the Jade Gate to Rome: A Study of the Silk Routes during the Later Han
Dynasty 1st to 2nd Centuries CE. John E. Hill, 2009.
Hostelter, Laura. Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern
China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Hou Xiaorong 后曉榮. Qindai zhengqu dili 秦代政區地理. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian
chubanshe, 2009.
Hsing I-tien [Xing Yitian] 邢義田. “Dong Han de Hu bing” 東漢的胡兵. Guoli zhengzhi daixue
xuebao 國立政治大學學報 28 (1973): 143-166.
────. “Han Wudi zai Mayi zhiyi zhong de juese” 漢武帝在馬邑之役中的角色. In idem,

323

Tianxia ijia: Huangdi,guanliao yu shehui 天下一家：皇帝、官僚與社會, pp. 136-159. Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 2011.
────. “Yunwen yunwu: Handai guanli de yizhong dianxing” 允文允武：漢代官吏的一種典
型. In idem, Tianxia ijia: Huangdi,guanliao yu shehui, pp. 224-284.
────. “Dong Han xiaolian de shenfen beijing” 東漢孝廉的身分背景. In idem, Tianxia ijia:
Huangdi,guanliao yu shehui, pp. 285-354.
────. “Lun Handai de yimao churen” 論漢代的以貌取人. In idem, Tianxia ijia:
Huangdi,guanliao yu shehui, pp. 377-395.
────. “Qin Han de luling xue” 秦漢的律令學. In idem, Zhiguo anbang: fazhi, xing heng yu
junshi 治國安邦：法制、行政與軍事, pp. 1-61. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011.
────. “Shishi Handai de Guandong, Guanshi yu Shandong, Shanxi” 試釋漢代的關東、關西
與山東、山西. In idem, Zhiguo anbang: fazhi, xing heng yu junshi, pp. 180-210.
Hsu Cho-yun 許倬雲. Han Agriculture: The Formation of Early Chinese Agrarian Economy
(206 B.C.-A.D. 220). Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1980.
────. “Handai Zhongguo tixi de wangluo” 漢代中國體系的網絡. In idem et al., eds.,
Zhongguo lishi lunwenji 中國歷史論文集, pp. 1-28. Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan,
1986.
────. “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han dynasty.” In
Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill eds., The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations.
pp. 176-195. Tucson: University of Arizon Press, 1988.
────. Xi Zhou shi 西周史. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1994.
────. “Dui Wang Dequan xiansheng ‘Gudai Zhongguo tixi de tuancheng’ de huiying” 對王
德權先生＜古代中國體系的摶成＞的回應 Xin Shixue 14.1 (March, 2003): 203-208.

324

Hu Baoguo 胡寶國. “Handai zhengzhi wenhua zhongxin de zhuanyi” 漢代政治文化中心的轉
移. In idem, Han Tang jian shixue de fazhan 漢唐間史學的發展, pp. 214-229. Beijing:
Shangwu yinshuguan, 2003.
Hu Pingsheng 胡平生 and Zhang Defang 張德芳. Dunhuang Xuanquan Hanjian shicui 敦煌
懸泉漢簡釋粹. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001.
Huang Jinyan 黃今言. Qin Han junzhi shilun 秦漢軍制史論. Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin
chubanshe, 1993.
Huang Liuzhu 黃留珠. Qin Han shijin zhidu 秦漢仕進制度. Xi'an: Xibei daxue chubanshe,
1985.
Huang Jinlin 黃金麟. Zhanzheng, shenti, xiandaixing : jindai Taiwan de junshi zhili yu shenti,
1895-2005 戰爭、身體、現代性 : 近代臺灣的軍事治理與身體, 1895-2005. Taipei: Lianjing
chuban shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2009.
Hulsewé, A. F. P. [Hulsewé, Anthony]. Remnants of Han Law, volume 1: Introductory Studies and
Annotated Translation of Chapters 22 and 23 of the History of the Former Han Dynasty.
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955.
────. with an introduction by M. A. N. Loewe, China in Central Asia: The Early Stage: 125
B.C- A.D. 23. An Annotated Translation of Chapters 61 and 96 of the History of the Former
Han Dynasty. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979.
────. “Law as One of the Foundations of State Power in Early Imperial China.” In S. R.
Schram ed., Foundations and Limits of State Power in China. pp. 11-32. London: School of
Oriental and African Studies, 1987.
Ikeda Yūichi 池田雄一. Chūgoku kodai no juraku to chihō gyōsei 中国古代の聚落と地方行政.
Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2002.

325

Isett, Christopher Mills. State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2007.
Jin Fagen 金發根. “Dong Han danggu renwu de fenxi” 東漢黨錮人物的分析. Zhongyang
yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊 34(1963): 505-558.
────. “Wang Fu shengzu niansui de kaozheng ji Qianfu lun xieding shijian de tuilun” 王符
生卒年歲的考證及潛夫論寫定時間的推論. Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo
jikan 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊 40.2(1969): 781-799.
Jones, Sian. The Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the Past and Present.
London: Routledge, 1997.
Kano Naosada 狩野直禎. Gokan seijishi no kenkyū 後漢政治史の硏究. Kyōto: Dōhōsha,
1993.
Kawakatsu Yoshio 川勝義雄. “Kizokuseiji no seiritsu” 貴族政治の成立. In idem, Rikuchō
kizokusei shakai no kenkyū 六朝貴族制社会の研究, pp. 3-22. Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 2000.
────. “Kanmatsu no rejisutansu undō” 漢末のレジスタンス運動. In idem, Rikuchō
kizokusei shakai no kenkyū, pp. 23-56.
Kern, Martin. The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-Huang: Text and Ritual in Early Chinese
Imperial Representation. New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2000.
Khazanov, Anatoly M. Nomads and the Outside World. Julia Crookenden trans. Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1994.
Khodarkousky, Michael. Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.
Kimura Masao

木村正雄. Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei: Toku ni sono seiritsu no kiso jō ken

中囯古代帝国の形成：特にその成立の基礎条件. Tōkyō: Hikaku Bunka Kenkyūjo, 2003.

326

Kinney, Anne Behnke. The Art of the Han Essay: Wang Fu’s Ch’ien-Fu Lun. Tempe, Arizona:
Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1990.
Kleeman, Terry F. Great Perfection: Religion and Ethnicity in a Chinese millennial Kingdom.
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998.
Knapp, Keith. “Did the Middle Kingdom have a Middle Period? The Problem of ‘Medieval’ in
China’s History.” Education about Asia 12.3 (2007): 1-32.
Kojima Shigetoshi 小嶋茂稔. Kandai kokka tōchi no kōzō to tenkai: gokan kokkaron kenkyū
josetsu 漢代国家統治の構造と展開：後漢国家論研究序說. Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2009.
Kristof, Ladis K. D. “The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries.” Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 49(1959): 269-282.
Kudō Motoo 工藤元男. Suikochi Shinkan yorimita Shindai no kokka to shakai 睡虎地秦簡より
みた秦代の國家と社會. Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1998.
Kuhn, Philip A. Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1970.
Kumagai Shigezo 熊谷滋三. “Go-Kan no Kyozoku naishisaku ni tsuite” 後漢の羌族内徙策に
ついて. Shiteki 史滴 9 (1988): 49-74.
Lai Ming-Chui 黎明釗. “Handai haozu daxing de yanjiu huigu” 漢代豪族大姓的研究回顧. In
Zhou Liangkai 周樑楷 ed., Jiewang erbian 結網二編, pp. 93-133. Taipei: Dongda tushu
gufen youxiangongsi, 2003.
Lao Kan. “Population and Geography in the Two Han Dynasties.” In E-Tu Zen Sun and John de
Francis eds., Chinese Social History: Translations of Selected Studies, pp. 83-102. Washington,
DC.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1956.
Lattimore, Owen. Inner Asian Frontiers of China. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962.

327

Lary, Diana. Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers 1919-1937. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985.
Lee, James. “Migration and Expansion in Chinese History.” In Williams H. McNeill and Ruth S.
Adams eds., Human Migration—Patterns and Policies, pp. 20-47. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1978.
Lei Haizong 雷海宗. Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo de bing 中國文化與中國的兵. Shanghai:
Shangwu yinshuguan, 1940.
Lewis, Mark Edward. Sanctioned Violence in Early China. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1990.
────. “The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service.” In Hans van de Ven ed., Warfare
in Chinese History. pp. 33-75. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000.
────. The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han. Cambridge and London: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.
────. “Gift Circulation and Charity in the Han and Roman Empires.” In Walter Scheidel ed.,
Rome and China: Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires, pp. 121-136. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009.
Li Feng. Landscape and Power in Early China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
────. “‘Feudalism’ and Western Zhou China: A Criticism.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies 63.1 (June, 2003): 115-144.
────. Bureaucracy and the State in Early China: Governing the Western Zhou. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Li Kaiyuan 李開元. Handiguo de jianli yu Liu Bang jiduan : jungong shouyi jieceng yanjiu 漢
帝國的建立與劉邦集團：軍功受益階層硏究. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2000.

328

Li Shuicheng 李水城. “Huaxia bianyuan yu wenhua hudong: yi changcheng yanxian xiduan de
taoge weili” 華夏邊緣與文化互動：以長城沿綫西段的陶鬲為例. In idem Dongfeng xijian:
Zhongguo xibei shiqian wenhua zhi jincheng 東風西漸 : 中國西北史前文化之進程, pp.
176-199. Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2009.
Li Xiaocong 李孝聰. Zhongguo quyu lishi dili 中國區域歷史地理. Beijing: Beijing daxue
chubanshe, 2004.
Li Xiaojie 李曉杰. Dong Han zhengqu dili 東漢政區地理. Jinan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe,
1999.
Li Yufu 李玉福. “Qin Han shidai de bingyi zhidu” 秦漢時代的兵役制度. In idem, Qin Han
zhidu shilu 秦漢制度史論. pp. 215-270. Jinan: Shandong daixue chubanshe, 2003.
────. “Qin Han shidai de junshi jianzhi” 秦漢時代的軍事建制. In idem, Qin Han zhidu
shilu. pp. 271-245.
Li Zhengzhou 李正周. “Dong Han ‘sanjue santong’ Xiyu yu ‘Qianghuo’ zhi guanlian” 東漢
「三絕三通」西域與「羌禍」之關聯. Yantai shifan xueyuan xuebao 煙台師範學院學報 21.3
(2004.9) : 24-27.
Liu Pak-yuen 廖伯源. “Shilun Xi Han zhu jiangjun zhi zhidu jiqi zhengzhi diwei” 試論西漢諸
將軍之制度及其政治地位. In idem, Lishi yu zhidu: Handai zhengzhi zhidu shishi 歷史與制
度：漢代政治制度試釋, pp. 138-203. Hong Kong: Xianggang jiaoyu tushu gongsi, 1997.
────. “Dong Han jiangjun zhidu zhi yanbian” 東漢將軍制度之演變. In idem, Lishi yu
zhidu: Handai zhengzhi zhidu shishi, pp. 204-308.
────. Shizhe yu guanzhi yanbian: Qin Han huangdi shizhe kaolun 使者與官制演變：秦漢
皇帝使者考論. Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 2006.
────. “Lun Handai xizhi bianjiang minzu yu saini zhi zhengce” 論漢代徙置邊疆民族於塞

329

內之政策. In Jilindaxue gujiyanjiusuo 吉林大學古籍研究所 ed., "1-6 Shiji Zhongguo beifang
bianjiang, minzu, shehui guoji xueshu yantaohui" lunwenji

"1-6 世纪中國北方邊疆・民族

・社會國際學術研討會"論文集. pp. 62-85. Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2008..
Liu Wenqi 劉文起. Wang Fu "Qianfu lun" suo fanying zhi dong Han qingshi 王符《潛夫論》所
反映之東漢情勢. Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1995.
Loewe, Michael. “The Orders of Aristocratic Rank of Han China.” T’oung Pao, Second Series,
vol. 48, Livr. 1/3 (1960): 97-174.
────. Records of Han Administration 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.
────. Crisis and Conflict in Han China 104 BC to AD 9. London: George Allen and Unwin
Ltd, 1974.
────. “The Conduct of Government & the Issues at Stake A.D. 57-167.” In Denis Twitchett
and Michael Loewe eds., The Cambridge History of China vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires,
221 B.C.–A.D. 220. pp. 291-316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
────. “Social Distinctions, Groups and Privileges.” In Michael Nylan and Michael Loewe
eds., China’s Early Empires: A Re-appraisal. pp. 296-307. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010.
────. “The Western Han Army: Organization, Leadership, and Operation.” In Di Cosmo ed.,
Military Culture in Imperial China. pp. 65-89.
Lorge, Peter. War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900-1795. London and New York:
Routledge, 2005.
Luo Tonghua 羅彤華. Handai de liumin wenti 漢代的流民問題. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju,
1989.
Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to

330

the Third. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
Ma Changshou 馬長壽. Di yu Qiang 氐與羌. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984.
Mansvelt Beck, B. J. “The Fall of Han.” In Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe eds., The
Cambridge History of China vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220., pp.
327-330. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
────. The Treatises of Later Han: Their Author, Sources, Contents and Place in Chinese
Historiography. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1990.
Markley, Jonathan. “Gaozu confronts the Shanyu: The Han Dynasty’s First Clash with the
Xiongnu.” In Craig Benjamin and Samuel N. C. Lieu eds., Walls and Frontiers in Inner Asian
History. pp. 131-140. Sydney: Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie
University, 2002.
Masubuchi Tatsuo 増淵龍夫. “Gokan tōko jiken no shihyō ni tsuite” 後漢党錮事件の史評につ
いて. In idem, Chūgoku kodai no shakai to kokka 中囯古代の社会と囯家, pp. 296-317.
Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1996.
────. “Gokan gunkensei no chiiki betsuteki kōsatsu” 後漢の郡県制の地域別的考察. In
idem, Chūgoku kodai no shakai to kokka, pp. 537-566.
McNeal, Robin. “Acquiring People: Social Organization, Mobilization, and the Discourse on the
Civil and the Martial in Ancient China.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 2000.
Michaud, Paul. “The Yellow Turbans.” Monumenta Serica XVII (1958): 41-127.
Millward, James A. “New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier.” In Remapping China: Fissures in
Historical Terrain. Gail Hershatter, Emily Honig, Johathan N. Lipman, and Randall Stross eds.,
pp. 113-129. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
────. Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864.

331

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.
────. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. London: Hurst & Company, 2007.
Momiyama Akira 籾山明. “kandai gōzokuron he no ichi shikaku” 漢代豪族論への一視角,
Tōyōshi kenkyū 東洋史研究 43.1 (1984): 165-173.
────. Kan teikoku to henkyō shakai: chōjō no fūkei 漢帝国と辺境社会：長城の風景.
Tōkyō: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 1999.
Morimoto Jun 森本淳. “Dong Han monian de Qiangzu yu Hanzu” 東漢末年的羌族與漢族. In
Zhongguo Wei Jin Nanbeichao shixuehui 中 國 魏 晉 南 北 朝 史 學 會 and Wuhandaxue
Zhongguo sanzhijiu shiji yanjiusuo 武 漢 大 學 中 國 三 至 九 世 紀 研 究 所 eds., Wei Jin
Nanbeichao shi yanjiu: huigu yu tansuo—Zhongguo Wei Jin Nanbeichao shixuehui dijiujie
nianhui lunwenji 魏晉南北朝史硏究：回顧與探索──中國魏晉南北朝史學會第九屆年會
論文集. pp. 178-185. Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2009.
Mostern, Ruth. “Dividing the Realm in Order to Govern”: The Spatial Organization of the Song
State (960-1276 CE). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011.
Mote, F. W. Imperial China, 900-1800. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Mullaney, Thomas S. Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.
Nagata Hidemasa 永田英正 ed. Kandai sekkoku shūsei 漢代石刻集成 2 vols. Kyoto: Dohosha,
1994.
Nishijima Sadao 西嶋定生. Chūgoku kodai teikoku no keisei to kōzō: nijittō shakusei no kenkyū
中國古代帝國の形成と構造：二十等爵制の硏究. Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1961.
────. Shikan teikoku 秦漢帝国. Tōkyō: kōdansha, 1974.
Nylan, Michael. “Ying Shao’s ‘Feng Su Tung Yi’: An Exploration of Problems in Han Dynasty

332

Political, Philosophical and Social Unity.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1982.
────. “A Problematic Model: The Han ‘Orthodox Synthesis,’ Then and Now.” In Kai-wing
Chow, On-cho Ng, and John B. Henderson eds., Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian
Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics, pp. 17-56. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1999.
────. The Five “Confucian” Classics. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2001.
Ōta Yukio 太田幸男. Chūgoku kodai kokka keiseishi ron 中国古代国家形成史論. Tōkyō:
Kyūko Shoin, 2007.
Pearson, Margaret J. Wang Fu and the Comments of a Recluse. Tempe, Arizona: Center for Asian
Studies, Arizona State University, 1989.
Perdue, Peter C. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Cambridge and
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.
Poo Mu-chou 蒲慕州. “Wuguzhihuo de zhengzhi yiyi” 巫蠱之禍的政治意義. Zhongyang
yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊 57.3 (1987):
511-538.
Powers, Martin J. Art and Political Expression in Early China. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1991.
Psarras, Sophia-Karin. “The Han Far South.” Asiatische Studien Etudes Asiatiques LI.3 (1997):
757-778.
────. “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (I).”
Monumenta Serica 51 (2003): 55-236.
────. “Han and Xiongnu: A Reexamination of Cultural and Political Relations (II).”
Monumenta Serica 52 (2004): 37-93.

333

Pulleyblank, E. G. “The Hsiung-nu Language.” Asia Major (New Series) IX.2 (1963): 239-265.
Puett, Michael. “Centering the Realm: Wang Mang, the Zhouli, and Early Chinese Statecraft.” In
Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern eds., Statecraft and Classical Learning: The Rituals of
Zhou in East Asian History, pp. 129-154. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
Qian Mu 錢穆. Guoshi dagang 國史大綱. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1994.
────. Qin Han Shi 秦漢史. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1994.
Reardon-Anderson, James. Reluctant Pioneers: China’s Expansion Northward, 1644-1937.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
Ren Naiqiang 任 乃 強 . Qiangzu yuanliu tansuo 羌 族 源 流 探 索 . Chongqing: Chongqing
chubanshe, 1984.
Robinson, David M. Empire’s Twilight: Northeast Asia under the Mongols. Cambridge: Harvard
University Asia Center, 2010.
Ruff, Julius R. Violence in Early Modern Europe 1500-1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
Sage, Steven F. Ancient Sichuan and the Unification of China. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1992.
Sahlins, Peter. Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees. Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1989.
Satake Yasuhiko 佐竹靖彥. “Kandai jyūsanshū no chiikisei ni tsuite” 漢代十三州の地域性に
ついて. Rekishi hyōron 歴史評論, 357 (1980): 37-65 and 79.
────. Chūgoku kodai no densei to yūsei 中国古代の田制と邑制. Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten,
2006.
Scheidel, Walter ed. Rome and China: Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires.

334

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
────. “The Monetary Systmes of the Han and Roman Empires.” In Scheidel ed., Rome and
China. pp. 137-207.
Shao Taixin 邵台新. Handai Hexi sijun de tuozhan 漢代河西四郡的拓展. Taipei: Taiwan
shangwu yinshuguan, 1988.
Shelach, Gideon., and Yuri Pines. “Secondary State Formation and the Development of Local
Identity: Change and Continuity in the State of Qin (770-221 B.C.).” In Miriam T. Stark ed.,
Archaeology of Asia. pp. 202-230. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
Shelach, Gideon. Prehistoric Societies on the Northern Frontiers of China: Archaeological
Perspectives on Identity Formation and Economic Change during the First Millennium BCE.
London: Equinox Publishing Ltd, 2009.
Shepherd, John Robert. Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
Shi Nianhai 史念海. “Huangtu gaoyuan jiqi nonglinmu fenbu diqu de bianqian” 黄土高原及其
農林牧分佈地區的變遷. In idem, Huangtu gaoyuan lishi dili yanjiu 黄土高原歷史地理硏究,
pp. 386-391. Zhengzhou: Huanghe shuili chubanshe, 2001.
Shimoda Makoto 下田誠. Chūgoku kodai kokka no keisei to seidō heiki 中国古代国家の形成
と青銅兵器. Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2008.
Shin, Leo Kwok-yueh. The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming
Borderlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 睡虎地秦墓竹簡整理小組. Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian 睡
虎地秦墓竹簡. Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1977.
Skinner, G. William. “Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History.” Journal of Asian

335

Studies, 44.2 (Feb., 1985): 271-292.
────. Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China. Ann Arbor: Association for Asian
Studies, 2001.
Standen, Naomi. Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossings in Liao China. Honolulu: University of
Hawai’i Press, 2007.
Sun Yutang 孫毓棠. “Xi Han de bingzhi” 西漢的兵制. In idem, Sun Yutang xueshu luwenji 孫
毓棠學術論文集. pp. 269-327. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995.
────. “Dong Han bingzhi de yanbian” 東漢兵制的演變. In idem, Sun Yutang xueshu
luwenji. pp. 328-355.
Szonyi, Michael. Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008.
Tackett, Nicolas. “The Great Wall and Conceptualizations of the Border under the Northern
Song.” Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 38(2008): 99-138.
Tada Kensuke 多田狷介, “Kōkin no ran zenshi” 黄巾の乱前史. In idem, Kan Gi Shin shi no
kenkyū 漢魏晋史の研究, pp. 49-76. Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 1999.
Takamura Takeyuki 高村武幸. Kandai no chihō kanri to chiiki shakai 漢代の地方官吏と地域
社会. Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 2008.
Tanigawa Michio 谷川道雄. Medieval Chinese Society and the Local “Community”. Translated,
with an introduction by Joshua A. Fogel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
Tang Xiaofeng 唐曉峰, “Guifang: Yin Zhou shidai beifang de nongmu hunhe zuqun” 鬼方：殷
周時代北方的農牧混合族群. In Hou Renzhi 侯仁之 and Deng hui 鄧輝 eds., Zhongguo
beifang ganhan banganhan diqu lishi shiqi huanjing bianqian yanjiu wenji 中國北方乾旱半
乾旱地區歷史時期環境變遷研究文集, pp. 263-270. Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2006.

336

Tatemi Satoshi 楯身智志, “Zen Kan ni okeru ‘Teishi’ no kōzō to hensen─nijittō shakusei no
kinō wo megutte─” 前漢における「帝賜」の構造と変遷─二十等爵制の機能をめぐって
─. In Kudō Motoo 工藤元男 and Ri Sonshi 李成市 eds., Higashi Ajia kodai shutsudo moji
shiryō no kenkyū 東アジア古代出土文字資料の研究. pp. 82-110. Tōkyō: Yūzankaku, 2009.
Teng, Emma. Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures,
1683-1895. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004
Teng Mingyu 滕銘予. Qin wenhua: cong fengguo dao diguo de kaoguxue guancha 秦文化 : 從
封國到帝國的考古學觀察. Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2002.
Thomsen, Rudi. Ambition and Confucianism: A Biography of Wang Mang. Aarhus: Aarhus
University Press, 1988.
Tian Yuqing 田餘慶. “Shu Zhang Chu: Guanyu wang Qin bi Chu wenti de tantao” 說張楚──關
於「亡秦必楚」問題的探討. In idem, Qin Han Wei Jin shi tanwei 秦漢魏晉史探微, pp. 1-27.
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993.
Tighe, Justin. Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northern Territory and Development in Early
Twentieth-Century China. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1992. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1990.
Tinios, Ellis. “‘Loose Rein’ in Han Relations with Foreign Peoples”. Department of East Asian
Studies, University of Leeds, 2000.
Tomiya Itaru 冨谷至. Gobi ni ikita otokotachi: Ri Ryō to So Bu ゴビに生きた男たち：李陵と
蘇武. Tōkyō: Hakuteisha, 1994.
────. Mokkan, chikukan no kataru Chūgoku kodai: shoki no bunkashi 木簡・竹簡の語る
中国古代：書記の文化史. Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2003.

337

Tonami Mamoru 礪波護, Kishimoto Mio 岸本美緒 and Sugiyama Masaaki 杉山正明 eds.,
Chūgoku rekishi kenkyū nyūmon 中国歴史研究入門. Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai,
2006.
Tse Wai Kit Wicky 謝偉傑. “Lun Han Gaodi yichao de beijing dongluan” 論漢高帝一朝的北
境動亂. Hanxue yanjiu 漢學研究 25: 1 (2007.6): 31-58.
Tsuruma Kazuyuki 鶴間和幸, “Kandai gōzoku no chiikiteki seigaku” 漢代豪族の地域的性格,
Shigaku zasshi 史学雑誌 87.12 (1978): 1-38.
Turner, Frederick Jackson. “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” In idem, The
Frontier in American History, pp. 1-38. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920.
Ueda Sarae 上田早苗, “Gokan makki no sōyō no gōzoku” 後漢末期の襄陽豪族, Tōyōshi
kenkyū 東洋史研究 28.4 (1970): 283-305.
Ukai Masao 鵜飼昌男. He Shuangquan 何雙全 trans. “Jianwu chuqi Hexi diqu de zhengzhi
dongxiang: ‘Hou Hanshu Dou Rong zhuan’ buyi” 建武初期河西地區的政治動向──《後漢
書．竇融傳》補遺. In Xibei shifan daxue lishixi 西北師範大學歷史系 and Gansusheng wenwu
kaogu yanjiusuo 甘肅省文物考古硏究所 eds., Jianduxue yanjiu 簡牘學研究 vol. 2, pp.
227-232. Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 2009.
Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi 宇都宮淸吉. “Dōyaku kenkyū” 僮約研究. In idem, Kandai shakai
keizai shi kenkyū 漢代社會經濟史硏究, pp. 256-374. Tōkyō: Shibundō, 1967.
────. “Ryōshū to nanyō” 劉秀と南陽. In idem, Kandai shakai keizai shi kenkyū, pp.
375-404.
────. “Kandai niokeru ka to gōzoku” 漢代における家と豪族. In idem, Kandai shakai
keizai shi kenkyū, pp. 405-472.
────. “kandai gōzoku kenkyū” 漢代豪族研究. In idem, Chūgoku kodai chūseishi kenkyū

338

中囯古代中世史硏究, pp. 351-388. Tōkyō: Sōbunsha, 1977.
────. “Kandai kenkyū gūkan” 漢代研究偶感. In idem, Chūgoku kodai chūseishi kenkyū,
pp. 389-401.
von Falkenhausen, Lothar. Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000-250 BC): The
Archaeological Evidence. Los Angeles: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology, University of
California, Los Angeles, 2006.
von Glahn, Richard. The Country of Streams and Grottoes: Expansion, Settlement, and the
Civilizing of the Sichuan Frontier in Song Times. Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian
Studies, Harvard University, 1987.
Waldron, Arthur. The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
────. “The ‘Great Wall of China’: An Author’s Reflections after Twenty Years.” In Chinese
Walls in Time and Space: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Roger Des Forges et al eds., pp.
3-36. Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2009.
Wang Aihe. “Creators of an Emperor: The Political Group Behind the Founding of the Han
Empire”, Asia Major 14.1 (2001): 19-50.
Wang Dequan 王德權. “Gudai Zhongguo tixi de tuancheng” 古代中國體系的摶成. Xin Shixue
新史學 14.1 (March, 2003): 143-201.
Wang Mingke 王明珂. “The Ch’iang of Ancient China through the Han Dynasty: Ecological
Frontiers and Ethnic Boundaries.” Ph.D dissertation, Harvard University, 1992.
────. Huaxia bianyuan: lishi jiyi yu zuqun rentong 華夏邊緣：歷史記憶與族群認同.
Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 1997.
────. Manzi, Hanren yu Qiangzu 蠻子、漢人與羌族. Taipei: Sanmin shujun gufen

339

youxiangongsi, 2001.
────. Qiang zai Han Zang zhjian : yige Huaxia bianyuan de lishi renleixue yanjiu 羌在漢
藏 之 間 : 一 個 華 夏 邊 緣 的 歷 史 人 類 學 研 究 . Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gufen
youxiangongsi, 2003.
────. Yingxiong zuxian yu dixiong minzu: genji lishi de wenben yu qingjing 英雄祖先與弟
兄民族：根基歷史的文本與情境. Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxiangongsi, 2006.
────. Youmuzhe de jueze: miandui Handiguo de bei Ya youmu buzu 游牧者的抉擇：面對漢
帝國的北亞游牧部族. Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2008.
Wang Shoukuan 汪受寬. Gansu tongshi: Qin Han juan 甘肅通史：秦漢卷. Lanzhou: Gansu
renmin chubanshe, 2009.
Wang Xien 王希恩. “Hanmo Liangzhou junfa jituan jianlun” 漢末涼州軍閥集團簡論. Gansu
shehui kexue 甘肅社會科學 1991.2: 71-75.
Wang Xiuyu. China’s Last Imperial Frontier: Late Qing Expansion in Sichuan’s Tibetan
borderlands. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011.
Wang Yong 王勇. Dong Zhou Qin Han Guanzhong nongye bianqian yanjiu 東周秦漢關中農業
變遷研究. Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2004.
Wang Zijin 王子今. Qin Han jiaotong shigao 秦漢交通史稿. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang
dangxiao chubanshe, 1994.
────. “Qin Han wenhua de tongyi fengge yu quyu tese” 秦漢文化的統一風格與區域特色.
In idem, Qin Han quyu wenhua yanjiu 秦漢區域文化研究, pp. 1-23. Chengdu: Sichuan
renmin chubanshe, 1998.
Wang Zongwei 王宗維. Handai sichouzhilu de yanhou: Hexilu 漢代絲綢之路的咽喉：河西路.
Beijing : Kunlun chubanshe, 2001.

340

Watanabe Yoshihiro 渡邉義浩. Gokan kokka no shihai to jukyō 後漢囯家の支配と儒敎. Tōkyō:
Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1995.
────. Sangokushi Kenkyū nyūmon 三国志研究入門. Tōkyō: Nichigai Asoshietsu, 2007.
────. Gokan ni okeru J"ukyō kokka" no seiritsu 後漢における「儒教国家」の成立. Tōkyō:
Kyūko Shoin, 2009.
Wilbur, C. Martin. Slavery in China during the Former Han Dynasty 206 B.C.-A.D. 25. Chicago:
Field Museum of Natural History, 1943.
Willems, Emilio. A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism: An
Anthropological Approach. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1986.
Woodside, Alexander. “The Centre and the Borderlands in Chinese Political Theory.” In Diana
Lary ed., The Chinese State at the Borders, pp. 11-28. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007.
Xiao Kangda 肖亢達. “Gangu Hanjian yu dong Han houqi shehui zhengzhi” 甘谷漢簡與東漢
後期社會政治. Kaogu yu wenwu 考古與文物 1989.6: 78-85.
Xin Deyong 辛德勇. “Qin Shihuang sanshiliu jun xinkao” 秦始皇三十六郡新考. In idem, Qin
Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu 秦漢政區與邊界地理研究, pp. 3-92. Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju, 2009.
────. “Liang Han zhouzhi xinkao” 兩漢州制新考. In idem, Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie
dili yanjiu 秦漢政區與邊界地理研究, pp. 93-177.
────. “Yinshan Gaoque yu Yangshan Gaoque bianxi” 陰山高闕與陽山高闕辨析. In idem,
Qin Han zhengqu yu bianjie dili yanjiu, pp. 181-255.
Xu Pingfang 徐蘋芳. Taotao Huang and John Moffett trans., “The Archaeology of the Great Wall
of the Qin and Han Dynasties.”

Journal of East Asian Archaeology 3:1-2 (2002): 259-281.

341

Yan Buke 閻步克. Shidaifu zhengzhi yansheng shigao 士大夫政治演生史稿. Beijing: Beijing
daxue chubanshe, 1996.
────. Chaju zhidu bianqian shigao 察舉制度變遷史稿. Shenyang : Liaoning daxue
chubanshe, 1997.
────. “Xiaolian tongsui yu Hanmo xuanguan” 孝廉同歲與漢末選官. In idem, Yueshi yu
shiguan: chuantong zhengzhi wenhua yu zhengzhi zhidu lunji 樂師與史官：傳統政治文化與
政治制度論集, pp. 209-225. Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2001.
Yan Gengwang 嚴耕望. Liang Han taishou cishi biao 兩漢太守刺史表. Shanghai: Shangwu
yinshuguan, 1948.
────. Zhongguo defang xingzheng zhidu shi: Qin Han difang xingzheng zhidu 中國地方行
政制度史：秦漢地方行政制度. Nan’gang: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo,
1961.
────. “Zhanguo shidai lieguo minfeng yu shengji: jianlun Qin tongyi tianxia zhi beijing” 戰
國時代列國民風與生計──兼論秦統一天下之背景. In idem, Gengwang shixue lunwen
xuanji 嚴耕望史學論文選集, pp. 95-112. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1991.
Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞. “Donghan de haozu” 東漢的豪族. Qinghua xuebao 清華學報 11:4
(1936): 1007-1063.
────. “Great Families of the Eastern Han.” In E-Tu Zen Sun and John de Francis eds.,
Chinese Social History: Translations of Selected Studies, pp. 103-136. Washington, DC.:
American Council of Learned Societies, 1956.
Yang Jianhua 楊建華. Chunqiu Zhanguo shiqi Zhongguo beifang wenhuadai de xingcheng 春秋
戰國時期中國北方文化帶的形成. Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 2004.
Yang Quan 楊權. Xin wude lilun yu liang Han zhengzhi: "Yaohou huode" shuo kaolun 新五德理

342

論與兩漢政治──「堯後火德」說考論. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006.
Yang Yongjun 楊永俊. “Shi bijiao ‘Liangzhou sanming’ de zhi Qiang zhengce” 試比較「涼州三
明」的治羌政策. Xibei shidi 西北史地 1996.2: 73-80.
────. “Lun Xi Han de ‘gejue Qiang Hu’ zhengce dui liang Han Xi Qiang zhi ‘huo’ de
yingxiang” 論西漢的「隔絕羌胡」政策對兩漢西羌之「禍」的影響. Yichun shizhuan xuebao
宜春師專學報 20.4 (1998.8): 27-31.
────. “Lüelun Handai Longyou difang shili de xingqi jiqi yu Qiang Hu de guanxi” 略論漢
代隴右地方勢力的興起及其與羌胡的關係. Dunhuang xue jikan 敦煌學輯刊 2000.2:
104-109.
Yates, Robin D. S. “The City-State in Ancient China,” in Deborah L. Nichols and Thomas H.
Charlton eds., The Archaeology of City-States: Cross-Cultural Approaches, pp. 71-90.
Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997.
────. “Early China.” In Kurt Raflaub and Nathan Rosenstein ed., War and Society in the
Ancient and Medieval Worlds: Asia, The Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica, pp. 7-46.
Washington D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1999.
────. “Law and the Military in Early China.” In Nicola Di Cosmo ed., Military Culture in
Imperial China, pp. 23-44. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2009.
Yoffee, Norman. “Orienting Collapse.” In The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations.
Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill eds., pp. 1-19. Tucson: University of Arizon Press,
1988.
Yong Jichun 雍際春. Longyou lishi wenhua yu dili yanjiu 隴右歷史文化與地理研究. Beijing:
Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban she, 2009.
Yoshikawa Mitsuo 吉川美都雄. “Gokan shoki niokeru gōzoku taisaku nitsuite” 後漢初期に於

343

ける豪族対策に就いて, Rekishigaku kenkyū 歴史学研究 7.9 (1939).
Yoshinami Takashi 好並隆司. Shikan teikoku shi kenkyū 秦漢帝国史研究. Tōkyō: Miraisha,
1978.
Young, Gregory. Three Generals of Later Han. Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian
National University, 1984.
Yu Weichao 俞偉超. “Gudai Xi Rong he Qiang, Hu kaoguxue wenhua guishu wenti de tantao”
古代“西戎”和“羌”、“胡”考古學文化歸屬問題的探討. In idem, Xian Qin liang Han kaoguxue
lunji 先秦兩漢考古學論集, pp. 180-192. Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1985.
Yu Yingchun 于迎春. Qin Han shishi 秦漢士史. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2000.
Yü Ying-shih 余英時. Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the structure of
Sino-barbarian economic relations. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
────. "Dong Han zhengquan zhi jianli yu shizu daxing zhi guanxi" 東漢政權之建立與士
族大姓之關係. In his Zhongguo zhishi jieceng shilun: gudaipian 中國知識階層史論：古代篇,
pp. 109-203. Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980.
────. “Han Foreign Relaions.” In Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe eds., The Cambridge
History of China vol. 1: The Ch’in and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220., pp. 377-462.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
────. “The Hsiung-nu.” In Denis Sinor ed., The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, pp.
118-149. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Zeng Zhongsha 曾仲珊 annotated. Jijiu Pian 急就篇. Changsha: Yuelu shushe , 1989.
Zhang Nali 張娜麗. Seiiki shutsudo monjo no kisoteki kenkyū : Chūgoku kodai ni okeru
shōgakusho dōmōsho no shosō 西域出土文書の基礎的研究 : 中国古代における小学書・
童蒙書の諸相. Tōkyō : Kyūko Shoin, 2006.

344

Zhang Shuang 張爽 and Xue Haibo 薛海波. “Shilun Dong Han Liang zhou liumin wenti” 試
論東漢涼州流民問題. Gansu shehui kexue 甘肅社會科學 2006.2: 77-80.
Zhang Xuezheng 張 學 正 . “Gangu Hanjian kaoshi” 甘 谷 漢 簡 考 釋 . In Gansusheng
wenwugongzuodui 甘肅省文物工作隊 and Gansusheng baowuguan 甘肅省博物館 eds.,
Hanjian yanjiu wenji 漢簡研究文集. pp. 85-140. Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1984.
Zhangjiashan ersiqi hao Hanmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 張家山二四七號漢墓竹簡整理小組.
Zhangjiashan Hanmu zhujian (ersiqi hao mu) : shiwen xiudingben 張家山漢墓竹簡(二四七
號墓) : 釋文修訂本. Beijing : Wenwu chubanshe, 2006.
Zhao Huacheng 趙化成. “Gansu dongbu Qin he Qiang Rong wenhua de kaoguxue tansuo” 甘肅
東部秦和羌戎文化的考古學探索. In Yu Weichao ed., Kaogu leixingxue de lilun yu shijian
考古類型學的理論與實踐, pp. 145-175. Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1989.
Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan kaoguyanjiusuo 中國社會科學院考古硏究所 ed. Juyan Hanjian:
jiayi bian 居延漢簡：甲乙編. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980.
Zhou Changshan 周長山. Handai difang zhengzhishi lun: dui junxian zhidu ruogan wenti de
kaocha 漢代地方政治史論 : 對郡縣制度若干問題的考察. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue
chubanshe, 2006.
Zhou Zhenhe 周振鶴. “Qin Han fengsu dili quhua” 秦漢風俗地理區劃. In idem ed., Zhongguo
lishi wenhua quyu yanjiu 中國歷史文化區域研究, pp. 107-128. Shanghai: Fudan daxue
chubanshe, 1997.
Zhu Shaohou 朱紹侯. Jungong juezhi kaolun 軍功爵制考論. Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan,
2008.
Zhu Ziyan 朱子彥. “Lun Han Wei zhiji Qiang Hu hua de Liangzhuo junshi jituan” 論漢魏之際
羌胡化的涼州軍事集團. In Jilindaxue gujiyanjiusuo 吉林大學古籍研究所 ed., "1-6 Shiji

345

Zhongguo beifang bianjiang, minzu, shehui guoji xueshu yantaohui" lunwenji "1-6 世纪中國
北方邊疆・民族・社會國際學術研討會"論文集. pp. 112-125. Beijing: Kexue chubanshe,
2008.
Zuferey, Nicolas. To the Origin of Confucianism: The Ru in Pre-Qin Times and During the early
Han Dynasty. New York: Peter Lang Pub Inc, 2003.

347

INDEX
Advisory Counselor (Jianyi Dafu 諫議大夫)

Chang’an 長安 3, 53, 183-184, 186, 253,

151

256, 273-274, 277, 284, 286; camp 290

Anding 安定 (Han commandery) 82, 95, 97,

Chang Chun-shu 張春樹 8n8, 40, 87n77,

104, 108, 110-111, 120-122, 134-135, 147,

91n88, 92

150, 154, 154n74, 215, 247, 253, 256,

Chaona 朝那 136

284-285

Chen Shou 陳壽 50

Balazs, Etienne 215n4, 216, 216n6

Chen Jun 陳俊 181

Ban Biao 班彪 228-229

Chen Tang 陳湯 125

Ban Chao 班超 166-169

Chen Zhong 陳忠 167-169, 168n96

Ban Gu 50, 62n16

Cheng 成, emperor 130, 133, 205

Ban Yong 班勇 168-169

Chiyang 池陽 284

Beigong Boyu 北宮伯玉 277

Ch’ü T’ung-tsu 瞿同祖 13, 18

Beidi 北地 (Han commandery) 74-76, 79-80,

Confucian 14-17, 24, 185, 195-196, 202,

82-85, 108, 110-111, 120-122, 124-125, 132,

208, 223; Confucian state 14, 16-17, 23-24,

134-135, 137, 143, 147, 150, 154, 247, 252,

208, 211, 310; Confucianism 15-17, 196,

256, 264, 277, 284-286

203; Confucianization 203, 203n201,

Beihai 北海 (Han commandery) 10

309-311

Biandao 辨道 75

Cui Lie 崔烈 278

Bianyi 邊議 216

Dali 大荔 74

Bielenstein, Hans, 3n2, 6n3, 7n6, 13,

Daxiao yugu 大小榆谷 240

13nn19-20, 50n108, 51n109, 73n46, 97n102,

danggu 黨錮 18

101n109, 108n122, 165n89, 177n116,

de Crespigny, Rafe 19, 19n41n43, 21,

183n157, 185n163

22n47, 37n81, 95n99, 112n126, 170, 120,

Bing 并 (Han province) 2, 111, 206, 260

161n84n85, 164n86, 166n 91, 169n99n100

Bodao 薄道 75

170n101, 207n209, 2121n218, 216n5n7,
224n18, 236n44, 247n68, 248n71, 288n146,

Cen Peng 岑彭 181

Deng, Empress Dowager 251, 272; Deng

Chaju 察舉 200

Yu 鄧禹 181-182, 252; Deng Zhi 251-252,

Chanyu 單于 54, 55, 80, 84, 87, 100, 125,

271-273, 275

133, 166n91, 233n40

348

Dependent State (Shuguo 屬國) 96, 96n99,

Fuli camp 扶黎營 290

97, 104, 109, 111

Fufeng 扶風 247, 284-285

Di Cosmo, Nicolas 37n81, 54n1, 64n20,

Flying General (Fei Jiangjun 飛將軍) 128,

65n21n22, 66n27n28, 67n31, 68n35,

132, 145

76n54n57, 78n59, 79n62, 190n169, 222,

Fu Jiezi 傅介子 122, 126, 140

222n15n16, 224n17, 228n26, 240n51,

Fu Jun 傅俊 181

288n146

Fu Xie 傅燮 137-138, 141, 278, 282,

Dianlian 滇零 252, 254, 285

301-303

Didao 狄道 75
Didao 邸道 75

Gai Xun 蓋勳 138, 141, 143, 204-205, 211

Dong Zhuo 董卓 1, 3, 4, 5, 23, 41, 49, 106,

Gai Yan 蓋延 182

107-108, 137-139, 211, 235, 260, 277, 293,

Gan Yanshou 甘延壽 122, 124

296, 298-300, 303, 308, 310

Gangu 甘谷, 267 G

Donghai 東海 101, 149

Gansu 甘肅, province 31, 33, 39-41, 58,

Dou Rong 竇融 102-105, 103n115, 134,

60-61, 65, 67-68, 70, 218-219, 252, 267

182-183

General of Chariots and Cavalry (Juji

Du Du 杜篤 186

jiangjun 車騎將軍) 251

Du Jigong 杜季貢 285

General of Infantry (Caiguan Jiangjun 材官

Du Mao 杜茂 181

將軍)132

Du Qi 杜琦 285

General of Light Chariots (Qingju Jiangjun

Duan Jiong 段熲 113-115,136, 141-143,

輕車將軍)128

207-209, 257-259, 263-264, 276, 294-296

General of the Genetlemen of the

Duliao camp 度遼營 290

Household (Zhonglang Jiang 中郎將) 200

Dushi fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要 50, 304,

General of the Rear (Hou Jiangjun 後將軍)

304n2

129
General of the Right (You Jiangjun 右將

Ebrey, Patricia Buckley 9n10, 14, 14n24n25,

軍) 130

51n109

General of the Strong Crossbow (Qiangnu

Excellency over the Masses (Situ 司徒) 278

Jiangjun 強弩將軍) 124
General of the Van (Qian Jiangjun 前將軍)

Fan Ye 范曄 50, 216, 220-224, 230, 233, 259

199

Fan Zhun 樊準 271

General of Towered Warship (Louchuan

Feng Yi 馮異 181

Jiangjun 樓船將軍) 172

Fengsu tongyi 風俗通義 50, 224, 230, 291

General who Conquers the West (Zhengxi

349

jiangjun 征西將軍) 255

Hanbei jishi 漢碑集釋 51, 151n69,

General who Crushes the Qiang (Po Qiang

152n70,153n72, 154n74, 261n96n97

Jiangjun 破羌將軍) 130, 259

Hangu 函谷 Pass 81, 121, 173

Geng Chun 耿純 182

Hanshu 漢書 50, 62, 76, 90, 96, 101,

Geng Yan 耿弇 181

119,120, 122-124, 132, 143, 148-150, 152,

Goi Naohiro 五井直弘 9n9, 12

220,237

Gongsun Ao 公孫敖 132

Hanzhong 漢中 53

Gongsun He 公孫賀 122, 125-126, 140

Hartwell, Robert 43, 43n98

Gongsun Hunye 公孫昆邪 125

haozu 豪族 9, 10n9; haozu neizheng 豪族

gōzoku 豪族 9, 10n

內爭 19

Gōzoku kyōdōtai 豪族共同体 12

Hedong 河東 134, 154, 247, 253

Gōzoku rengō seiken 豪族連合政権 11

Heguan 河關 276

Grand Commandant (Taiwei 太尉) 209, 273

Henei 河內 176, 253-254

Great Proscriptions 18-19, 161n84

Hetao 河套 78

Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹 304, 304n2

Hexi Corridor 39-41, 54-55, 61, 64, 66-67,

Gudao 故道 75

84, 134, 163, 168, 183, 256

Guandong 關東 82, 85, 92-94, 121, 123, 143,

Hongnong 弘農 114, 210-211

147, 172, 174-179, 183, 186, 193, 202-203,

Hou Hanshu 後漢書 50, 90, 108, 123,

206, 209-210, 235, 272, 275, 278, 279, 303

154-155, 165, 216, 220, 259-260

Guanzhong 關中 80-82, 112, 162, 171-180,

Hou Ying 侯應 241

184, 186, 247, 252-253, 256, 258, 262,

Huang River (Huangshui 湟水) 63, 67;

270-272, 284-285

Huangzhong 湟中 2, 252, 255, 277;

Guangwu 光武, emperor 1, 7, 10, 11, 13, 103,

Huangzhong Yicong Hu 湟中義從胡 277

134, 154-155, 165, 168, 180-183, 197, 208,

Huangfu Gui 皇甫規 113, 135, 137, 141,

228, 271, 287-289

257, 267-268, 277, 302-303

Guanxi 關西 81, 121-123

Huangfu Song 皇甫嵩 137-138, 207, 276

Guangzhi 廣至 137

302-303

Guannei 關內 80

Huo Guang 霍光 127-128

Guo Si 郭汜 299

Huo Qubing 霍去病 84, 193n175

Guo Xiang 郭襄 249
Jia Fu 賈復 181
Han Guan 漢官 291

Jia Juanzhi 賈捐之 280

Han Sui 韓遂 277, 298-300

Jijiu pian 急就篇 50, 119, 120n9

Jian Tan 堅鐔 181

350

Jin Fagen 金發根 210, 210n217, 215n3

Liang Tong 梁統 134, 141, 153-154

Jin Midi 金日磾 128

Liangzhou ren 涼州人 299

Jincheng 金城 95-98, 108, 110-111, 129,

Liangzhou sanming 涼州三明 114

144, 149-152, 155, 220, 239, 243, 246-247,

Lingju 令居 77, 129, 152

251, 253, 255, 262, 265, 270-271, 277, 283,

Lintao 臨洮 77-78, 138, 238

285

Liujun liangjiazi 六郡良家子 83, 121,

Jing Dan 景丹 182

125, 129, 138, 140, 142-143, 152, 157, 174,

Jing River 70

191-192, 212, 303

Jiubian 救邊 214

Liyi 驪邑 75

Jiuquan 酒泉 77, 89,

Loewe, Michael 6n3, 37n81, 40n91, 64n20,

Jukyō kokka 儒教国家 14, 16

85n75, 91, 96n101, 119n7, 125n16,

Junguo zhi 郡國志 108

126n19, 139n47, 148n60, 165n87, 190n169,

Juyan 居延 40, 139n47, 243

288n146
Longxi 隴西 53, 74-75, 78-80, 82-85,

Kayue 卡約 67, 72n44, 219

95-98, 108, 110-111, 120-122, 127, 130-131

Kandai sekkoku shūsei 漢代石刻集成 51,

133, 138, 143, 145, 146-147, 150-151, 154,

151n69, 152n70,153n72, 154n74, 261n96n97

158, 238-239, 247, 249, 251, 253, 255, 257,

Kodai teikoku hōkai ron 古代帝国崩壊論 17

262, 264-265, 283, 285

Kojima Shigetoshi 小嶋茂稔 8n6, 12

Lu Fang 盧芳 102, 104-105

Kou Xun 寇恂 181

Lu Jia 陸賈 193-194

Kuaiji 會稽 147, 147n57

Luoyang 洛陽 3, 71, 162, 179, 183-186,
162, 179, 183-186, 272

Lattimore, Owen 28-29, 29n61n62, 38, 38n86
Lewis, Mark Edward 8n8, 48n106, 190n169,

Ma Chao 馬超 298

289, 289n148

Ma Cheng 馬成 181

Li Cai 李蔡 122, 127

Ma Teng 馬騰 298, 300

Li Guang 李廣 122, 127, 132, 145, 238

Ma Wu 馬武 182

Li Jue 李傕 299

Ma Xian 馬賢 255, 263, 267, 285

Li Ling 李陵 132-133, 158

Ma Yuan 馬援 182n155, 256, 248, 270-271

Li Tong 李通 182

Majiayao 馬家窰 66, 68

Li Wenhou 李文侯 277

Meng Tain 蒙恬 78

Li Xi 李息 132

Meiyang 美陽 284

Li Xiu 李脩 273-275

Mianzhu 綿諸 75

Liang Qin 梁慬 135-141

Militarization 46-49, 118, 146, 189-191,

351

287-288, 311

Regional Commissioner (Zhou mu 州牧)
174

Nanhai 南海 (Han commandery) 102

Ren Guang 任光 181

Nanyang 南陽 176, 209-210

Ren Shang 任尚 252-253, 261

Neishi 內史 74, 74n50

Rikuchō kizokusei shakai 六朝貴族制社会

Nishijima Sadao 西嶋定生 8n8, 190,

20

190n169

Rongdao 戎道 75
Runan 汝南 209

Ordos 78-79, 84-87, 92, 94

Rusheng 儒生 195

Pang Can 龐參 271-273

San miao 三苗 220, 222-223

Pei Tong 邳彤 182

Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊 128

Peripheralization 156, 159, 307

Sanguozhi 三國志 50

Pifa 披髮 225; Pifa zuoren 被髮左衽 228,

Sanhu fa 三互法 281

229n29, 230

Shandong (modern province) 29

Poqiang 破羌, county 152-153, 270

Shandong 山東 (Han geographical

Protector General of the Western Regions

concept) 2, 29, 82, 121-123, 173-174,

(Xiyu Duhu 西域都護) 125, 130, 133, 165

174n109
Shang 上 commandery 74, 79-80, 82, 120-

Qianfu lun 潛夫論 50, 215

122, 147-148, 221, 247, 254, 284-285

Qiang 羌 2, 21, 45, 48, 52, 63, 68, 89, 90, 95,

Shangguan Jie 上官桀 122, 128, 140

100-102, 104, 105, 109, 112, 113-115, 119,

Shanggui 上邽 75, 122, 128-129, 133,

122, 124, 129-131, 135-136, 138, 140, 148,

151-152

152-155, 167-168, 171, 214- 286, 290-291,

Shaofu 少府 151

294-299, 301, 304

Shentu Jia 申屠嘉 191

Qiangzhong 羌中 244, 244n62

Shibian 實邊 216

Qijia 齊家 66-68,

Shiji 史記 49, 71, 74, 89-90, 133n36, 220,

Qimen 期門 121, 125, 128, 140

222, 237

Quan Rong 犬戎 69, 71

Shusun Tong 叔孫通 193-194
Si Sangong shan bei 祀三公山碑 261

Ranks of merit 189-192, 287, 287n145

Siba 四垻 67

Recommendation System 200-201, 203-204,

Sima Qian 司馬遷 49, 55n4, 133n36, 222

206, 209, 212

Sima Tan 司馬談 49

Siwa 寺窪 67, 70, 219

Wei Qing 衛青 84, 128, 192, 192n175

352

Sixiong 四凶 220

Western Regions 37, 39, 45, 76-77, 82, 87

Skinner, G. William 41-42, 41n93n94, 44

89-90, 106-107, 119, 126, 128, 130-131,

Song Xiao 宋梟 204

133-135, 162-171, 243, 250-251, 295

State-sanctioned migration 145, 147, 149

Witchcraft (Wugu 巫蠱) 127, 132, 150
Wu Han 吳漢 181

Taishan 泰山 149, 175

Wuhuan 烏桓 21, 135-136

Taiyuan 太原 210

Wusun 烏孫 87-88, 130-131, 134, 148

Three Brilliants of Liang province 113, 135,

Wuyi Yuanjian 無弋爰劍 221, 223-224

142, 207, 257
Tianshui 天水 82, 95, 97, 103, 108, 110, 120,

Xianbei 鮮卑 21, 171

121, 128, 133, 145, 239, 247

Xianglin camp 象林營 290

Turner, Frederick Jackson 27n55, 33, 33n71,

Xiangwu 襄武 122, 130

40

Xiao He 蕭何 195
Xihai 西海 101-102, 244-245

Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi 宇都宮淸吉 11

Xihe 西河 82, 85, 120-122, 147-148, 247
Xindian 辛店 67, 72n44, 219

Wan Xiu 萬脩 182

Xin Qingji 辛慶忌 131, 140

Wang Ba 王霸 181

Xin Tang 辛湯 130

Wang Chang 王常 182

Xin Wuxian 辛武賢 122, 130-131

Wang Fu 王符 214, 214n2, 215, 216, 266,

Xiongnu 匈奴 2, 21, 45, 53-55, 62, 118,

280-282, 291

125-127, 129, 132-133, 135, 140, 146, 158,

Wang Liang 王梁 181

162-170, 222, 237-239, 241, 243, 254, 273,

Wang Mang 王莽 6n3, 7, 7n6, 8n7, 100-102,

290-294

106, 131, 134, 160-161, 163, 165, 180, 185,

Xiyu 西域 37, 76; Xiyu duhu 西域都護

196, 244, 246, 270, 289

125

Wang Mingke 王明珂 222n15, 225-226,

Xuanquan 懸泉 244

225n20, 231n36, 244n62

Xu Shen 許慎 231

Wang Wei 王圍 122, 124
Wang Xin 王信 285

Yan Zhong 閻忠 302-303

Watanabe Yoshihiro 渡邉義浩 16, 16n30,

Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞 9, 10, 10n11, 17

203

Yang Pu 楊僕 172

Wei Ao 隗囂 102, 103-105, 103n115,

Yao, Mount 崤山 81, 121

184n158, 246, 271

Yao Qi 銚期 182

Yegu, Mount 射姑山 255, 263

Zheng Tai 鄭泰 1, 4, 120, 277, 293, 296

353

Yellow Turbans 20, 21n46, 138, 264, 276,

Zhizhi 郅支, Chanyu 125, 125n16

278, 302

Zhu You 朱佑 181

Yiqu 義渠 74-75, 122, 125-126, 132, 241;

Zhuo Mao 卓茂 182

Yiqu Anguo 義渠安國 241-242

Zhuya 珠崖 281

Yingchuan 潁川 175, 209

Zuoren zhi lu 左衽之虜 278-279

Ying Shao 應劭 224, 230-231, 233, 291-293

Zuo Zhuan 左傳 292, 292n153

Yong camp 雍營 290
Yoshikawa Mitsuo 吉川美都雄 11
Yu Xu 虞詡 123, 273-276, 282, 285-286, 301
Yuandao 獂道 75
Yuanquan 淵泉 113, 136
Yudao 予道 75
Yuezhi 月氏 54-55, 87-88, 163
Yulin 羽林 121, 125, 128-129, 138, 140
Yumen 玉門, pass 167
Yuntai 雲臺 181
Yuyang camp 漁陽營 290
Yuzhi 郁郅 122, 124, 132
Zang Gong 臧宮 182
Zeitgeist 159, 161, 287
Zhai Zun 祭遵 181
Zhang Huan 張奐 113-115, 136, 138, 141,
143, 156-157, 207-211, 257, 267-268
Zhang Qian 張騫 53-55, 77, 86-89
Zhang Wen 張溫 277
Zhangye 張掖 89, 90-91, 95-97,102, 108,
110, 131, 144, 149-150, 239, 283
Zhangye shuguo duwei 張掖屬國都尉 105
Zhao Kuan 趙寬 151-152, 261-262
Zhao Yi 趙翼 15

